por admin » Jue Sep 02, 2010 6:28 pm
Si Saddam se hubiera quedado, el se hubiera reunido con los otros chicos nucleares del club de los chicos malos de Iran y North Korea.
El discurso que dio Obama anunciando el fin de la guerra de Irak fue menos importante que su discurso de hace ocho anios cuando el Senador de Illinios. Era Octubre del 2002 cuando declaro que era una "guerra tonta" en una manifestacion contra la guerra de Irak en la Plaza Federal de Chicago. En ese entonces Obama tenia una vision mas compleja acerca de Irak de la que tiene ahora.
Hoy dia la guerra de Irak se ha reducido a no mas que una larga, sangrienta y honorable pelea entre las tropas Americanas y los varios grupos homicidas jihadist e insurgentes dentro de Irak, una guerra sostenida por G. Bush, D. Cheney y algun asesor neocon primariamente para imponer la democracia a los Irakies.
Creo que se comente un profundo error al confinar el significado de la gerra solamente a las fronteras de Irak. Obama mismo ha hecho la pregunta central en su discurso del 2002: Es que Saddam Hussein es un peligro para sus vecinos o no?
"Dejame aclarar" dijo el entonces Senador Obama. "no sufro de ilusiones acerca de Saddam Hussein... yo no creo que Saddam signifique mayor peligro directo para US.... se le puede contener."
Este es un punto de vista que muchos comparte. El edito del Economista comparte la opinion de Obama de que la guerra fue una guerra tonta. Lo que la guerra hizo fue remover a un dictador del Medio Oriente.
La guerra hizo mucho mas que eso.
Asumamos que la opinion "inteligente" de Obala hubiera prevalecido, y que se hubiera dejado a Saddam en el poder en Irak. Como seria la situacion en estos momentos?
Ellos piensan que las ambiciones nucleares de Saddam podian haber sido contenidas. Pienso que es exactamente lo contrario.
Cuando Obama daba ese discurso anti-Irak, tres eventos significativos no relacionados con Irak ocurrian" Iran y North Korea comenzaban a armarse nuclearmente, y A.Q. Kahn empezaba a actuar.
En Marzo del 2002, Mr. Khan, el notorio Pakistani vendedor de materiales nucleares, movio su produccion de Pakistan a Malaysia.
En Agosto, un grupo exiliado de Iran revelaba la existencia de una fabrica centrifuga en Natanz, Iran.
Un mes despues, la inteligencia Americana concluia que North Korea habia completado "una produccion-escala" de una facilidad centrifuga.
Tambien en el 2002 alQaeda estaba comenzando sus compras de materiales nucleares. En el WSJ esta semana, Jay Salomon describe como dos operativos de North Korea en ese periodo desarrollaron un network para adquirir tecnologia nuclear.
El hubiera empezado nuevamente su programa nuclear.
En el corto plazo, los chicos malos del club nuclear empezaban a actuar en el 2002. Puede alguien seriamente creer que Saddam se hubiera contenido de administra sus camaras de tortura?
Saddam era todo acerca de centrifugas. El fue a la geurra contra Iran en 1980 y contra Kuwait 10 anios despues. Saddam era un jugador, y a partir del 2002 su ambicion era obtener armas nucleares.
La definitiva prueba de la intencion nuclear de Saddam y de armas de destruccion masiva esta en el Duelfer Report. emitido por el Survey Group de Irak en el 2005. Si ese reporte concluyo que Saddam no tenia armas de destruccion masiva. Pero en muchas partes del reporte de 1,000 paginas se mencionaba que la intencion de Saddam era de liberarse de las sancciones de las Naciones Unidas y empezar sus esfuerzos para adquirir armas nucleares y armas de destruccion masiva.
Saddam estaba obsesionado con Iran. Se imaginan el efecto que hubiera tenido el surgimiento de Mahmoud Ahmadinejad publicamente burlandose de los esfuerzos del occidente de detener sus programas nucleares. Ese anio, Nejad rompio con los sellos de las Naciones Unidas en la planta de enriquecimiento de uranio en Isfahan. En North Korea Kim Jong estaba manipulando al mundo civilizado conduciendo pruebas nucleares en el mar de Japon. En un mundo asi, Saddam se hubiera contenido de jugar en la misma liga junto con Iran y Noko? Nosotros hubieramos tenido que contenerlo.
Iran e Irak hubieran simultaneamente incentivado Egipt, Syria, Saudi Arabia y Sudan a entrar en el mercado nuclear. Pakistan e India hubieran incrementado su arsenal nuclear ante las tensiones en lugar de disminuir su arsenal.
Nosotros debemos estar orgullos de nuestra tropas que regresan a sus hogares. Ellos se merecen un monumento. Esa guerra no era solamente para ayudar a Irak. Era acerca de nosotros. La marcha nuclear de los regimenes lunaticos es claro y presente. El sacrificio hecho por US en Irak logro remover a uno de esos locos obsesionado por el armamento nuclear de la mesa y le dio al mundo mas margin para lidiar con los que queda, si es que el liderazo mundial puede detenerlos. No estoy tan seguro.
