¿Por qué aprender a hacer trading?
por OnTrader •Hace 10 horas
Cualquier persona no tiene el nivel mental e intelectual para especular en los mercados financieros, incluso personas con nivel profesional en el área de la economía, finanzas o negocios internacionales, no se acoplan fácilmente a los retos que trae el trading.
Científicamente está demostrado que los seres humanos, somos individuos que interactúan de una forma emocional ante el dinero, el problema principal para realizar trading es el hecho de ser humanos, ya que las emociones juegan un papel importante.
Todo el mundo debería tratar de aprender trading. Es como aprender a nadar, no sabemos cuando realmente lo necesitemos y de pronto podríamos resultar ser excelentes en eso, es como aprender a cocinar, no sabemos cuándo vamos a necesitar de esa habilidad, o como aprender defensa personal, o como aprender a montar bicicleta al inicio caemos y caemos, luego se convierte en algo natural, la especulación pasa de ser enredada a algo que vemos de forma simple, llegamos con los años a practicarla de forma natural, al igual que una persona toma su carro y de forma natural lo conduce, al inicio la mayoría de personas somos torpes cuando estamos aprendiendo a conducir, en el trading se es torpe al inicio, todo es cuestión de práctica.
La diferencia del trading con otras habilidades, está en que el trading es de las pocas habilidades que nos entrena para captar las oportunidades en los mercados financieros, y de ese modo generar ingresos, el cocinar, el aprender a conducir carro, el aprender defensa personal, o un montón de habilidades que podemos aprender, solo nos genera dinero si creamos un negocio en torno a ello, el trading es una habilidad para generar dinero, tiene ese enfoque, la meta de un chef es cocinar exquisito, la meta de un trader es ser un activo y coleccionar los mejores activos.
No hay carta de presentación
A los mercados no les importa, quien es usted, que ha estudiado, cual es su hoja de vida, de que estrato social es, al mercado no le importa sus estudios, numerosos estudios han demostrado que personas consideradas brillantes son terribles en los mercados. en parte por el exceso de confianza y en parte porque lo más importante en este negocio es el control emocional, no el intelectual. usted es independiente, usted es un cazador en esta selva capitalista.
El trading es meritocracia en su forma más pura. probablemente tener una cuenta bancaria grande puede ayudar al principio, pero no es una condición necesaria, es un segundo plano inútil, quien sabe sabe, quien no puede manejar 100 dòlares, no sabe manejar 1.000.000 de dólares, la diferencia son unos cuantos ceros.
Independencia.
Usted es independiente, no necesita correr el riesgo de toparse con un ‘Chupa sangre financiero’, me refiero a aquellos bancos, corredores de bolsa y fondos de inversión, cuyo fin es aprovecharse de su desconocimiento, para sacar legalmente el dinero de su bolsillo y pasar ese dinero a ellos. Se ahorra mucho dinero pagando comisiones o intereses a corredores de bolsa, bancos o fondos de inversión.
El 100% de las veces el inversionista decide cuanto está dispuesto a perder en función de su rentabilidad esperada. esta libertad no existe en ninguna otra actividad en donde las estimaciones de pérdidas y ganancias dependen de muchas otras variables. no se tiene que lidiar con empleados, clientes, regulaciones, licencias comerciales e impuestos, recursos humanos, y competidores.
Asimismo, la variedad de instrumentos financieros permite prosperar en cualquier clima económico, finalmente, un trader exitoso puede manejar su tiempo con mayor flexibilidad que en cualquier otro exitoso empleo.
Tecnología
Hoy en dìa un trader puede especular desde cualquier parte con acceso a internet, los traders pasamos incognitos, todo se hace con un par de clic, incluso las llamas para comprar/vender ya son poco usadas, desde una tableta, una computadora o un celular inteligente se puede especular, desde 100 dòlares podemos invertir en estos mercados.
El Apalancamiento
Para mí el apalancamiento es magia, un trader se puede apalancar 100 veces o mucho màs, de ese modo se puede generar rentabilidades muy altas, un banco, un corredor de bolsa, un fondo de inversión, difícilmente le puede generar una rentabilidad similar a la que puede generar usted como trader, en este momento existen millones de personas usadas como‘borregos’ por los bancos, por algunos corredores de bolsa, por fondos de inversión e incluso fondos de pensión, personas que solo son importantes como estadísticas, como instrumento para llevar dinero a las arcas de ladrones con cuello blanco.
Entonces el trading es la cura a un chorro de dinero, que está saliendo de su bolsillo, a bolsillos ajenos, no solo a los bolsillos de las instituciones e individuos mencionadas previamente, también el mal gastar por no saber que uso dar al dinero, es una forma de maltratar nuestro dinero, dinero que queda en el comercio local, muchas veces dinero gastado por gastar.
Recuerde, mientras usted deja su dinero quieto en un banco, su banco lo aprovecha para hacer lo que una persona, sin conocimientos en trading sabe hacer….lo invierte y no le da nada de lo ganado, muchos no se dan cuenta.
El trading es un arte, una habilidad, una profesiòn, una cura, el trading es un pasa tiempo, el trading es tener una visiòn de rayos x.
Viernes 20/03/15 Inflacion de Atlanta
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Re: Viernes 20/03/15 Inflacion de Atlanta
por Fenix » Vie Mar 20, 2015 6:34 pm
- Fenix
- Mensajes: 16334
- Registrado: Vie Abr 23, 2010 2:36 am
Re: Viernes 20/03/15 Inflacion de Atlanta
por Fenix » Vie Mar 20, 2015 6:36 pm
6:22 JP Morgan pronostica un recorte de tipos en Hungría de 50 pbs
Los analistas de JP Morgan pronostican que el banco central de Hungría bajará tipos en 50 puntos básicos. No esperan que Hungría alcance el grado de inversión antes de 2016.
La QE de Draghi está avivando el riesgo de burbuja de los bonos
por Carlos Montero •Hace 11 horas
Se supone que el mercado de bonos del gobierno es un lugar tranquilo, desprovisto de las emociones y los sobresaltos que caracterizan la renta variable. Pero ya no. Desde que los bancos centrales comenzaron a comprar bonos soberanos se han convertido tan emocionantes que los inversores han comprado más de 2 billones de euros en bonos con rendimiento negativos, principalmente en Europa.
Incluso en la Depresión de la década de 1930 las tasas de interés nunca cayeron por debajo de cero. ¿Estamos viendo en esta rareza una burbuja en el mercado de bonos?
Algunos economistas sostienen que el bajo nivel actual de los rendimientos se justifica por los fundamentales, sobre todo si estamos ante un estancamiento secular, el ritmo de la innovación se está debilitando, y el déficit de demanda es tal que las tasas cercanas a cero de interés son incapaces de reactivar la economía, comenta John Plender en el Financial Times.
"Otros sugieren que la percepción sobre la magnitud y probabilidad de eventos extremos negativos ha cambiado desde la crisis financiera y los inversores que antes pensaban que una implosión del sistema financiero era un evento que se producía una vez cada 100 años, ahora pueden pensar que se producirá una vez cada 50 o 25 años. Esto proporciona una explicación plausible de por qué los rendimientos cayeron significativamente después de la crisis. Sin embargo, para que esto explique el fenómeno más reciente de los rendimientos negativos, se requeriría que la percepción del riesgo de una implosión financiera ha aumentado enormemente en este tiempo. Como alternativa, el cambio podría explicarse por las preocupaciones sobre el riesgo geopolítico. Pero ninguna de estas ideas parece totalmente convincente.
Una explicación más simple, es que un exceso de ahorro mundial se enfrenta a una escasez de activos seguros y que este desequilibrio entre la oferta y la demanda está siendo exacerbado por las compras de bonos del Banco Central Europeo. Alguien tiene que vender sus bonos para facilitar las compras del BCE por importe de 60 mil millones de euros al mes. Sin embargo, los candidatos obvios tienen pocos incentivos para hacerlo. En el caso de los bancos, los bonos del gobierno se asientan en el balance para satisfacer los requisitos reglamentarios para la liquidez. Cambiarlos por activos de mayor riesgo, lo que en parte busca incentivar la QE del BCE, no tiene ningún sentido para ellos.
Los bonos en manos de los fondos de pensiones son imprescindibles y su venta podría resultar en una cartera con un menor grado de concordancia. En cuanto a las compañías de seguros, también tienen requisitos reglamentarios que satisfacer. Y si reducen sus carteras de bonos existentes sólo pueden reinvertir en rendimientos mucho más bajos o con rendimientos comparables en activos con mayor riesgo. Eso no tiene ningún atractivo.
Eso no es lo que Mario Draghi, presidente del BCE, quiere después de haber tomado la inusual decisión de decirle al mercado que comprará bonos del rendimiento mientras el rendimiento esté por debajo de la tasa de depósito del BCE, que ahora está en el -0,2 por ciento. En otras palabras, se trata de un comprador forzoso. Como en cualquier burbuja, los inversores especulativos ahora invierten con la perspectiva de que habrá alguien que compre más caro. Los bonos más seguros de Europa, los bonos alemanes, liderarán el camino hacia una rentabilidad negativa. Y otros activos menos seguros seguirán ese mismo camino.
Si la esencia de una burbuja es que los precios pierden el contacto con los fundamentales, ese es el camino al que se dirigen los bonos soberanos. Los participantes del mercado reciclarán pagarés del gobierno en manos del banco central sin importar el riesgo relativo. Al mismo tiempo, la búsqueda de rentabilidad inducida por el banco central alcanzará nuevos niveles y creará nuevas distorsiones.
Es extraordinario que a pesar de las muy diferentes políticas monetarias que tienen los EE.UU. y la zona euro, los rendimientos de los bonos en ambos lugares descendieron después del anuncio de la flexibilización cuantitativa (QE) del BCE. Si los rendimientos negativos se extienden a vencimientos más largos en la deuda alemana, el diferencial de rentabilidad entre la deuda estadounidense y alemana provocará un mayor flujo de fondos al mercado americano de bonos. De hecho, el dicho tradicional que señala que los mercados mundiales bailan al son de Wall Street se está revirtiendo. Ahora hay una influencia crítica de los bonos de la zona euro sobre EE.UU. y el resto del mundo.
Todas las burbujas al final estallan. Hasta que eso ocurra Europa ofrece oportunidades de endeudamiento fabulosamente baratas, al menos para las grandes corporaciones. Si no logran traducirse en mayores niveles de inversión de capital, puede que la tesis de estancamiento secular necesite revisarse."
Fuentes: John Plender
Los analistas de JP Morgan pronostican que el banco central de Hungría bajará tipos en 50 puntos básicos. No esperan que Hungría alcance el grado de inversión antes de 2016.
La QE de Draghi está avivando el riesgo de burbuja de los bonos
por Carlos Montero •Hace 11 horas
Se supone que el mercado de bonos del gobierno es un lugar tranquilo, desprovisto de las emociones y los sobresaltos que caracterizan la renta variable. Pero ya no. Desde que los bancos centrales comenzaron a comprar bonos soberanos se han convertido tan emocionantes que los inversores han comprado más de 2 billones de euros en bonos con rendimiento negativos, principalmente en Europa.
Incluso en la Depresión de la década de 1930 las tasas de interés nunca cayeron por debajo de cero. ¿Estamos viendo en esta rareza una burbuja en el mercado de bonos?
Algunos economistas sostienen que el bajo nivel actual de los rendimientos se justifica por los fundamentales, sobre todo si estamos ante un estancamiento secular, el ritmo de la innovación se está debilitando, y el déficit de demanda es tal que las tasas cercanas a cero de interés son incapaces de reactivar la economía, comenta John Plender en el Financial Times.
"Otros sugieren que la percepción sobre la magnitud y probabilidad de eventos extremos negativos ha cambiado desde la crisis financiera y los inversores que antes pensaban que una implosión del sistema financiero era un evento que se producía una vez cada 100 años, ahora pueden pensar que se producirá una vez cada 50 o 25 años. Esto proporciona una explicación plausible de por qué los rendimientos cayeron significativamente después de la crisis. Sin embargo, para que esto explique el fenómeno más reciente de los rendimientos negativos, se requeriría que la percepción del riesgo de una implosión financiera ha aumentado enormemente en este tiempo. Como alternativa, el cambio podría explicarse por las preocupaciones sobre el riesgo geopolítico. Pero ninguna de estas ideas parece totalmente convincente.
Una explicación más simple, es que un exceso de ahorro mundial se enfrenta a una escasez de activos seguros y que este desequilibrio entre la oferta y la demanda está siendo exacerbado por las compras de bonos del Banco Central Europeo. Alguien tiene que vender sus bonos para facilitar las compras del BCE por importe de 60 mil millones de euros al mes. Sin embargo, los candidatos obvios tienen pocos incentivos para hacerlo. En el caso de los bancos, los bonos del gobierno se asientan en el balance para satisfacer los requisitos reglamentarios para la liquidez. Cambiarlos por activos de mayor riesgo, lo que en parte busca incentivar la QE del BCE, no tiene ningún sentido para ellos.
