por admin » Mar Nov 16, 2010 11:01 pm
El verdadero peligro para el Euro
Forzar a Ireland a aceptar un rescate no salvara al euro
Los ministros de finanzas estan en Bruselas tratando de convencer a Ireland de que acepte el rescate del fondo de estabilizacion establecido despues de la crisis de Grecia. El tema, repetido en todas partes en Europa esta semana, ha sido que es necesario "estabilizar a los mercados" y prevenir el "contagio"
Pero el problema de euro no es el "contagio." Es la solvencia. Rescatar a Ireland no hace mas probable que Portugal o Espania o hasta Francia paguen sus deudas en el futuro. Y rescatar a los bondholders de Dublin hace nada por mejorar la solvencia de otro gobierno Europe. Al margen de que podria empeorar sus problemas, ya que cada uno de los paises tendria que contribuir al costo del rescate.
La pregunta verdadera con respecto a Ireland es si a largo plazo los compromisos de Dublin de recapitalizar a su banca sera demasiado para las finanzas de ese pais y si podran pagar sus deudas mas adelante. Obtener un prestamo de Brussels no hace nada para contestar esa pregunta. Solamente demoraria el momento en que Dublin tenga que pagar sus deudas a Brussels. Tampoco revela nada acerca de la capacidad de Lisbon de que su politica fiscal es sostenible.
Por el momento, Dublin no necesita emitir deuda. El 8% de los yields 10 anios en el mercado secundario, no reflejan todavia lo que Ireland esta pagando por su deuda por ahora.
Pero esos yields reflejan el valor del mercado deprimido de la deuda Irlandesa, las cuales golpearian duramente los balances de los bancos europeos que tienen la deuda cuando hagan el mark to market. El rescate propuesto, entonces, seria visto como un rescate para beneficiar a los que le han prestado a Ireland" los bancos en Alemania y en los demas paises.
El salvar a los acreedores de perdidas es la definicion del moral hazard, no importa lo gastada que este la frase. Y si Brussels no tiene cuidado, podria encontrarse en una situacion analoga a la de Dublin ahora.
Dublin se encuentra en esta crisis porque en la cumbre de la crisis en Setiembre del 2008, el gobierno Irlandes en su infinita sabiduria garantizo la deuda de los bancos mas grandes del pais - no solo a sus ahorristas, si no a los senior y subordinados tenedores de bonos. Eso parece lo mas alto de la estupidez de la EU el ofrecer una garantia similar, aunque sea por implicacion, a los tenedores de toda la deuda soberana de la zona euro.
En esencia, hizo eso el Mayo pasado cuando formo el fondo de estabilizacion despues del rescate a Grecia de 750 billones de euros. Esto se suponia que era para calmar a los mercados y para mantener los prestamos abiertos a los gobiernos. Pero esta conduta de los bonos Irlandeses y Portugueses indican claramente, que no funciono, porque no hizo nada para solucionar el excesivo gasto y el poco crecimiento de las economias que es el centro del problema de la deuda Europea.
Ireland, por lo menos, esta tomando el problema del gasto excesivo seriamente. Estarian en mejor forma si no hubieran garantizado la deuda. Repetir los errores de Ireland a nivel del continente no salvara al euro, y podria herirlo. Esta semana Angela Merkel dijo que si el "euro cae, europa cae." pero el euro es una moneda de una union, no de una deuda unida - por lo menos hasta el mes de Mayo.
Mrs.Merkel lo tiene de cabeza. Si la zona euro, en violacion al tratado que lo creo, efectivamente asume la deuda de todos sus miembros, le haria mas danio a la credibilidad de la moneda del bloque que a un corte de pelo a sus acreedores. Si Ireland, como Grecia, no puede pagar sus deudas, necesita restructurarlas, y cuanto antes mejor.
The Real Euro Danger
Forcing Ireland to accept a bailout won't save the currency
Europe's finance ministers are in Brussels, trying to convince Ireland to accept a bailout from the stabilization fund established in the wake of last spring's crisis in Greece. The conventional wisdom, repeated everywhere in Europe this week, is that this is necessary to "stabilize the markets" and prevent "contagion."
But the euro zone's main problem is not "contagion." It's solvency. Bailing out Ireland does not make it more likely that Portugal or Spain or even France will be more likely to pay their bills going forward. And bailing out Dublin's bondholders does nothing to improve the solvency of any other European capital. On the margin it could make their problems worse, since each would have to contribute to the cost of the bailout.
The vital question with respect to Ireland is whether in the long run Dublin's commitment to recapitalizing its banks will overwhelm the government's capacity to repay its debts as they come due. Getting a loan from Brussels does nothing to address that question. It will merely put off the asking of it until some future date when the moment arrives for Dublin to pay its debts to Brussels. Nor will it reveal anything about whether Lisbon's fiscal path is sustainable.
For the moment, Dublin does not need to tap the debt markets. The scary yields of 8% or more on its thinly traded 10-year government debt are prices in the secondary market; they don't reflect what Ireland is actually paying on its debt—for now.
The conventional wisdom, repeated everywhere in Europe this week, is that an Ireland bailout is necessary to stabilize the markets.
.But those yields do reflect the depressed market value of Irish sovereign debt, which in turn could hit the balance sheets of European banks that hold that debt if they have to mark it to market. The proposed bailout, then, would seem to be intended for the benefit of Ireland's lenders—banks in Germany and elsewhere that hold that debt on their books.
Saving those creditors from taking any haircut is the definition of moral hazard, however quaint that phrase has become. And if Brussels isn't careful, it could find itself in a position analogous to Dublin's now.
Dublin finds itself in this mess because at the height of the panic in September 2008, the Irish government in its infinite wisdom guaranteed the debts of all Ireland's large banks—not just depositors, but senior and subordinated bondholders too. It seems the height of folly for the EU to extend a similar guarantee, even by implication, to the holders of all euro-zone sovereign debt.
In a sense, it did this last May when it set up the €750 billion stability fund after Greece's rescue. This was supposed to calm markets and keep them open to government borrowing. But as the behavior of Irish and Portuguese bonds attests, that didn't work, because it did nothing to address the overspending and lackluster growth at the heart of Europe's debt problem.
Ireland, at least, is taking the overspending problem seriously. It would be in much better shape if not for that open-ended guarantee to bank creditors. Repeating Ireland's mistake on a continental scale won't save the euro, and could harm it. This week, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that "if the euro fails, then Europe fails." But the euro is a currency union, not a debt union—at least it wasn't until last May.
Mrs. Merkel has it backwards. If the euro zone, in violation of the treaty that created it, effectively assumes the debts of all its members, it would do more damage to the credibility of the currency bloc than a haircut for its lenders. If Ireland, like Greece, cannot pay its debts, it needs to restructure them, and the sooner the better.
Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page 13