If Saddam Had Stayed Saddam would have joined the nuclear bad-boys club with Iran and North Korea.
By DANIEL HENNINGER.
From the vantage point of history, Barack Obama's prime-time speech announcing the Iraq war's end is less important than the speech he gave eight years ago as a state senator in Illinois. This was the October 2002 "dumb war" speech to an anti-Iraq war rally in Chicago's Federal Plaza. Back then, Mr. Obama had a more complex view of the stakes in Iraq than he does now.
Today, the Iraq war has been reduced to not much more than a long, bloody and honorable gunfight between U.S. troops and various homicidal jihadists and insurgents inside Iraq, a war sustained by George Bush, Dick Cheney and some neocon advisers mainly to "impose" democracy on the Iraqis.
I think it is a profound mistake to confine the war's significance to the borders of Iraq. Mr. Obama himself raised the central question about Iraq in that 2002 speech: Did Saddam Hussein pose a danger beyond his borders, or not?
"Let me be clear," State Senator Obama told the Federal Plaza crowd, "I suffer no illusions about Saddam Hussein. . . . He has repeatedly thwarted U.N. inspection teams, developed chemical and biological weapons and coveted nuclear capacity. . . . But I also know that Saddam poses no imminent and direct threat to the United States. . . [H]e can be contained."
Daniel Henninger asks what the world look like today if Saddam Hussein had remained in power in Iraq.
.Wonder Land
Listen to Daniel Henninger's podcast.
.This is a widely held view. The Economist's editors this week said Mr. Obama was largely right that Iraq was a dumb war. What the war did, they say, was "rid the Middle East of a bloodstained dictator."
It did a lot more than that.
Let us assume that Mr. Obama's "smarter" view had prevailed, that we had left Saddam in power in Iraq. What would the world look like today?
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.Mr. Obama and others believe that Saddam and his nuclear ambitions could have been contained. I think exactly the opposite was likely.
At the time of Mr. Obama's 2002 antiwar speech, three other significant, non-Iraqi events were occurring: Iran and North Korea were commencing toward a nuclear break-out, and A.Q. Khan was on the move.
In March 2002, Mr. Khan, the notorious Pakistani nuclear materials dealer, moved his production facilities from Pakistan to Malaysia.
In August, an Iranian exile group revealed the existence of a centrifuge factory in Natanz, Iran.
A month later, U.S. intelligence concluded that North Korea had almost completed a "production-scale" centrifuge facility.
It was also believed in 2002 that al Qaeda was shopping for nuclear materials. In The Wall Street Journal this week, Jay Solomon described how two North Korean operatives through this period developed a network to acquire nuclear technologies.
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Associated Press
He would have restarted his nuclear program.
.In short, the nuclear bad boys club was on the move in 2002. Can anyone seriously believe that amidst all this Saddam Hussein would have contented himself with administering his torture chambers? This is fanciful.
Saddam was centrifugal. He moved outward, into war with Iran in 1980 and into Kuwait 10 years later. Saddam was a player, and from 2002 onward the biggest game in his orbit was acquiring nuclear capability.
The definitive account of Saddam's WMD ambitions is the Duelfer Report, issued by the Iraq Survey Group in 2005. Yes, the Duelfer Report concluded that Saddam didn't have active WMD. But at numerous points in the 1,000-page document, it asserted (with quotes from Iraqi politicians and scientists) that Saddam's goal was to free himself of U.N. sanctions and restart his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and other WMD.
The report: "Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq's WMD capability. . . . Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability." The Survey Group described Iraqi plans to develop three long-range ballistic missiles.
Saddam was obsessed with Iran. Imagine the effect on the jolly Iraqi's thinking come 2005 and the rise to stardom of Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, publicly mocking the West's efforts to shut his nuclear program and threatening enemies with annihilation. That year Ahmadinejad broke the U.N. seals at the Isfahan uranium enrichment plant. In North Korea, Kim Jong Il was flouting the civilized world, conducting nuclear-weapon tests and test-firing missiles into the Sea of Japan. In such a world, Saddam would have aspired to play in the same league as Iran and NoKo. Would we have "contained" him?
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran and Saddam Hussein in Iraq simultaneously would have incentivized Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Sudan to enter the nuclear marketplace. Pakistan and India would be increasing their nuke-tinged tensions, not trying as now to ease them.
We ought to be a lot prouder of our troops coming home from Iraq than we are showing this week. They deserve a monument. That war wasn't just about helping Iraq. It was about us. The march across the nuclear threshold by lunatic regimes is a clear and present danger. The sacrifice made by the United States in Iraq took one of these nuclear-obsessed madmen off the table and gave the world more margin to deal with the threat that remains, if the world's leadership is up to it. A big if.