Los bonos en manos de los fondos de pensiones son imprescindibles y su venta podría resultar en una cartera con un menor grado de concordancia. En cuanto a las compañías de seguros, también tienen requisitos reglamentarios que satisfacer. Y si reducen sus carteras de bonos existentes sólo pueden reinvertir en rendimientos mucho más bajos o con rendimientos comparables en activos con mayor riesgo. Eso no tiene ningún atractivo.
Eso no es lo que Mario Draghi, presidente del BCE, quiere después de haber tomado la inusual decisión de decirle al mercado que comprará bonos del rendimiento mientras el rendimiento esté por debajo de la tasa de depósito del BCE, que ahora está en el -0,2 por ciento. En otras palabras, se trata de un comprador forzoso. Como en cualquier burbuja, los inversores especulativos ahora invierten con la perspectiva de que habrá alguien que compre más caro. Los bonos más seguros de Europa, los bonos alemanes, liderarán el camino hacia una rentabilidad negativa. Y otros activos menos seguros seguirán ese mismo camino.
Si la esencia de una burbuja es que los precios pierden el contacto con los fundamentales, ese es el camino al que se dirigen los bonos soberanos. Los participantes del mercado reciclarán pagarés del gobierno en manos del banco central sin importar el riesgo relativo. Al mismo tiempo, la búsqueda de rentabilidad inducida por el banco central alcanzará nuevos niveles y creará nuevas distorsiones.
Es extraordinario que a pesar de las muy diferentes políticas monetarias que tienen los EE.UU. y la zona euro, los rendimientos de los bonos en ambos lugares descendieron después del anuncio de la flexibilización cuantitativa (QE) del BCE. Si los rendimientos negativos se extienden a vencimientos más largos en la deuda alemana, el diferencial de rentabilidad entre la deuda estadounidense y alemana provocará un mayor flujo de fondos al mercado americano de bonos. De hecho, el dicho tradicional que señala que los mercados mundiales bailan al son de Wall Street se está revirtiendo. Ahora hay una influencia crítica de los bonos de la zona euro sobre EE.UU. y el resto del mundo.
Todas las burbujas al final estallan. Hasta que eso ocurra Europa ofrece oportunidades de endeudamiento fabulosamente baratas, al menos para las grandes corporaciones. Si no logran traducirse en mayores niveles de inversión de capital, puede que la tesis de estancamiento secular necesite revisarse."
Fuentes: John Plender
- Fenix
- Mensajes: 16334
- Registrado: Vie Abr 23, 2010 2:36 am
Re: Viernes 20/03/15 Inflacion de Atlanta
por Fenix » Vie Mar 20, 2015 6:39 pm
7:29 ¿Está el S&P 500 caro?
El siguiente gráfico recoge la evolución del PER esperado a 12 meses del S&P 500 con relación a su media de cinco, de diez y de quince años.
Vemos como la lectura actual se sitúa por encima de todas las medias. Ahora cotiza a un PER 16,8 veces beneficio, mientras que las medias de 5 años es de 16x, la de 10 años de 14x y la de 15 años de algo más de 13,5x.
¿Subirá o no la Fed las tasas de interés?
por Inteligencia Financiera Global •Hace 7 horas
No hay espacio económico en el que no se aborde el tema de la posible alza de tasas de interés que la Reserva Federal (Fed), banco central de Estados Unidos, podría efectuar en su reunión de junio próximo. Conviene recordar que desde diciembre de 2008, la Fed bajó su rango objetivo para la tasa de fondos federales de 0 a 0.25% –un mínimo histórico, y se puso a inyectar dólares para tratar de estimular el crecimiento a través de la compra de activos.
Así las cosas, la economía estadounidense logró maquillarse y lucir mejor en apariencia, y países como México, se beneficiaron de flujos de capital que no dejaban de llegarnos. Pero claro, la expectativa comenzó a cambiar el año pasado cuando la Fed, contuvo la inyección de dinero y lo que se espera, es que las tasas comiencen a subir.
Con motores como Japón, China y Europa en serios apuros y con la imprenta de dinero en marcha, los capitales han comenzando a regresar al dólar, que todavía es visto como refugio. Esa es la razón principal de que haya subido tanto y de que economías emergentes como la mexicana estén padeciendo las consecuencias.
Sin embargo, podría venir un respiro, porque a diferencia de la mayoría de analistas, en este espacio hemos sostenido desde hace un año que la Fed no subirá las tasas, no porque no quiera, sino porque de hacerlo, provocaría una auténtica estampida de capitales hacia el dólar, tumbaría las bolsas y el mercado de bonos, y entonces sí, entraríamos de golpe a una recesión global.
Este analista consultó con tres expertos internacionales al respecto: Jim Rogers, el gurú de las materias primas; Jim Rickards, autor del best seller “Currency Wars” y al Prof. Antal Fékete, fundador de la Nueva Escuela Austríaca de Economía (NASOE por sus siglas en inglés).
En exclusiva para Inteligencia Financiera Global, Rogers opinó que aunque no tiene idea de si la Fed subirá o no las tasas, en realidad “casi siempre sigue al mercado, a pesar de la sabiduría convencional que cree que son ellos los que están a cargo”. De ocurrir, asegura, “la mayoría de los mercados emergentes se vendrían abajo primero, pero subirían después”. Para protegerse de esa eventualidad, recomendó “aprender de coberturas como la venta ‘en corto’ y/o sobre otras divisas y/o activos reales, como la agricultura.”
Por su parte, Rickards considera que la Fed es probable que no suba tasas este año, porque al abandonar la política de orientación hacia adelante, “sólo les quedan los datos como guía para su política. Los datos que vienen son muy débiles y la inflación está cayendo. El resultado será que no haya alzas de tipos”. Eso sí, aclara que si sucediera, quien esté endeudado en dólares tendría problemas porque la divisa se fortalecería, sobre todo en mercados en desarrollo como México. Rickards recomendó comprar bonos del Tesoro a 10 años como protección para esa contingencia, pues si la Fed actúa, “empeoraría la deflación y esos bonos se desempeñarían aún mejor”.
Antal Fékete fue mucho más profundo y explícito: Janet Yellen “insinuó que un aumento de tasas no está considerado. Es ‘flexibilización cuantitativa’ (QE) por los siglos de los siglos, amén.” Para el profesor, la Fed ha perdido todo margen de maniobra que pudo haber tenido alguna vez, “Janet está moviendo una palanca de velocidades que no está conectada a la transmisión.” Aún así, opinó que si escalara los tipos, las consecuencias serían terribles y rompería la columna vertebral de la economía, que colapsaría.
Fékete advirtió que la única manera de elevar las tasas de interés sería eliminando la compra de bonos –recordemos que aunque ya terminó oficialmente el QE, la Fed mantiene las compras de reinversión para mantener expandida su hoja de balance–, lo que tiraría por la borda sus precios. De este modo “el capital del sistema sería aniquilado y la economía se hundiría en depresión. El oro es el único refugio bajo esas circunstancias”. Por lo anterior, para el fundador de la NASOE, es más probable que la Fed mantenga el curso actual, haciendo libre de riesgos la especulación en el mercado de bonos, que a la larga, también nos dirige hacia la deflación y la depresión.
Por eso, en un ambiente en que la economía está condenada, insistió en que “el oro es una de las dos formas de capital que pueden sobrevivir la destrucción de capital, la otra, es la plata.” Su recomendación para México y otras economías emergentes es que incentiven a que la gente compre estos “seguros” como escudo contra la depresión.
En suma, aunque la mayoría de analistas espera el alza de tasas en junio, lo cierto es que la Fed no tiene mucho margen de maniobra. Los futuros de la tasa de fondos federales anticipan que la subida podría llegar en septiembre, pero como vemos, la realidad es que la Fed no tiene vías de escape que no impliquen un colapso del sistema. Si espera, malo, si desespera, peor.
La Fed entonces está ante el dilema de si saltar al precipicio o esperar, caminando a la orilla del barranco hasta que también se acabe el camino. Si opta por esta segunda vía, llegará el respiro al que nos hemos referido para divisas y mercados sobre todo de países como México. Será entonces la última oportunidad de preparase para lo que vendrá, porque, como podrá entenderse, una nueva crisis ya no se puede evitar.
El siguiente gráfico recoge la evolución del PER esperado a 12 meses del S&P 500 con relación a su media de cinco, de diez y de quince años.
Vemos como la lectura actual se sitúa por encima de todas las medias. Ahora cotiza a un PER 16,8 veces beneficio, mientras que las medias de 5 años es de 16x, la de 10 años de 14x y la de 15 años de algo más de 13,5x.
¿Subirá o no la Fed las tasas de interés?
por Inteligencia Financiera Global •Hace 7 horas
No hay espacio económico en el que no se aborde el tema de la posible alza de tasas de interés que la Reserva Federal (Fed), banco central de Estados Unidos, podría efectuar en su reunión de junio próximo. Conviene recordar que desde diciembre de 2008, la Fed bajó su rango objetivo para la tasa de fondos federales de 0 a 0.25% –un mínimo histórico, y se puso a inyectar dólares para tratar de estimular el crecimiento a través de la compra de activos.
Así las cosas, la economía estadounidense logró maquillarse y lucir mejor en apariencia, y países como México, se beneficiaron de flujos de capital que no dejaban de llegarnos. Pero claro, la expectativa comenzó a cambiar el año pasado cuando la Fed, contuvo la inyección de dinero y lo que se espera, es que las tasas comiencen a subir.
Con motores como Japón, China y Europa en serios apuros y con la imprenta de dinero en marcha, los capitales han comenzando a regresar al dólar, que todavía es visto como refugio. Esa es la razón principal de que haya subido tanto y de que economías emergentes como la mexicana estén padeciendo las consecuencias.
Sin embargo, podría venir un respiro, porque a diferencia de la mayoría de analistas, en este espacio hemos sostenido desde hace un año que la Fed no subirá las tasas, no porque no quiera, sino porque de hacerlo, provocaría una auténtica estampida de capitales hacia el dólar, tumbaría las bolsas y el mercado de bonos, y entonces sí, entraríamos de golpe a una recesión global.
Este analista consultó con tres expertos internacionales al respecto: Jim Rogers, el gurú de las materias primas; Jim Rickards, autor del best seller “Currency Wars” y al Prof. Antal Fékete, fundador de la Nueva Escuela Austríaca de Economía (NASOE por sus siglas en inglés).
En exclusiva para Inteligencia Financiera Global, Rogers opinó que aunque no tiene idea de si la Fed subirá o no las tasas, en realidad “casi siempre sigue al mercado, a pesar de la sabiduría convencional que cree que son ellos los que están a cargo”. De ocurrir, asegura, “la mayoría de los mercados emergentes se vendrían abajo primero, pero subirían después”. Para protegerse de esa eventualidad, recomendó “aprender de coberturas como la venta ‘en corto’ y/o sobre otras divisas y/o activos reales, como la agricultura.”
Por su parte, Rickards considera que la Fed es probable que no suba tasas este año, porque al abandonar la política de orientación hacia adelante, “sólo les quedan los datos como guía para su política. Los datos que vienen son muy débiles y la inflación está cayendo. El resultado será que no haya alzas de tipos”. Eso sí, aclara que si sucediera, quien esté endeudado en dólares tendría problemas porque la divisa se fortalecería, sobre todo en mercados en desarrollo como México. Rickards recomendó comprar bonos del Tesoro a 10 años como protección para esa contingencia, pues si la Fed actúa, “empeoraría la deflación y esos bonos se desempeñarían aún mejor”.
Antal Fékete fue mucho más profundo y explícito: Janet Yellen “insinuó que un aumento de tasas no está considerado. Es ‘flexibilización cuantitativa’ (QE) por los siglos de los siglos, amén.” Para el profesor, la Fed ha perdido todo margen de maniobra que pudo haber tenido alguna vez, “Janet está moviendo una palanca de velocidades que no está conectada a la transmisión.” Aún así, opinó que si escalara los tipos, las consecuencias serían terribles y rompería la columna vertebral de la economía, que colapsaría.
Fékete advirtió que la única manera de elevar las tasas de interés sería eliminando la compra de bonos –recordemos que aunque ya terminó oficialmente el QE, la Fed mantiene las compras de reinversión para mantener expandida su hoja de balance–, lo que tiraría por la borda sus precios. De este modo “el capital del sistema sería aniquilado y la economía se hundiría en depresión. El oro es el único refugio bajo esas circunstancias”. Por lo anterior, para el fundador de la NASOE, es más probable que la Fed mantenga el curso actual, haciendo libre de riesgos la especulación en el mercado de bonos, que a la larga, también nos dirige hacia la deflación y la depresión.
