JPM's Head Quant Explains Who Unleashed The S&P Rally, And What May Happen Next
Submitted by Tyler D.
03/06/2016 16:43 -0500
Yesterday, when reading the latest note by JPM's "Gandalf" head quant Marko Kolanovic, we noted something strange: for the first time we observed a JPM quant not only commenting on such sensitive topics as social fairness, but daring to challenge the oligarch orthodoxy implying that Buffett is wrong that "the babies being born in America today are the luckiest crop in history."
This is what he said:
While we do not take either a glass half-full or glass half-empty view on the current state of US economy, there are good reasons to believe that ‘the luckiest generation in history’ statement is overly optimistic. US primary results show a very strong lead for D. Trump in the Republican Party, and a surprisingly good showing for B. Sanders. We believe this indicates that a significant part of the electorate disapproves of the current political establishment and feels left behind by the new economy (e.g. voters may not agree with W. Buffet that an average upper-middle class American today has a better living standard as compared to John D. Rockefeller Sr.).
Since the opinion of Kolanovic's boss Jamie Dimon - if only that for public purposes - is largely a carbon copy of Buffett's, we hope this rare statement of truth from a banker does not cost Kolanovic his job, especially since his uncanny insight and abilities to time market inflection points have made him almost as invaluable to stock pickers as Gartman (the latter, by batting a solid 0.000, is arguably the most irreplaceable voice on Wall Street today).
Insight such as this, on who is buying and selling this bear market rally:
Since mid-February, the S&P 500 has staged a meaningful rebound. Similar to the market rally in October 2015, systematic strategies had an important role in both the January selloff (here) and February rally (Figure 1).
Short term equity momentum (1-month) turned positive around the 1930 level and 6m momentum turned positive a few days ago. This would have resulted in CTAs covering most of their short equity exposure and inflows in $50-70bn (also confirmed by the equity beta of CTA benchmarks). The market moving higher also changed the index option (gamma) imbalance and resulted in daily hedging flow that suppressed realized volatility. Lower realized volatility in turn led to some (albeit smaller) equity inflows into Volatility Targeting strategies (~$10bn) and Risk Parity strategies ~$10-$20 bn. All In all, over the past 2 weeks, equity inflows from systematic strategies totaled around $80-$100bn. Taking into account the low liquidity (S&P 500 futures market depth) and assuming that total equity market depth is ~4 times that of futures (including stocks, ETFs, and options), we estimate that more than half of the market rally in the second half of February was driven by these systematic inflows. Another likely significant driver is the rally in oil prices over the past 2 weeks.
... and that, as we showed, and as UBS confirmed last Thursday, has been entirely a function of an epic short covering squeeze.
So now that we know who drove the rally, here - according to Kolanovic - is what happens next:
What is the fate of this market rally? In terms of technical flows, more inflows would come if 3M and 12M momentum turn positive, which would happen at ~2025 and ~2075, respectively (the precise level depends on the timing of potential moves). If volatility stays subdued, volatility-managed strategies could also increase equity exposure. However, equity momentum is also vulnerable to the downside and a move lower could be accelerated by 6M and 1M momentum unraveling at ~1950 and ~1900, respectively. From the perspective of systematic strategies, downside and upside risks are balanced. However, equity fundamentals remain a headwind. In our recent strategy note, we showed that historically, periods of consecutive quarterly EPS contractions are often followed by (or coincide with) economic recessions (~80% of the time over the past ~120 years). EPS recoveries that follow 2 consecutive EPS contractions (~20% of times) were typically triggered by some form of stimulus (fiscal, monetary or exogenous). We expect market volatility to stay elevated and investors to remain focused on macro developments such as the Fed’s rates path, developments in China, and releases of US Macro data. Elevated volatility and EPS downside revisions will provide a headwind for the S&P 500 to move significantly higher (via multiple expansion). While investors need to have equity exposure, we think there are better opportunities in Value stocks, International and EM equities (as compared to broad S&P 500 exposure)
Which probably also explains why late last week JPM's head strategists went underweight stocks last week "for the first time this cycle", while urging clients to buy gold.