Por eso, en un ambiente en que la economía está condenada, insistió en que “el oro es una de las dos formas de capital que pueden sobrevivir la destrucción de capital, la otra, es la plata.” Su recomendación para México y otras economías emergentes es que incentiven a que la gente compre estos “seguros” como escudo contra la depresión.
En suma, aunque la mayoría de analistas espera el alza de tasas en junio, lo cierto es que la Fed no tiene mucho margen de maniobra. Los futuros de la tasa de fondos federales anticipan que la subida podría llegar en septiembre, pero como vemos, la realidad es que la Fed no tiene vías de escape que no impliquen un colapso del sistema. Si espera, malo, si desespera, peor.
La Fed entonces está ante el dilema de si saltar al precipicio o esperar, caminando a la orilla del barranco hasta que también se acabe el camino. Si opta por esta segunda vía, llegará el respiro al que nos hemos referido para divisas y mercados sobre todo de países como México. Será entonces la última oportunidad de preparase para lo que vendrá, porque, como podrá entenderse, una nueva crisis ya no se puede evitar.
- Fenix
- Mensajes: 16334
- Registrado: Vie Abr 23, 2010 2:36 am
Re: Viernes 20/03/15 Inflacion de Atlanta
por Fenix » Vie Mar 20, 2015 6:51 pm
7:41 Sector Bancos Eurostoxx. Resistencia en 155/156
El sector Bancos del Eurostoxx ha conseguido superar el canal bajista iniciado en los máximos de junio 2014 y ahora se enfrente a la resistencia de 155/156.
El primer soporte se encuentra en 150 y después 145,30/145,00 y 138/139 puntos.
El momentum de largo plazo se mantiene alcista, aunque el comportamiento relativo es plano.
7:45 La constructora KB Home se dispara en pre-market tras buenos resultados
KB Home (KBH) publica un beneficio por acción en el primer trimestre fiscal de 0,08 dólares vs 0,02 dólares consenso.
Los ingresos de primer trimestre fiscal asciende a 580,1 millones de dólares vs 473,5 millones consenso.
Las acciones de KB Home ascienden un 6,3% en pre-market.
8:06 SocGen espera ver la paridad en el EUR/USD en el primer trimestre de 2016
Los analistas de Societe Generale espera que el euro dólar alcance la paridad en el primer trimestre de 2016, declarando que una ruptura por debajo de 1,04 o 1,04 podría provocar una caída hacia 0,96. Sin embargo el euro dólar tiene la capacidad de recuperarse por sorpresas económicas.
8:16 El peligro de una baja inflación persistente
The Wall Street Journal escribe que si la baja inflación persiste en el largo plazo, Estados Unidos podría entrar en la próxima recesión con tasas aún cerca de 0%, lo que daría limitadas opciones para combatir tal evento.
8:37 S&P 500 junio. Aparece dinero por encima del soporte de 2074
La corrección desde el máximo de 2099 parece haberse detenido en el soporte clave de corto plazo de 2074, pero para recuperar nuevos máximos debemos superar los 2088 y 2092.
El soporte por debajo de 2074 se encuentra en 2053, aunque antes hay una línea de tendencia alcista que ahora pasa por 2062.
Resistencia 2088 2092 2099 2104 2110
Soportes 2077 2074 2062 2053 2032
14:27 Morgan Stanley recomienda vender el CAD/JPY a 97,90 con objetivo 88,80
Los analistas de Morgan Stanley recomiendan la venta del dólar canadiense frente al yen (CAD/JPY) a 97,90 con un objetivo en 88,80 y stop-loss en 101,60.
Morgan Stanley cita la probabilidad de que el Banco de Canadá relaje su política monetaria debido al continuo descenso de los precios del petróleo.
El sector Bancos del Eurostoxx ha conseguido superar el canal bajista iniciado en los máximos de junio 2014 y ahora se enfrente a la resistencia de 155/156.
El primer soporte se encuentra en 150 y después 145,30/145,00 y 138/139 puntos.
El momentum de largo plazo se mantiene alcista, aunque el comportamiento relativo es plano.
7:45 La constructora KB Home se dispara en pre-market tras buenos resultados
KB Home (KBH) publica un beneficio por acción en el primer trimestre fiscal de 0,08 dólares vs 0,02 dólares consenso.
Los ingresos de primer trimestre fiscal asciende a 580,1 millones de dólares vs 473,5 millones consenso.
Las acciones de KB Home ascienden un 6,3% en pre-market.
8:06 SocGen espera ver la paridad en el EUR/USD en el primer trimestre de 2016
Los analistas de Societe Generale espera que el euro dólar alcance la paridad en el primer trimestre de 2016, declarando que una ruptura por debajo de 1,04 o 1,04 podría provocar una caída hacia 0,96. Sin embargo el euro dólar tiene la capacidad de recuperarse por sorpresas económicas.
8:16 El peligro de una baja inflación persistente
The Wall Street Journal escribe que si la baja inflación persiste en el largo plazo, Estados Unidos podría entrar en la próxima recesión con tasas aún cerca de 0%, lo que daría limitadas opciones para combatir tal evento.
8:37 S&P 500 junio. Aparece dinero por encima del soporte de 2074
La corrección desde el máximo de 2099 parece haberse detenido en el soporte clave de corto plazo de 2074, pero para recuperar nuevos máximos debemos superar los 2088 y 2092.
El soporte por debajo de 2074 se encuentra en 2053, aunque antes hay una línea de tendencia alcista que ahora pasa por 2062.
Resistencia 2088 2092 2099 2104 2110
Soportes 2077 2074 2062 2053 2032
14:27 Morgan Stanley recomienda vender el CAD/JPY a 97,90 con objetivo 88,80
Los analistas de Morgan Stanley recomiendan la venta del dólar canadiense frente al yen (CAD/JPY) a 97,90 con un objetivo en 88,80 y stop-loss en 101,60.
Morgan Stanley cita la probabilidad de que el Banco de Canadá relaje su política monetaria debido al continuo descenso de los precios del petróleo.
- Fenix
- Mensajes: 16334
- Registrado: Vie Abr 23, 2010 2:36 am
Re: Viernes 20/03/15 Inflacion de Atlanta
por Fenix » Vie Mar 20, 2015 6:56 pm
9:25 Bolsas europeas cerca de máximos intradía
"El mercado puede estar sobrevalorado pero a los inversores no les importa demasiado"
Subidas generalizadas en las bolsas europeas y en Wall Street, en una jornada en la que la ausencia de referencias macroeconómicas han dejado vía libre al inversor para seguir dando rienda suelta a su apetito por el riesgo.
El Eurostoxx 50 sube en estos momentos un 0,98% a 3.706 puntos. El Ibex 35 sube un 1,90% a 11.301 puntos. El Dow Jones +0,78% a 18.098 puntos.
"Muchos dicen que los mercados están sobrevalorados, y quizás tengan razón, pero lo que yo sé es que en mi mesa se amontonan órdenes y órdenes de compra cuando las bolsas corrigen un poco. El mercado puede estar sobrevalorado pero a los inversores por ahora no les importa demasiado", nos comentaba un operador hace unos breves minutos.
9:35 Grecia y sus socios de la UE respetan el acuerdo del 20 de febrero
Afirma Alexis Tsipras
Alexis Tsipras, primer ministro griego, ha declarado tras la cumbre de la UE que Grecia y sus socios europeos respetan el acuerdo del 20 de febrero. Y añade:
- La negociación política es clave para poner todo de nuevo en marcha.
- No se llevará a cabo ninguna medida de recesión.
- Grecia implementará sus propias reformas.
- Cumbre reconoce una crisis humanitaria en Grecia.
- Grecia cumplirá con sus obligaciones.
- Tanto Grecia como Alemania acordaron olvidar los compromisos del gobierno anterior.
9:55 Estas alzas no están justificadas
Tomi Kilgore destaca varios gráficos que según su criterio muestra que las alzas en los mercados de acciones pueden estar equivocadas. Iremos publicando estos gráficos en la web.
Hoy les traemos por un lado la clara divergencia que existe entre la evolución de la renta variable (S&P 500) línea negra, y el cambio interanual en el PIB (línea azul), y por otro la misma divergencia entre el S&P 500 y las ventas minoristas interanual. Vemos que en ambos casos la subida de las bolsas no es acompañada por la evolución positiva de los datos macro.
10:40 Lockhart fija en las reuniones de junio, julio y septiembre la primera subida de tipos
Dennis Lockhart, presidente de la Reserva Federal de Atlanta dice que en las reuniones de junio, julio y septiembre está todo en juego para el despegue de tipos. Añade:
- La inflación es más débil de lo esperado.
- Mi preocupación sobre el dólar ha subido debido al impacto de las exportaciones.
- La economía está arrojando señales mixtas.
- Veo crecimiento moderado.
10:30 Índice ECRI semanal 131,1 frente 131,6 anterior
El indicador de crecimiento anticipado semanal diseñado para pronosticar la actividad económica de EE.UU. se ha situado en -3,7% frente -4,0% semana anterior.
El índice semanal subió a 131,1 desde 131,6 anterior.
10:23 Las acciones de EE.UU. son vulnerables a una significativa corrección
Richard Fisher
El ex presidente de la Fed de Dallas, Richard Fisher, ha declarado que "las acciones de EE.UU. son vulnerables a una corrección significativa", y añade:
- Los mercados deberían estar preparados para una normalización de la política monetaria.
- No se si la Fed elevará los tipos este año, pero deberían hacerlo.
"El mercado puede estar sobrevalorado pero a los inversores no les importa demasiado"
Subidas generalizadas en las bolsas europeas y en Wall Street, en una jornada en la que la ausencia de referencias macroeconómicas han dejado vía libre al inversor para seguir dando rienda suelta a su apetito por el riesgo.
El Eurostoxx 50 sube en estos momentos un 0,98% a 3.706 puntos. El Ibex 35 sube un 1,90% a 11.301 puntos. El Dow Jones +0,78% a 18.098 puntos.
"Muchos dicen que los mercados están sobrevalorados, y quizás tengan razón, pero lo que yo sé es que en mi mesa se amontonan órdenes y órdenes de compra cuando las bolsas corrigen un poco. El mercado puede estar sobrevalorado pero a los inversores por ahora no les importa demasiado", nos comentaba un operador hace unos breves minutos.
9:35 Grecia y sus socios de la UE respetan el acuerdo del 20 de febrero
Afirma Alexis Tsipras
Alexis Tsipras, primer ministro griego, ha declarado tras la cumbre de la UE que Grecia y sus socios europeos respetan el acuerdo del 20 de febrero. Y añade:
- La negociación política es clave para poner todo de nuevo en marcha.
- No se llevará a cabo ninguna medida de recesión.
- Grecia implementará sus propias reformas.
- Cumbre reconoce una crisis humanitaria en Grecia.
- Grecia cumplirá con sus obligaciones.
- Tanto Grecia como Alemania acordaron olvidar los compromisos del gobierno anterior.
9:55 Estas alzas no están justificadas
Tomi Kilgore destaca varios gráficos que según su criterio muestra que las alzas en los mercados de acciones pueden estar equivocadas. Iremos publicando estos gráficos en la web.
Hoy les traemos por un lado la clara divergencia que existe entre la evolución de la renta variable (S&P 500) línea negra, y el cambio interanual en el PIB (línea azul), y por otro la misma divergencia entre el S&P 500 y las ventas minoristas interanual. Vemos que en ambos casos la subida de las bolsas no es acompañada por la evolución positiva de los datos macro.
10:40 Lockhart fija en las reuniones de junio, julio y septiembre la primera subida de tipos
Dennis Lockhart, presidente de la Reserva Federal de Atlanta dice que en las reuniones de junio, julio y septiembre está todo en juego para el despegue de tipos. Añade:
- La inflación es más débil de lo esperado.
- Mi preocupación sobre el dólar ha subido debido al impacto de las exportaciones.
- La economía está arrojando señales mixtas.
- Veo crecimiento moderado.
10:30 Índice ECRI semanal 131,1 frente 131,6 anterior
El indicador de crecimiento anticipado semanal diseñado para pronosticar la actividad económica de EE.UU. se ha situado en -3,7% frente -4,0% semana anterior.
El índice semanal subió a 131,1 desde 131,6 anterior.
10:23 Las acciones de EE.UU. son vulnerables a una significativa corrección
Richard Fisher
El ex presidente de la Fed de Dallas, Richard Fisher, ha declarado que "las acciones de EE.UU. son vulnerables a una corrección significativa", y añade:
- Los mercados deberían estar preparados para una normalización de la política monetaria.
- No se si la Fed elevará los tipos este año, pero deberían hacerlo.
- Fenix
- Mensajes: 16334
- Registrado: Vie Abr 23, 2010 2:36 am
Re: Viernes 20/03/15 Inflacion de Atlanta
por Fenix » Vie Mar 20, 2015 6:59 pm
11:19 "A la mínima que salte una chispa comenzará una guerra nuclear"
Afirma el embajador de Corea del Norte en el Reino Unido
Hyun Hak Bong, embajador de Corea del Norte, ha declarado que su país está capacitado para lanzar un ataque nuclear en cualquier momento.
"Estamos completamente preparados. A la mínima que salte una chispa en la península de Corea, comenzará una guerra nuclear. No hablamos en vano y vamos en serio. Estados Unidos no tiene el monopolio de los ataques nucleares", ha declarado.
El BCE más optimista acerca de la evolución económica
Viernes, 20 de Marzo del 2015 - 12:00:00
(i) El Boletín Económico Mensual del BCE recogió la visión más optimista acerca de la evolución económica, que provocó la significativa revisión al alza de las perspectivas de crecimiento y los síntomas de mejora del crédito en el conjunto de la Eurozona. Gracias en parte a las medidas de política monetaria puestas en marcha por el BCE. Considera que la recuperación económica europea ganará fortaleza en los próximos trimestres, como se pone de manifiesto en la reciente mejora de los indicadores de confianza.
La brusca caída en los precios del petróleo, la depreciación del euro y el efecto positivo de las medidas adicionales de política monetaria del BCE son las principales causas de esta aceleración del crecimiento. Los datos más recientes confirman el punto de inflexión que experimentó la demanda de crédito a principios de 2014.
(ii) El BCE realizó una operación de financiación a largo plazo condicionada a la concesión de crédito a empresas y familias (TLTRO), en la que las entidades financieras han solicitado 97.800M€. Se trata de una cifra superior a los 40.000 M€ estimados por el consenso de mercado. Hasta la fecha, el BCE ha comprado con este tipo de operaciones en torno a 310.000M€.
El hecho de que los bancos hayan solicitado mayor importe de lo que se podía estimar en un principio se puede atribuir a 3 factores.
(i) La economía europea está mejorando, con una aceleración del crecimiento y una incipiente aumento en la demanda de crédito.
(ii) El programa de compra de deuda del BCE está provocando una caída en las rentabilidades de la deuda soberana y corporativa que llevará a los bancos a aumentar su inversión crediticia para sostener los márgenes.
(iii) Las condiciones de acceso a esta liquidez del BCE han mejorado, ya que se ha eliminado la prima de 10 p.b. que se cargaba sobre el tipo director del BCE en los 2 TLTRO anteriores, por lo que el coste de esta financiación es 0,05%.
S&P expuso ayer que el impacto de las medidas implementadas por el BCE pueden tener un impacto negativo si no vienen acompañadas de reformas estructurales.
Bankinter
Afirma el embajador de Corea del Norte en el Reino Unido
Hyun Hak Bong, embajador de Corea del Norte, ha declarado que su país está capacitado para lanzar un ataque nuclear en cualquier momento.
"Estamos completamente preparados. A la mínima que salte una chispa en la península de Corea, comenzará una guerra nuclear. No hablamos en vano y vamos en serio. Estados Unidos no tiene el monopolio de los ataques nucleares", ha declarado.
El BCE más optimista acerca de la evolución económica
Viernes, 20 de Marzo del 2015 - 12:00:00
(i) El Boletín Económico Mensual del BCE recogió la visión más optimista acerca de la evolución económica, que provocó la significativa revisión al alza de las perspectivas de crecimiento y los síntomas de mejora del crédito en el conjunto de la Eurozona. Gracias en parte a las medidas de política monetaria puestas en marcha por el BCE. Considera que la recuperación económica europea ganará fortaleza en los próximos trimestres, como se pone de manifiesto en la reciente mejora de los indicadores de confianza.
La brusca caída en los precios del petróleo, la depreciación del euro y el efecto positivo de las medidas adicionales de política monetaria del BCE son las principales causas de esta aceleración del crecimiento. Los datos más recientes confirman el punto de inflexión que experimentó la demanda de crédito a principios de 2014.
(ii) El BCE realizó una operación de financiación a largo plazo condicionada a la concesión de crédito a empresas y familias (TLTRO), en la que las entidades financieras han solicitado 97.800M€. Se trata de una cifra superior a los 40.000 M€ estimados por el consenso de mercado. Hasta la fecha, el BCE ha comprado con este tipo de operaciones en torno a 310.000M€.
El hecho de que los bancos hayan solicitado mayor importe de lo que se podía estimar en un principio se puede atribuir a 3 factores.
(i) La economía europea está mejorando, con una aceleración del crecimiento y una incipiente aumento en la demanda de crédito.
(ii) El programa de compra de deuda del BCE está provocando una caída en las rentabilidades de la deuda soberana y corporativa que llevará a los bancos a aumentar su inversión crediticia para sostener los márgenes.
(iii) Las condiciones de acceso a esta liquidez del BCE han mejorado, ya que se ha eliminado la prima de 10 p.b. que se cargaba sobre el tipo director del BCE en los 2 TLTRO anteriores, por lo que el coste de esta financiación es 0,05%.
S&P expuso ayer que el impacto de las medidas implementadas por el BCE pueden tener un impacto negativo si no vienen acompañadas de reformas estructurales.
Bankinter
- Fenix
- Mensajes: 16334
- Registrado: Vie Abr 23, 2010 2:36 am
Re: Viernes 20/03/15 Inflacion de Atlanta
por Fenix » Vie Mar 20, 2015 7:05 pm
13:15 El valor de las compañías USA básicamente son sus activos intangibles
Este interesante gráfico que publicamos elaborado por Ocean Tomo, recoge la evolución de los activos intangibles frente a la capitalización de las compañías del S&P 500.
Como vemos claramente, el peso de estos activos ha ido incrementándose ininterrumpidamente desde 1975, presentando ahora más del 80% del valor total de la compañía. Son varias las conclusiones que el analista Justin Fox saca de este hecho:
- El alza del valor de los activos intangibles desde 1970 es en parte un reflejo del alza en las valoraciones del mercado de acciones.
- El PER ajustado cíclicamente ha subido 2 veces y media desde 1975, mientras que los activos intangibles han subido cinco veces.
Es evidente que nos encontramos ante otro tipo de empresas a las de unas décadas, en donde el valor viene de más de sus propiedades intelectuales que de edificios, caja o bonos que tengan en sus carteras.
14:08 Bristol-Myers Squibb: soporte en torno a 65.9
CMC Markets
Punto de rotación se sitúa en 65.9.
Preferencia: la subida se mantiene siempre que el soporte se sitúe en 65.9.
Escenario alternativo: por debajo de 65.9, el riesgo es una caída hasta 63.2 y 61.6.
En lo referente al análisis técnico, el RSI (índice de fortaleza relativa) se sitúa por encima de 70. El indicador de convergencia/divergencia de medias móviles (MACD) se sitúa por encima de su línea de señal y es positivo.
Asimismo, la acción se sitúa por encima de su media móvil de 20 y 50 días (se sitúa a 64.57 y 62.32 respectivamente).
El mercado de valores mundial: 1899 vs 2014
Viernes, 20 de Marzo del 2015 - 14:35:00
El mercado de valores mundial es ahora muy diferente al de hace 115 años. La gráfica adjunta muestra las capitalizaciones de los distintos mercados de acciones a finales de 1899.
El siguiente gráfico muestra cómo han cambiado a finales de 2014. Los mercados que no están incluidos en el conjunto de datos están en color negro. Estos gráficos circulares cubren el 98% del mercado de renta variable mundial en 1900 y el 91% a finales de 2014.
La capitalización bursátil de las sociedades cotizadas en Estados Unidos hoy en día totaliza los 28 billones de dólares y el mercado de valores de Estados Unidos es más grande que todos los demás combinados.
La explosión del mercado de valores de China es también evidente. Representaba un 2,2% del mercado mundial a pesar de haber abierto sus puertas en noviembre de 1990.
Fuentes: Business Insider
15:27 Bono EEUU junio. Probable rebote hacia 129-00\129-19
La caída de corto plazo desde la referencia de Fibonacci del 127,2% encontró soporte en la mitad del cuerpo en 128-01.
El movimiento a la baja parece una corrección de corto plazo, por lo que es probable un intento alcista hacia la zona de 129-00\129-19 una vez que se supere la resistencia de corto plazo de 128-22½ (máximo de la onda B)
Hay más soporte en la media móvil exponencial de 21 días y el máximo del 12 de marzo de 127-21½/127-18.
Resistencias 128-14 128-22½ 129-00½ 129-11 129-19½
SOportes 128-02½ 128-01 127-21½ 127-18 126-25
15:52 Las empresas del S&P 500 pagaron 376.000 mlns de dólares en dividendo el ultimo año
El reputado analista John Butters, de la firma de investigación de mercado FactSet, escribió una nota que describe cómo las empresas del S&P 500 pagaron un total de 376 mil millones de dólares en dividendos a sus accionistas entre enero de 2013 y enero de 2014.
Butters incluye un gráfico que muestra que los dividendos por acción (la línea azul) han crecido a un ritmo increíblemente rápido y se encuentran en un máximo de 20 años.
Como era de esperar, las dos empresas más grandes del mundo, Exxon Mobil y Apple, son también las dos que han pagado mayores dividendos.
Este interesante gráfico que publicamos elaborado por Ocean Tomo, recoge la evolución de los activos intangibles frente a la capitalización de las compañías del S&P 500.
Como vemos claramente, el peso de estos activos ha ido incrementándose ininterrumpidamente desde 1975, presentando ahora más del 80% del valor total de la compañía. Son varias las conclusiones que el analista Justin Fox saca de este hecho:
- El alza del valor de los activos intangibles desde 1970 es en parte un reflejo del alza en las valoraciones del mercado de acciones.
- El PER ajustado cíclicamente ha subido 2 veces y media desde 1975, mientras que los activos intangibles han subido cinco veces.
Es evidente que nos encontramos ante otro tipo de empresas a las de unas décadas, en donde el valor viene de más de sus propiedades intelectuales que de edificios, caja o bonos que tengan en sus carteras.
14:08 Bristol-Myers Squibb: soporte en torno a 65.9
CMC Markets
Punto de rotación se sitúa en 65.9.
Preferencia: la subida se mantiene siempre que el soporte se sitúe en 65.9.
Escenario alternativo: por debajo de 65.9, el riesgo es una caída hasta 63.2 y 61.6.
En lo referente al análisis técnico, el RSI (índice de fortaleza relativa) se sitúa por encima de 70. El indicador de convergencia/divergencia de medias móviles (MACD) se sitúa por encima de su línea de señal y es positivo.
Asimismo, la acción se sitúa por encima de su media móvil de 20 y 50 días (se sitúa a 64.57 y 62.32 respectivamente).
El mercado de valores mundial: 1899 vs 2014
Viernes, 20 de Marzo del 2015 - 14:35:00
El mercado de valores mundial es ahora muy diferente al de hace 115 años. La gráfica adjunta muestra las capitalizaciones de los distintos mercados de acciones a finales de 1899.
El siguiente gráfico muestra cómo han cambiado a finales de 2014. Los mercados que no están incluidos en el conjunto de datos están en color negro. Estos gráficos circulares cubren el 98% del mercado de renta variable mundial en 1900 y el 91% a finales de 2014.
La capitalización bursátil de las sociedades cotizadas en Estados Unidos hoy en día totaliza los 28 billones de dólares y el mercado de valores de Estados Unidos es más grande que todos los demás combinados.
La explosión del mercado de valores de China es también evidente. Representaba un 2,2% del mercado mundial a pesar de haber abierto sus puertas en noviembre de 1990.
Fuentes: Business Insider
15:27 Bono EEUU junio. Probable rebote hacia 129-00\129-19
La caída de corto plazo desde la referencia de Fibonacci del 127,2% encontró soporte en la mitad del cuerpo en 128-01.
El movimiento a la baja parece una corrección de corto plazo, por lo que es probable un intento alcista hacia la zona de 129-00\129-19 una vez que se supere la resistencia de corto plazo de 128-22½ (máximo de la onda B)
Hay más soporte en la media móvil exponencial de 21 días y el máximo del 12 de marzo de 127-21½/127-18.
Resistencias 128-14 128-22½ 129-00½ 129-11 129-19½
SOportes 128-02½ 128-01 127-21½ 127-18 126-25
15:52 Las empresas del S&P 500 pagaron 376.000 mlns de dólares en dividendo el ultimo año
El reputado analista John Butters, de la firma de investigación de mercado FactSet, escribió una nota que describe cómo las empresas del S&P 500 pagaron un total de 376 mil millones de dólares en dividendos a sus accionistas entre enero de 2013 y enero de 2014.