The Unintended Consequences Of Greenspan's "Frankenstein" Markets
03/06/2016 18:45 -0500
Submitted by Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk
It is common knowledge by now that Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan oversaw, enabled and approved of, a major transition in the US economy. His infamous “Greenspan-put” in which his actions at the central bank would be driven, if not dictated, by the whims of financial markets, clearly led to higher asset prices. Investors obviously picked up on the strong bias in the Greenspan-Fed’s conduct of monetary policy as they slashed rates at the tiniest hiccup in financial markets, and kept them at low levels for much longer than what would be considered prudent by former administrations. Following markets on the escalator up and taking the elevator down together set a precedent that created a Frankenstein monster, which socialised losses through the printing press while privatizing profits. Such a system was and still is unsustainable as it more or less ensures valuations decouple from underlying fundamentals.
The monetary system in place since the gold-exchange standard that emerged from the rubble of WWI clearly favours inflation over deflation, so we should expect values expressed in money to have an upward trend imbedded in them. However, a stable system would see nominal valuations rise more or less in tandem. In other words, we would expect a balanced sustainable system to see the price of apples, S&P500, cars, commodities and GDP grow more or less at the same pace.
Note, we are not saying certain markets will never experience idiosyncratic price movements due to their own peculiarities as driven by shifts in supply or demand. On the contrary, shifts in relative prices are the one thing that make a capitalistic system stable over the long run. What we are saying though is that the upward trend in prices is due to a diminution of the value of money per se ,driven by the inherent inflationary bias in monetary policy execution. With stable money, relative prices would change, but not the overall price level. This is important, as any comparative analysis of the pre-Greenspan era versus recent past must take into account the fact that prices do rise, relentlessly. We must thus examine financial asset valuations in relation to other markets to understand what the Greenspan put mean.
One way to do that is to look at equity values relative to GDP. As the chart clearly shows, right after Greenspan takes charge of the Federal Reserve equity valuations move to a completely new paradigm. Monetary policy implementation completely changed under Greenspan’s watch.
Removing uncertainty about the future course of interest rates obviously created a herd mentality among investors. Why would anyone take a contrarian position when the central bank more or less told the public what the Fed would do? Do not fight the Fed emerged as the most profitable market mantra. What used to be extreme overvaluations in the pre-Greenspan era became the exact opposite under his watch. It is almost as Fischer’s unfortunate 1929 “stocks have reached a permanently high plateau“-prediction finally came true. Reversion to mean though, require a 50 per cent drop in equity values. A staggering 90 per cent drop is necessary to compensate for the current extreme over-valuation through an undershoot from the pre-Greenspan mean.
Non Fin Cap to GDP
A better way at looking at equity valuations, which does not entail a flawed GDP concept, is to compare it with other asset classes. Our next chart depict US farmland and residential real estate compared to the S&P 500. The idea is that these all reflect somewhat the productive capacity of society and should therefore yield more or less the same. And throughout history they did. While they clearly diverged now and then, such as the equity boom of the 1960s, farmland bubble in the 1970s and housing in the 2000s, the massive divergence in equity valuations starting with Greenspan’s reigns stands out.sp vs agri
And this is not because farmand productivity suddenly fell. On the contrary, from the 1940s output per acre has steadily risen. This is central bankers herding investors into stocks by altering the risk/reward balance. output in agri sector
As a side note, with the latest bout of monetary madness farmland prices has indeed reached a new bubble; a bubble so severe that it makes the folly of the 1970s look like good old fashioned mid-western prudence. Turns out there were some unintended consequences of printing trillions of currency units after all.Agri without SP500
As we have shown here before, the S&P500 is extremely dependent on what happens around FOMC days.
S&P with and without FOMC
Excluding trading on the day of and after an FOMC decision shaves more than 40 per cent off the index.