Butters incluye un gráfico que muestra que los dividendos por acción (la línea azul) han crecido a un ritmo increíblemente rápido y se encuentran en un máximo de 20 años.
Como era de esperar, las dos empresas más grandes del mundo, Exxon Mobil y Apple, son también las dos que han pagado mayores dividendos.
- Fenix
- Mensajes: 16334
- Registrado: Vie Abr 23, 2010 2:36 am
Re: Viernes 20/03/15 Inflacion de Atlanta
por Fenix » Vie Mar 20, 2015 7:37 pm
A reason to buy negative (income) yield is to obtain a capital (growth) profit, yield down, value up! So he that buys said bond is planning for the bond to increase in value, sod the yield, this is short-term fianancial planning and don't forget the tax relief on capital gains. It's never about a longer term gain, today we are in 'instant' territory (click of a mouse) - easy come, easy go - we call it 'day-trading' or sometimes 'nano-second trading'.
It's all unreal anyway, except the money - we always make da money! If you don't understand it, stay away!
'Unpatriotic' Goldman Dares To Suggest "Buy Russian Bonds"
Submitted by Tyler D.
03/14/2015
On the scale of 'unpatriotic' things to suggest, there is only one thing worse than a tax inversion for an American to do... suggest something positive about Russia, Russian markets, or Russia's economy. So it perhaps ultimately ironic that none other than Goldman "doing God's work" Sachs suggests Russian bonds are both cyclically and strucuturally under-priced.
America's Latest Craze: Flushing Money Down The Toilet On "Luxury" Toilet Paper (And Going Commando)
Submitted by Tyler D.
03/14/2015
US sales of what the industry calls "luxury" rolls — anything quilted, lotioned, perfumed or ultra-soft, from two- to four-ply — climbed to $1.4 billion last year, outpacing all other kinds of toilet paper for the first time in nearly a decade, data from market research firm Euromonitor International show. The luxury market is one-fourth the size of the standard TP market, but its prominence in Big Wipe is growing faster than many industry watchers expected. Luxury toilet paper sales have grown more than 70 percent since 2000, and they're expected to keep growing faster than all other categories every year through at least 2018.
"An 'Old-Fashioned' Recession Is Spreading Across The World," Billionaire Hedge Fund Manager Warns
Tyler Durden's picture
Submitted by Tyler D.
03/14/2015
The bust of Aussie boom-towns, collapse of the mining industry, dramatic capital outflows, and a bursting housing bubble all have one thing in common, according to billionaire hedge fund manager Crispin Odey - "China is everything to Australia in lots of ways." Simply put, he tells The Australian Financial Review, economies dependent on China for income, including Australia, are headed for recession and central banks will not be able to able to come to the rescue because they have exhausted the arsenal of policy weapons. "We've got a very old-fashioned recession which is spreading across the world," and Australian banks face a tough time ahead too because there are indications bad debt risks are rising.
Confirming Goldman's view that with 9 of 10 components negative in February, Goldman's Swirlogram has collapsed from expansion to contraction within just 6 months...
First negative print since 2012 - indicating global industrial production is set to contract...
What is the GLI: The Global Leading Indicator (GLI) is a Goldman Sachs proprietary indicator that is meant to provide an early signal of
the global industrial cycle on a monthly basis. There is an Advanced reading for each month, released mid-month, followed by the Final reading, released on the first business day of the following month.
One of the world's leading hedge fund managers has warned that economies dependent on China for income, including Australia, are headed for recession and central banks will not be able to able to come to the rescue because they have exhausted the arsenal of policy weapons.
Crispin Odey, who is the founder of London-based Odey Asset Management, has taken a number of short positions on Australia since adopting a bearish view of China's growth outlook.
He is short stocks Genworth Mortgage Insurance Australia and Fortescue Metals Group, indicating that he expects the share prices to fall, and he believes the Australian dollar is headed for further losses. He said Australia's banks could have a "bad time time ahead of them".
"China is everything to Australia in lots of ways," Mr Odey told The Australian Financial Review.
The world's second-largest economy was eroding its competitiveness and its capital accounts were vulnerable to outflows as Chinese policy becomes more accommodative. "We've got a very old-fashioned recession which is spreading across the world."
The first impact was the hit to income, followed by the decline in capital expenditure and rising unemployment. All three trends are already evident and have prompted the Reserve Bank of Australia to cut interest rates to a record low 2.25 per cent this year. Australian banks faced a tough time ahead too because of indications bad debt risks would rise.
"The only thing you can do in those countries as you're seeing in Australia is you're cutting interest rates," Mr Odey observed.
"Frankly, it's a demand problem."
This is complicated by the prevalence of quantitative easing (QE), or large monetary stimulus, elsewhere in the world which has pushed share prices to record highs in spite of worsening economic conditions in many economies outside of the United States. The competing forces of QE and the threat of recession could set up a crash as "we're in the midst of a wonderful bubble".
Mr Odey is one of several high-profile hedge fund managers to bet on Australia running out of luck.
Jim Chanos, one of of the world's largest short-sellers and a prominent China bear, has shorted shares Fortescue Metals and several local other iron ore and coal miners, a position he confirmed last year.
George Soros' Soros Funds Management is also understood to have considered betting on a downturn by shorting mining services companies while in April 2010 Jeremy Grantham of GMO branded Australia's property market a bubble, sparking interest in shorting Australia's banks that has remained ever since.
It's all unreal anyway, except the money - we always make da money! If you don't understand it, stay away!
'Unpatriotic' Goldman Dares To Suggest "Buy Russian Bonds"
Submitted by Tyler D.
03/14/2015
On the scale of 'unpatriotic' things to suggest, there is only one thing worse than a tax inversion for an American to do... suggest something positive about Russia, Russian markets, or Russia's economy. So it perhaps ultimately ironic that none other than Goldman "doing God's work" Sachs suggests Russian bonds are both cyclically and strucuturally under-priced.
America's Latest Craze: Flushing Money Down The Toilet On "Luxury" Toilet Paper (And Going Commando)
Submitted by Tyler D.
03/14/2015
US sales of what the industry calls "luxury" rolls — anything quilted, lotioned, perfumed or ultra-soft, from two- to four-ply — climbed to $1.4 billion last year, outpacing all other kinds of toilet paper for the first time in nearly a decade, data from market research firm Euromonitor International show. The luxury market is one-fourth the size of the standard TP market, but its prominence in Big Wipe is growing faster than many industry watchers expected. Luxury toilet paper sales have grown more than 70 percent since 2000, and they're expected to keep growing faster than all other categories every year through at least 2018.
"An 'Old-Fashioned' Recession Is Spreading Across The World," Billionaire Hedge Fund Manager Warns
Tyler Durden's picture
Submitted by Tyler D.
03/14/2015
The bust of Aussie boom-towns, collapse of the mining industry, dramatic capital outflows, and a bursting housing bubble all have one thing in common, according to billionaire hedge fund manager Crispin Odey - "China is everything to Australia in lots of ways." Simply put, he tells The Australian Financial Review, economies dependent on China for income, including Australia, are headed for recession and central banks will not be able to able to come to the rescue because they have exhausted the arsenal of policy weapons. "We've got a very old-fashioned recession which is spreading across the world," and Australian banks face a tough time ahead too because there are indications bad debt risks are rising.
Confirming Goldman's view that with 9 of 10 components negative in February, Goldman's Swirlogram has collapsed from expansion to contraction within just 6 months...
First negative print since 2012 - indicating global industrial production is set to contract...
What is the GLI: The Global Leading Indicator (GLI) is a Goldman Sachs proprietary indicator that is meant to provide an early signal of
the global industrial cycle on a monthly basis. There is an Advanced reading for each month, released mid-month, followed by the Final reading, released on the first business day of the following month.
One of the world's leading hedge fund managers has warned that economies dependent on China for income, including Australia, are headed for recession and central banks will not be able to able to come to the rescue because they have exhausted the arsenal of policy weapons.
Crispin Odey, who is the founder of London-based Odey Asset Management, has taken a number of short positions on Australia since adopting a bearish view of China's growth outlook.
He is short stocks Genworth Mortgage Insurance Australia and Fortescue Metals Group, indicating that he expects the share prices to fall, and he believes the Australian dollar is headed for further losses. He said Australia's banks could have a "bad time time ahead of them".
"China is everything to Australia in lots of ways," Mr Odey told The Australian Financial Review.
The world's second-largest economy was eroding its competitiveness and its capital accounts were vulnerable to outflows as Chinese policy becomes more accommodative. "We've got a very old-fashioned recession which is spreading across the world."
The first impact was the hit to income, followed by the decline in capital expenditure and rising unemployment. All three trends are already evident and have prompted the Reserve Bank of Australia to cut interest rates to a record low 2.25 per cent this year. Australian banks faced a tough time ahead too because of indications bad debt risks would rise.
"The only thing you can do in those countries as you're seeing in Australia is you're cutting interest rates," Mr Odey observed.
"Frankly, it's a demand problem."
This is complicated by the prevalence of quantitative easing (QE), or large monetary stimulus, elsewhere in the world which has pushed share prices to record highs in spite of worsening economic conditions in many economies outside of the United States. The competing forces of QE and the threat of recession could set up a crash as "we're in the midst of a wonderful bubble".
Mr Odey is one of several high-profile hedge fund managers to bet on Australia running out of luck.
Jim Chanos, one of of the world's largest short-sellers and a prominent China bear, has shorted shares Fortescue Metals and several local other iron ore and coal miners, a position he confirmed last year.
George Soros' Soros Funds Management is also understood to have considered betting on a downturn by shorting mining services companies while in April 2010 Jeremy Grantham of GMO branded Australia's property market a bubble, sparking interest in shorting Australia's banks that has remained ever since.
- Fenix
- Mensajes: 16334
- Registrado: Vie Abr 23, 2010 2:36 am
Re: Viernes 20/03/15 Inflacion de Atlanta
por Fenix » Vie Mar 20, 2015 7:50 pm
"Cancel All Student Debt" - The Petitions Begin
Tyler D.
03/15/2015
With global moral hazard having long ago become institutionalized, and codified as "monetary policy", catering almost exclusively to the TBTF entities in the financial sector, we were surprised it took as long as it did for Obama to announce (as he did last week), that the administration is now studying "new bankruptcy options" for student loan borrowers: code word for an across the board student debt moratorium, or forgiveness.
To wit from "Student Aid Bill of Rights: Taking Action to Ensure Strong Consumer Protections for Student Loan Borrowers":
The President is directing his Cabinet and White House advisers, working with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, to study whether consumer protections recently applied to mortgages and credit cards, such as notice and grace periods after loans are transferred among lenders and a requirement that lenders confirm balances to allow borrowers to pay off the loan, should also be afforded to student loan borrowers and improve the quality of servicing for all types of student loans. The agencies will develop recommendations for regulatory and legislative changes for all student loan borrowers, including possible changes to the treatment of loans in bankruptcy proceedings and when they were borrowed under fraudulent circumstances.
Well, it didn't take long for virtually every leftist group: from the Daily Kos, to Democracy for America, to Campaign for America's Future and many more, to jump on this bandwagon, and demand - you guessed it - that the administration "cancel all student debt."
Sure, why not: leaving aside the very touchy topic of personal responsibility and accountability, in a world in which record debt is merely "replaced" by even more debt, and in which profits are privatized but losses are always socialized with taxpayers and future generations bearing the brunt in the form of a record $18.2 trillion in public debt (and some $7 trillion more if one adds the government-backed GSEs which one should), why not go ahead and "cancel" the debt. And don't bother trying to explain the simple math that debt is never cancelled, as every liability is someone's asset, and that asset holder will demand to be made whole in the form of more debt elsewhere or else, like Hank Paulson in 2008, it will scream mutual assured destruction and threaten to blow up the world unless bailed out.
In short, what all the concerned entities listed above are saying is not "cancel all student debt", which is impossible, but share the burden of the 43.2 million "student debtors" shown in the chart below, with everyone.
After all, "it's only fair."
Finally, since nobody, anywhere is harboring any doubt that any of the record debt the world is burdened with will ever be repaid, and instead will eventually be hyperinflated away even it means paradropping bags of cash, this proposal actually has a good chance of passing (sorry future generations not only in the US but around the globe).
Once it does, and once colleges know they can charge anything for tuition, room and board - because the debt funding it will be socialized and ultimately "forgiven" - prepare for the green line below, already exponential, to go... vertical.
Mortgage Regulation Australian Style
Submitted by Tyler D.
03/15/2015 - 13:00
It's a total shock that maniacs who borrow nearly 100% on interest only terms to lose rental money to speculate on housing capital gains would love low interest rates. And with the lowest mortgage rates in Australian history, coinciding with the sloppiest lending standards in Australian history, combining with the highest property prices in Australian history, added to the highest household debt to income ratio in Australian history, what would you expect the biggest idiot of a treasurer in Australian history to do?
Tyler D.
03/15/2015
With global moral hazard having long ago become institutionalized, and codified as "monetary policy", catering almost exclusively to the TBTF entities in the financial sector, we were surprised it took as long as it did for Obama to announce (as he did last week), that the administration is now studying "new bankruptcy options" for student loan borrowers: code word for an across the board student debt moratorium, or forgiveness.
To wit from "Student Aid Bill of Rights: Taking Action to Ensure Strong Consumer Protections for Student Loan Borrowers":
The President is directing his Cabinet and White House advisers, working with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, to study whether consumer protections recently applied to mortgages and credit cards, such as notice and grace periods after loans are transferred among lenders and a requirement that lenders confirm balances to allow borrowers to pay off the loan, should also be afforded to student loan borrowers and improve the quality of servicing for all types of student loans. The agencies will develop recommendations for regulatory and legislative changes for all student loan borrowers, including possible changes to the treatment of loans in bankruptcy proceedings and when they were borrowed under fraudulent circumstances.
Well, it didn't take long for virtually every leftist group: from the Daily Kos, to Democracy for America, to Campaign for America's Future and many more, to jump on this bandwagon, and demand - you guessed it - that the administration "cancel all student debt."
Sure, why not: leaving aside the very touchy topic of personal responsibility and accountability, in a world in which record debt is merely "replaced" by even more debt, and in which profits are privatized but losses are always socialized with taxpayers and future generations bearing the brunt in the form of a record $18.2 trillion in public debt (and some $7 trillion more if one adds the government-backed GSEs which one should), why not go ahead and "cancel" the debt. And don't bother trying to explain the simple math that debt is never cancelled, as every liability is someone's asset, and that asset holder will demand to be made whole in the form of more debt elsewhere or else, like Hank Paulson in 2008, it will scream mutual assured destruction and threaten to blow up the world unless bailed out.
In short, what all the concerned entities listed above are saying is not "cancel all student debt", which is impossible, but share the burden of the 43.2 million "student debtors" shown in the chart below, with everyone.
After all, "it's only fair."
Finally, since nobody, anywhere is harboring any doubt that any of the record debt the world is burdened with will ever be repaid, and instead will eventually be hyperinflated away even it means paradropping bags of cash, this proposal actually has a good chance of passing (sorry future generations not only in the US but around the globe).
Once it does, and once colleges know they can charge anything for tuition, room and board - because the debt funding it will be socialized and ultimately "forgiven" - prepare for the green line below, already exponential, to go... vertical.
Mortgage Regulation Australian Style
Submitted by Tyler D.
03/15/2015 - 13:00
It's a total shock that maniacs who borrow nearly 100% on interest only terms to lose rental money to speculate on housing capital gains would love low interest rates. And with the lowest mortgage rates in Australian history, coinciding with the sloppiest lending standards in Australian history, combining with the highest property prices in Australian history, added to the highest household debt to income ratio in Australian history, what would you expect the biggest idiot of a treasurer in Australian history to do?
- Fenix
- Mensajes: 16334
- Registrado: Vie Abr 23, 2010 2:36 am
Re: Viernes 20/03/15 Inflacion de Atlanta
por Fenix » Vie Mar 20, 2015 7:56 pm
The Seal Is Broken: DB Is The First Major Bank To Predict Drop In 2015 S&P500 EPS
Tyler D.
03/15/2015
Back in early December, when the oil plunge and the dollar surge were not nearly as acute as they are now, we reported that just as a result of these two critical factors, an earnings (if not outright economic, for now) recession is on deck. Since then things have gone from bad to worse, as both the USD strength has continued (and as we wrote yesterday has become the one topic Goldman's clients are most concerned about), the oil plunge has resumed after a brief "dead crude bounce", and as we also first reported last month, for the first time since Lehman, full year 2015 revenues are now projected to decline.
Throughout all of this however one thing was constant: no matter how bad the overall profitability picture got, S&P500 earnings per share (assisted almost exclusively by a record amount of stock buybacks in 2015 putting downward pressure on the PS in EPS) would grow by the tiniest of amounts, just so the profit recession stigma could be avoided in a world in which the stock market is the last remaining bastion of faith in central planning and confidence in the economy.
No more. Overnight, Deutsche Bank finally did the unthinkable, and "broke the seal" of optimistic groupthink, when its strategist David Bianco became the first sell-sider to forecast that not only will 2015 EPS not grow (at 118 on a non-GAAP basis, this will be unchanged Y/Y), but "down a bit ex bank litigation costs."
From Deutsche:
We cut 2015E S&P EPS to $118 from $120 on rapid dollar appreciation
Accelerated dollar appreciation makes our prior 2015E S&P EPS of $120 hard to achieve. We assumed Euro averages $1.10-1.15 in 2015 and DXY 90-95. We now assume ~$1.05 and 100. Continued strong US job growth despite still slow GDP has put the first Fed hike credibly on the horizon, which underlies recent dollar gains. We think the Fed will soon communicate intentions to hike, but slowly and to plateau at a level below historical norms, which should slow dollar gains. Although we've been ahead of curve, we cut our 2015E S&P EPS again to $118, on new FX assumptions and ~$50/bbl avg. WTI oil in 2015.
Ironically, for Goldman these identical assumptions suggest a net offset to the negatives and positives, and yet for DB both are "unambiguously bad." So much for the propaganda narrative, which we mocked for 3 months and were proven yet again correct.
Flat is impressive: Energy down 45%, ~$12 of FX and oil price EPS headwind
2015E S&P EPS of $118 is flat from 2014 or down a bit ex bank litigation costs; which is respectable given enormous headwinds. S&P EPS would have been ~$130 w/ ~3% US GDP ex these factors. Nevertheless, this dollar reset and even much of the oil price plunge appears structural and unlikely to reverse anytime soon. This makes 2015 a year of lost S&P EPS growth, but normal EPS growth should resume in 2016.
So with EPS growth in 2015 now a wash (if not negative), which implies the only upside for the S&P500 will once again comes from substantial multiple expansion, beyond the already "99 percentile" 18x, where does DB expect earnings to grow?
We expect only two sectors to deliver 10%+ EPS growth in 2015: Financials at 12% or 7% ex. litigation and net of assumed higher loan loss provisions and Con. Disc. at 11% or 8% ex Auto. Health Care is at 5.5% EPS growth and all other sectors are at 1- 4%.
Uhm, why ex-litigation? Does anyone realistically believe that the criminal syndicate which have seen nearly $200 billion in recurring, non-one time legal fees also known as government kickbacks...
... to prison, will end this government racket, and instead opt to see members of their own syndicate incarcerated? We didn't think so.
As for what won't work, well... "Energy down 45%." So yeah, unambiguously bad.
Some parting words from David Bianco who used to be one of the biggest permabulls on the street, and now appears to have taken the place of what David Rosenberg used to be once upon a time at Merrill Lynch, the sellside's reluctant skeptic.
Flat S&P EPS, above avg. PE, Fed likely to hike: How 10yr yields react is key
It’s true that the S&P is typically positively correlated to early-cycle Fed hikes and a rising dollar, provided dollar strength isn’t from a flight to safety. However, the S&P is also positively correlated to EPS. This upcoming first Fed hike since the recession ended will not be accompanied with the usual surge in EPS. The S&P’s current PE is 10-15% above history and we don’t consider S&P EPS below potential anywhere other than at Energy and it’s rare for the PE to rise while the Fed hikes. Thus, we think the key to S&P performance is how long-term Treasury yields react to Fed hikes. If 10yr Treasury yields rise just modestly as the Fed hikes and look likely to stay below 3% through 2016, then we can justify current PEs with some upside at sectors that can generate decent EPS growth despite FX headwinds such as Tech and Health Care.
Historically there were periods of PE expansion accompanied by strengthening dollar and vice versa, but how dollar affects PE depends on current level and direction of inflation and interest rates, current PE, and EPS outlook. In early to mid 1980s, a strong dollar was welcomed by investors as it lowered inflation and interest rates from very high levels, and PE was at a very low 7-9x level and it climbed back to its historic norm (see figure 13 for years 1984-1986).
Tyler D.
03/15/2015
Back in early December, when the oil plunge and the dollar surge were not nearly as acute as they are now, we reported that just as a result of these two critical factors, an earnings (if not outright economic, for now) recession is on deck. Since then things have gone from bad to worse, as both the USD strength has continued (and as we wrote yesterday has become the one topic Goldman's clients are most concerned about), the oil plunge has resumed after a brief "dead crude bounce", and as we also first reported last month, for the first time since Lehman, full year 2015 revenues are now projected to decline.
Throughout all of this however one thing was constant: no matter how bad the overall profitability picture got, S&P500 earnings per share (assisted almost exclusively by a record amount of stock buybacks in 2015 putting downward pressure on the PS in EPS) would grow by the tiniest of amounts, just so the profit recession stigma could be avoided in a world in which the stock market is the last remaining bastion of faith in central planning and confidence in the economy.
No more. Overnight, Deutsche Bank finally did the unthinkable, and "broke the seal" of optimistic groupthink, when its strategist David Bianco became the first sell-sider to forecast that not only will 2015 EPS not grow (at 118 on a non-GAAP basis, this will be unchanged Y/Y), but "down a bit ex bank litigation costs."
From Deutsche:
We cut 2015E S&P EPS to $118 from $120 on rapid dollar appreciation
Accelerated dollar appreciation makes our prior 2015E S&P EPS of $120 hard to achieve. We assumed Euro averages $1.10-1.15 in 2015 and DXY 90-95. We now assume ~$1.05 and 100. Continued strong US job growth despite still slow GDP has put the first Fed hike credibly on the horizon, which underlies recent dollar gains. We think the Fed will soon communicate intentions to hike, but slowly and to plateau at a level below historical norms, which should slow dollar gains. Although we've been ahead of curve, we cut our 2015E S&P EPS again to $118, on new FX assumptions and ~$50/bbl avg. WTI oil in 2015.
Ironically, for Goldman these identical assumptions suggest a net offset to the negatives and positives, and yet for DB both are "unambiguously bad." So much for the propaganda narrative, which we mocked for 3 months and were proven yet again correct.
Flat is impressive: Energy down 45%, ~$12 of FX and oil price EPS headwind
2015E S&P EPS of $118 is flat from 2014 or down a bit ex bank litigation costs; which is respectable given enormous headwinds. S&P EPS would have been ~$130 w/ ~3% US GDP ex these factors. Nevertheless, this dollar reset and even much of the oil price plunge appears structural and unlikely to reverse anytime soon. This makes 2015 a year of lost S&P EPS growth, but normal EPS growth should resume in 2016.
So with EPS growth in 2015 now a wash (if not negative), which implies the only upside for the S&P500 will once again comes from substantial multiple expansion, beyond the already "99 percentile" 18x, where does DB expect earnings to grow?
We expect only two sectors to deliver 10%+ EPS growth in 2015: Financials at 12% or 7% ex. litigation and net of assumed higher loan loss provisions and Con. Disc. at 11% or 8% ex Auto. Health Care is at 5.5% EPS growth and all other sectors are at 1- 4%.
Uhm, why ex-litigation? Does anyone realistically believe that the criminal syndicate which have seen nearly $200 billion in recurring, non-one time legal fees also known as government kickbacks...
... to prison, will end this government racket, and instead opt to see members of their own syndicate incarcerated? We didn't think so.
As for what won't work, well... "Energy down 45%." So yeah, unambiguously bad.
Some parting words from David Bianco who used to be one of the biggest permabulls on the street, and now appears to have taken the place of what David Rosenberg used to be once upon a time at Merrill Lynch, the sellside's reluctant skeptic.
Flat S&P EPS, above avg. PE, Fed likely to hike: How 10yr yields react is key
It’s true that the S&P is typically positively correlated to early-cycle Fed hikes and a rising dollar, provided dollar strength isn’t from a flight to safety. However, the S&P is also positively correlated to EPS. This upcoming first Fed hike since the recession ended will not be accompanied with the usual surge in EPS. The S&P’s current PE is 10-15% above history and we don’t consider S&P EPS below potential anywhere other than at Energy and it’s rare for the PE to rise while the Fed hikes. Thus, we think the key to S&P performance is how long-term Treasury yields react to Fed hikes. If 10yr Treasury yields rise just modestly as the Fed hikes and look likely to stay below 3% through 2016, then we can justify current PEs with some upside at sectors that can generate decent EPS growth despite FX headwinds such as Tech and Health Care.
Historically there were periods of PE expansion accompanied by strengthening dollar and vice versa, but how dollar affects PE depends on current level and direction of inflation and interest rates, current PE, and EPS outlook. In early to mid 1980s, a strong dollar was welcomed by investors as it lowered inflation and interest rates from very high levels, and PE was at a very low 7-9x level and it climbed back to its historic norm (see figure 13 for years 1984-1986).
- Fenix
- Mensajes: 16334
- Registrado: Vie Abr 23, 2010 2:36 am
Re: Viernes 20/03/15 Inflacion de Atlanta
por Fenix » Vie Mar 20, 2015 8:16 pm
USDX Versus Gold Indicates Inflation Not Yet Dead
03/15/2015 11:38
Submitted by The World Complex
I have been plotting the US dollar index against the US dollar gold price for some time, looking for a sign.
Since about Halloween, the graph of USDX against gold price in USD has suggested deflation, as both parameters were increasing. I have previously argued that this behaviour benefits gold miners outside the US, as the number of US dollars they get for their product increases along with the purchasing power of those dollars.
In the past couple of weeks, the graph has reverted to the historical norm, wherein a rising US dollar is met by a falling dollar price for gold.
The blue line represents the deflationary trend discussed here and here, and the gold hyperbolae are isoquants, described here and here. An isoquant is a locus of points where the product of the USDX and the USD gold price is constant. The "traditional" behaviour of gold with respect to the US dollar is for the system to evolve along an isoquant--with the gold price rising as the US dollar falls and vice versa.
In the graph above we have plotted the isoquants for the 1000 and the 1150 level. The 1000 level has been important in the past. The initial rise in the gold price in 2010-11 began by migrating along the 1000 isoquant level, and the collapse in gold price in 2013 resulted in the graph bouncing several times off the 1000 isoquant (and penetrating it slightly twice).
Over the last few weeks the system has been moving along the 1150 isoquant. The 1150 isoquant has had some small influence on the system in the past--there is a knot just below the 1150 isoquant as the gold price rose sharply in 2011, suggesting that 1150 was a difficult level to break above. Similarly, during the collapse in 2013, the curve bounced twice off the 1150 isoquant before running down to the 1000 level.
In the last few weeks, we have seen what looks like a transition from deflationary behaviour to a more traditional behaviour in which gold acts as the "anti-dollar". I don't think this represents a sea-change--I still think there is more deflation to come. But we might see a change in behaviour for some time before deflation returns.
As noted before, deflation was temporarily overcome by the various central bank interventions since 2010. We then had over four years without deflation, before it re-established itself late last year (at least in this index). It is unclear whether we are seeing the result of a new intervention, which will once again probably be temporary (but this could be a long time). Alternatively, we are seeing a battle between investors who see inflation and those who foresee deflation, with the inflationistas holding the better hand, for the moment.
Saxobank's Chief Economist: 2015 Is A Lost Year (and Here's Why)
Tyler D.
03/15/2015 14:00
Even though the US has seen so-called 'strong' job numbers and Europe is forecast to grow 1.5% this year, Saxo Bank’s Chief Economist Steen Jakobsen says 2015 will be a lost year. That’s because the two supposed growth engines of the world - the US economy and emerging markets - will grind to a halt and slow Europe down in the process. As we already pointed out, for the first time since Lehman, US earnings are now expected to drop in 2015 - apparently confirming this second-half hockey-stick is now dead... and as Jakobsen explains in this brief clip, capital preservation remains a must going into the second quarter of the year... with 10Y Treasury yields expected below 1.5% by the end of the year.
The Full Explanation Of How The ECB Broke Europe's Bond Market
Tyler D.
03/15/2015 15:44
It was almost three years ago to the day when Zero Hedge first explained the biggest problem facing Europe when it comes to unconventional monetary policy: the lack, not scarcity, but outright shortage of collateral.
Initially, our focus was on private-sector collateral, and if one had to summarize the key difference between the US and Europe in one chart, it would be this one, showing that while in the US the split between secured and unsecured funding was roughly even, in Europe, some 90% of corporate funding was on bank loan books, with only 10% in the form of (unsecured) corporate bonds (which also explains why in Europe NPLs, aka bad bank debt is by far the biggest problem facing the financial industry).
Subsequently, we also showed that the collateral shortage is not only in the private bond market, but in the public one as well, because there simply wouldn't be enough net supply in Europe to cover the ECB's ambitious demands.
Three years later, and following the first week of direct ECB monetization in the bond market, we have proof not only that our warnings were accurate, but that the worst case outcome for the ECB - a failure to achieve its stated goals is now only a matter of time. The reason? After just a few days of intervention, the ECB's grand monetization experiment has already managed to get derailed.
To avoid repeating ourselves yet again, here is JPM with the full explanation of how the ECB appears to have broken the already rickety European bond market.
First, there is the issue of collapsing market liquidity as manifested by the plunge in European bond market depth to near record lows. Quote JPM:
The price action over the past few weeks and the market impact that the ECB purchases (of €9.8bn in three days) had in the first week of its QE program are raising concerns about collateral shortage and about whether the ECB will be practically able to achieve its bond purchase target without impairing market liquidity and the price transmission mechanism (i.e. without violating what the ECB defined as market neutrality condition).
The first issue of collateral shortage can be seen in the collapse of GC repo rates to negative territory since the beginning of last week for terms of greater than 3 months. 1yr Germany has been trading at close to -30bp; i.e. one can currently fund purchases of Bunds via the term repo market and achieve positive carry by even buying Bunds with yields between -20bp to -30bp. We note that this expensiveness in term repos shows how unwilling Bund holders are to depart from their collateral for more than a few days or weeks.
The second issue of market liquidity distortions is exacerbated by two developments, in our view:
1) by the big increase over the past two weeks in the universe of euro government bonds between 2y and 30y remaining maturity trading with a yield below -20bp. Figure 1 shows that this universe spiked to €170bn at the beginning of this week driven by Bunds. This means that almost 4% of the €4.6tr universe of 2y-30y euro government bonds and more than 20% of the €800bn universe of 2y-30y German government bonds traded below -20bp earlier this week, effectively inducing the ECB to extend the duration of its purchases.
2) by the sharp decrease in Bund liquidity as our market depth metric; i.e. the ability to transact in size without impacting market prices too much, collapsed this week (Figure 2). We measure market depth by averaging the size of the three best bids and offers each day for key markets. Figure 2 shows two such measures, for 10-year cash Treasuries (market depth measured in $mn) and German Bund futures (market depth measured in number of contracts). While both UST and Bund market depth have been trending lower in recent months and while the former moved recently below the Oct 15th low, what was striking this week was the divergence between a modest increase in UST market depth vs. an abrupt decline in Bund market depth. We note this development effectively challenges the market neutrality condition of the ECB from the first week of purchases already!
And then there is the just as critical issue of collateral scarcity.
But before we get into this point, we urge readers to refamiliarize themselves with the critical topic of shadow banking collateral volecity by rereading "What Shadow Banking Can Tell Us About The Fed's "Exit-Path" Dead End", since this is i) all that matters in a world in which every asset move is based on leverage of derivatives and in which the underlying collateral is so scarce, what matters is how efficiently its (re-)rehypothecated asset manifestation is re-used and ii) since virtually nobody actually understands this critical concept.
To be sure, our 2013 article was looking at the Fed's "exit" pathway, one which will soon be all the more critical if indeed Yellen is hoping to not only hike rates soon but to actively unwind the trillions in excess reserves. This is what Peter Stella wrote a year and a half ago on this topic:
Many major central banks are thinking strategically about exit pathways – how best to return to normal central banking. The main point of this column is to point to a key issue – the role of collateral – that has been under appreciated by many economists who are not in daily contact with financial markets.
When economies strengthen and central banks begin to drain reserves from the system, they will inevitably alter the composition of private sector asset portfolios.
* If good collateral is swapped for reserves, banks and nonbanks can use the collateral to fund create credition via what are known as collateral chains.
* If only term deposits are swapped for reserves, or if interest rates are raised only through IOR, the opportunity to lengthen collateral chains will be missed.
In today’s financial world, these chains are critical sources of money and credit creation – the days of textbook money-multipliers are long gone.
When it comes to reducing excess reserves, the ‘how’ matters as much as the ‘when’ and ‘how much’. Understanding this point requires mastery of the brave new world of shadow banks and re-hypothecation – a world that either did not exist or was truly in the shadows when most of us were taught about money and credit creation.
Stella's article also touched on something even more critical and even more misunderstood, namely why in a world in which rehypothecation, and shadow banking dominates, QE is in fact deflationary:
There is a great irony in the journalistic history of monetary policy. What many are calling central bank “money creation” “helicopter money” or “rolling the printing presses” may – in combination with tighter leverage ratios – lead to a tightening of bank credit and deflationary pressures. And all this is occurring while the spectre of uncontrolled credit expansion and monetary debasement are being decried countless times by those who have not recognized that yesteryear’s monetary paradigm is defunct.
... those such as the Fed and the ECB, who will keep piling on failed monetarist theories, in the process deflation the system even more (and pushing trillions and trillions of excess reserves into the equity markets, resulting in hyperinflation in risk prices and deflation everywhere else), until finally one day the central banks have no choice but to unleash hyperinflation. How? Well, rereading Ben Bernanke's seminal November 2002 "Deflation: Making Sure "It" Doesn't Happen Here" speech explains it all:
Even if households decided not to increase consumption but instead re-balanced their portfolios by using their extra cash to acquire real and financial assets, the resulting increase in asset values would lower the cost of capital and improve the balance sheet positions of potential borrowers. A money-financed tax cut is essentially equivalent to Milton Friedman's famous "helicopter drop" of money.
Said "helicopter drop" is coming, as is the hyperinflation it will engender via the inevitable collapse of fiat, but not quite yet: first the ECB, and then the PBOC, will jump through hoops and go through the motions to once again confirm they never grasped just how "yesteryear's monetary paradigm" became defunct, and inject that many more trillions of de novo created money into risky assets, meanwhile exporting deflation to anyone who isn't easing (thus explaining the 25 or so rate cuts in just the past two and a half months).
Indicatively, this is how we summarized this paradox nearly two years ago:
The paradox is that for the Fed to finally start "fixing" the economy, instead of the brokerage accounts of a few billionaires, it has to finally stop QE, because as long as it is running, the only "inflationary" sink hole will be global risk markets, and the only thing levitating are all asset prices enveloped in this bubble.
The Fed may have eased off the throttle, but it was merely replaced with even more easing by the BOJ and now, by the ECB. In a fungible, globally interconnected world, it means that in 2015 central banks will inject more liquidity than ever before.
Which brings us back to the topic of collateral shortage in Europe. And while the above section dealt with collateral shortage in the context of a monetary policy "exit", what JPM has done is flipped it around and shown just how profound are the limitations as the ECB tries to "enter" the same labyrinth of paradoxes that the Fed can supposedly exit in "15 minutes" (spoiler alert: it can't, and never will).
Back to JPM:
This week's speech by the ECB's Executive Board Member Benoît Coeuré tried to address both of the above issues. In particular the speech reinvigorated the debate about collateral shortage in the Euro area. Similar to his Oct 2012 speech, Coeuré made a distinction between collateral shortage and collateral scarcity "Scarcity is a fact and not a problem per se. Allocating scarce resources through prices is the way our economies work. The problem would be a shortage of collateral and/or an impaired price mechanism." At the time, in October 2012, the issue of collateral shortage arose because of the €2.5tr that was put forward as collateral by Euro area banks to be used in ECB's repo operations. We had argued at the time that those fears of collateral shortage were not justified as the ECB had in fact improved collateral availability. Via LTROs the ECB had created more than €1tr of reserves (i.e. cash) against low quality (e.g. peripheral and bank debt) or non marketable collateral (e.g. credit claims). Central bank reserves are equivalent to cash and represent highly-liquid high-quality collateral. In other words, the ECB had created at the time on net €1tr of additional high-quality (i.e. cash) collateral improving collateral availability.
However the situation is very different currently. It is true that in principle QE by itself does not affect the overall supply of collateral as government bonds are replaced with reserves; i.e. one form of high quality collateral is replaced by another form of high quality collateral. The only thing that is changing is the relative pricing of collateral. So in principle, the ECB's QE is merely creating scarcity by making one form of collateral (euro government bonds) more expensive relative to cash.
That's not all: the fungible reserves, because they can no longer be used by banks for downstream rehypothecation purposes, are instead used to invest in risky assets such as stocks. Unsure what this means? Then take one look at the mindblowing move in the Dax (or EuroStoxx) in the past 2 months since the announcement of Q€.
That's nothing more than frontrunning the ECB's reserves being fully allocated to risk assets instead of lying dormant in the form of European Government bonds.
Which then brings up the Stella point noted above regarding collateral rehypothecation front and center, because as JPM notes, "this assessment is complicated by reduced usage and efficiency of cash collateral in recent years. In particular, usage of government bond collateral has increased at the expense of cash collateral by both banks and investors. We note that buy-side investors are becoming more averse to usage of cash collateral for three reasons: 1) to avoid raising cash to meet margin calls by having to sell or repo assets from their portfolio thus increasing transaction costs; 2) to avoid the operational cost of processing interest payments back to the counterparty; and 3) to avoid becoming technically overweight cash which dampens returns, especially in the current zero or negative interest rate environment."
Banks are responding positively to reduced appetite for cash collateral by the buy side as this also helps banks to increase the efficiency of their own collateral management processes via re-hypothecation of security collateral and via consolidating and optimizing collateral across OTC derivatives, securities lending and repos to meet more onerous regulatory requirements. Re-hypothecation or re-use rate of security collateral has decreased post the Lehman crisis, but at around x2 currently it makes bond collateral more efficient than cash collateral."
Unsure what this means? Then refresh the following chart from 2013:
JPM's take:
In all, different to 2012 when the ECB was replacing low quality collateral with higher quality collateral, the ECB is currently replacing high efficiency government bond collateral with lower efficiency cash collateral. In a way an argument can be made against Coeuré’s speech that the ECB not only creates scarcity of one form of collateral vs. another but that it also creates shortage of collateral by replacing high efficiency collateral with low efficiency collateral.
That would be 100% correct, and one can now merely add Coeure to the ranks of those who don't understand that "yesteryear’s monetary paradigm is defunct."
Finally, it is not just the topic of swapping one asset with a higher collateral velocity for another with a far lower, if not zero, velocity, but also the issue of effective supply. As JPM notes, "another important aspect in Coeuré’s speech regarding market liquidity was the notion of "effective supply". What matters more for market liquidity and depth is indeed not the overall stock or supply of euro government bonds, but the size of the effective supply as some asset holders may not be willing to sell. And it is effective supply that would determine whether the Eurosystem be able to meet its quantitative targets. While it is inherently difficult to calculate effective supply we believe we can make some reasonable assumptions to proxy it."
But before JPM's analysis of effective supply in Europe (or lack thereof), it takes one more swipe at just how clueless the Goldman-advised ECB has become:
... we disagree with Coeuré’s view that, similar to their Japanese counterparts, "euro area banks will be more willing to sell euro government bonds to the ECB as they will receive central bank reserves, which in the current low interest rate environment can be viewed by banks as close substitutes for government bonds, and which count towards fulfilling e.g. the required liquidity ratios". The problem with this argument, in our view, is that the ratio of government bonds + reserves to assets for commercial banks remains low for European banks vs. those in the US or Japan. Euro area and UK banks, in particular, have a ratio of government bonds + reserves to assets of 7% vs. 30% for their US and Japanese counterparts. If Euro area banks sell no bonds at all to the ECB and at the same time the ECB injects €1.1tr into the Euro area banking system, the ratio of government bonds + reserves to assets would rise to 11%. This will still be well below the 30% for their US and Japanese counterparts. In addition, as we argued above, government bonds are worth more to banks from a collateral point of view given rehypothecation. And this is perhaps one of the reasons that banks are currently willing to hold euro government bonds with yields that are below -20bp. In all, we continue to believe that banks in the Euro area could end up selling bonds to the ECB, but to a much smaller extent than their Japanese counterparts given their much higher need for liquid assets.
Especially since the bulk of European bank "assets" are in the form of tens of trillions of "secured loans" which are turning "non-performing" at an alarming pace.
Which brings us to a most critical issue, and one which will be discussed in the coming months, potentially leading to the next European funding crisis - the ECB's stealthy attempts to incentivize the selling of government bonds by quietly moving them from "risk-free" to suggesting they do in fact have an implicit risk. The reason why the ECB is doing this is clear: it know very well that absnet a structural impetus to sell their bonds, European banks simply won't do that, as JPM correctly assumes. As a result, the ECB, and specifically ESRB, will likely soon "shock" the world when it reveals once again that far from having a zero-risk weighting, government bonds are in fact risky, and the logical thing for banks will be to sell them!
In addition, we find rather concerning the statement that "irrespective of the desirable review of the current regulatory framework of sovereign exposures, it is in the best interest of banks to reduce their exposure to their respective government, which should increase their willingness to sell." Clearly, euro area banks and investors are not factoring in a change in the risk weighting regime for government bonds in the foreseeable future. Coeuré’s speech coupled with the publication this week of an ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board) report arguing for increased risk weightings for sovereign bonds is concerning in our mind. Domestic banks have been stable holders of sovereign debt during the euro debt crisis and inducing a change of ownership to perhaps less stable holders, could risk making euro sovereign bond markets more vulnerable to future crisis.
And in a market in which the herd moves as one, and in which there is no liquidity (such as the European government bond market), all the ECB needs now is a controlled demolition whereby European banks, which ever since the infamous "whatever it takes" comment in July of 2012 suddenly decide to sell all their bond holdings. Even with the ECB as a backstop buyer, this essentially guarantees bond market chaos in the coming months.
Going back to the issue of calculating effective supply JPM references a recent report, "Who will sell to the ECB?" in which it argued that the Euro area looks more like Japan in terms of net bond withdrawal, "so various bond investors will need to sell bonds to the ECB eventually as was the case in Japan."
We also argued that the most likely candidate sellers to the ECB are non-euro area investors but with limited contribution from reserve managers, domestic retail investors as they shift away from bonds towards equities and domestic non-bank financial institutions. By looking at the holdings of euro government bonds by these sectors, i.e. investments funds, non-euro area banks/pension funds/insurance companies and others (excl. reserve managers), we calculate that the effective supply of euro government bonds is roughly 30% of overall supply (of €4.6tr stock of 2y-30y euro government bonds) which is not much higher than the 17% share the ECB intends to buy by September 2016. I.e. on our calculations effective supply could be as low as 30% of overall supply.
Here the ECB's last ditch backstop will also prove shortsighted and lacking:
The ECB has the provision that "in case the envisaged amounts to be purchased in a jurisdiction cannot be attained, national central banks will conduct substitute purchases in bonds issued by international organisations and multilateral development banks located in the euro area. These purchases will be subsumed under the 12% allocation to international organisations and multilateral development banks, which will be purchased by some national central banks". While this provision gives some flexibility to the ECB, we note it risks transmitting liquidity impairment from one jurisdiction to another. Raising the issue limit to above 25% for certain bonds or cutting the depo rate to more negative territory are possible options by the ECB as mentioned by our fixed colleagues, G. Salford section in this week’s GFIMS. But again this only shifts the market liquidity problem from one bond segment to another and risks making the ECB chasing its own tail, in our view.
And here, dear readers, is JPM's conclusion - phrased as politely as possible - why the ECB will fail in its QE endeavor, something we have been warning about for the past three years: "In all, we note the above analysis challenges the ability of the Eurosystem to meet its quantitative target without distorting market liquidity and price discovery."
What happens then, just before the wheels of the entire "modern" financial system fall off as the credibility of the "western central bank model" is lost once and for all, is that said model will desperately look toward China, and pray to Beijing to allow the PBOC to join the global monetization intervention in one last ditch effort to preserve the current financial system, before the infamous money paradropping helicopters are finally put into play.
That too will fail, but it will buy the status quo a few more precious months to prepare for what comes after the systemic reset which even JPM, indirectly, warns is fast approaching.
03/15/2015 11:38
Submitted by The World Complex
I have been plotting the US dollar index against the US dollar gold price for some time, looking for a sign.
Since about Halloween, the graph of USDX against gold price in USD has suggested deflation, as both parameters were increasing. I have previously argued that this behaviour benefits gold miners outside the US, as the number of US dollars they get for their product increases along with the purchasing power of those dollars.
In the past couple of weeks, the graph has reverted to the historical norm, wherein a rising US dollar is met by a falling dollar price for gold.
The blue line represents the deflationary trend discussed here and here, and the gold hyperbolae are isoquants, described here and here. An isoquant is a locus of points where the product of the USDX and the USD gold price is constant. The "traditional" behaviour of gold with respect to the US dollar is for the system to evolve along an isoquant--with the gold price rising as the US dollar falls and vice versa.
In the graph above we have plotted the isoquants for the 1000 and the 1150 level. The 1000 level has been important in the past. The initial rise in the gold price in 2010-11 began by migrating along the 1000 isoquant level, and the collapse in gold price in 2013 resulted in the graph bouncing several times off the 1000 isoquant (and penetrating it slightly twice).
Over the last few weeks the system has been moving along the 1150 isoquant. The 1150 isoquant has had some small influence on the system in the past--there is a knot just below the 1150 isoquant as the gold price rose sharply in 2011, suggesting that 1150 was a difficult level to break above. Similarly, during the collapse in 2013, the curve bounced twice off the 1150 isoquant before running down to the 1000 level.
In the last few weeks, we have seen what looks like a transition from deflationary behaviour to a more traditional behaviour in which gold acts as the "anti-dollar". I don't think this represents a sea-change--I still think there is more deflation to come. But we might see a change in behaviour for some time before deflation returns.
As noted before, deflation was temporarily overcome by the various central bank interventions since 2010. We then had over four years without deflation, before it re-established itself late last year (at least in this index). It is unclear whether we are seeing the result of a new intervention, which will once again probably be temporary (but this could be a long time). Alternatively, we are seeing a battle between investors who see inflation and those who foresee deflation, with the inflationistas holding the better hand, for the moment.
Saxobank's Chief Economist: 2015 Is A Lost Year (and Here's Why)
Tyler D.
03/15/2015 14:00
Even though the US has seen so-called 'strong' job numbers and Europe is forecast to grow 1.5% this year, Saxo Bank’s Chief Economist Steen Jakobsen says 2015 will be a lost year. That’s because the two supposed growth engines of the world - the US economy and emerging markets - will grind to a halt and slow Europe down in the process. As we already pointed out, for the first time since Lehman, US earnings are now expected to drop in 2015 - apparently confirming this second-half hockey-stick is now dead... and as Jakobsen explains in this brief clip, capital preservation remains a must going into the second quarter of the year... with 10Y Treasury yields expected below 1.5% by the end of the year.
The Full Explanation Of How The ECB Broke Europe's Bond Market
Tyler D.
03/15/2015 15:44
It was almost three years ago to the day when Zero Hedge first explained the biggest problem facing Europe when it comes to unconventional monetary policy: the lack, not scarcity, but outright shortage of collateral.
Initially, our focus was on private-sector collateral, and if one had to summarize the key difference between the US and Europe in one chart, it would be this one, showing that while in the US the split between secured and unsecured funding was roughly even, in Europe, some 90% of corporate funding was on bank loan books, with only 10% in the form of (unsecured) corporate bonds (which also explains why in Europe NPLs, aka bad bank debt is by far the biggest problem facing the financial industry).
Subsequently, we also showed that the collateral shortage is not only in the private bond market, but in the public one as well, because there simply wouldn't be enough net supply in Europe to cover the ECB's ambitious demands.
Three years later, and following the first week of direct ECB monetization in the bond market, we have proof not only that our warnings were accurate, but that the worst case outcome for the ECB - a failure to achieve its stated goals is now only a matter of time. The reason? After just a few days of intervention, the ECB's grand monetization experiment has already managed to get derailed.
To avoid repeating ourselves yet again, here is JPM with the full explanation of how the ECB appears to have broken the already rickety European bond market.
First, there is the issue of collapsing market liquidity as manifested by the plunge in European bond market depth to near record lows. Quote JPM:
The price action over the past few weeks and the market impact that the ECB purchases (of €9.8bn in three days) had in the first week of its QE program are raising concerns about collateral shortage and about whether the ECB will be practically able to achieve its bond purchase target without impairing market liquidity and the price transmission mechanism (i.e. without violating what the ECB defined as market neutrality condition).
The first issue of collateral shortage can be seen in the collapse of GC repo rates to negative territory since the beginning of last week for terms of greater than 3 months. 1yr Germany has been trading at close to -30bp; i.e. one can currently fund purchases of Bunds via the term repo market and achieve positive carry by even buying Bunds with yields between -20bp to -30bp. We note that this expensiveness in term repos shows how unwilling Bund holders are to depart from their collateral for more than a few days or weeks.
The second issue of market liquidity distortions is exacerbated by two developments, in our view:
1) by the big increase over the past two weeks in the universe of euro government bonds between 2y and 30y remaining maturity trading with a yield below -20bp. Figure 1 shows that this universe spiked to €170bn at the beginning of this week driven by Bunds. This means that almost 4% of the €4.6tr universe of 2y-30y euro government bonds and more than 20% of the €800bn universe of 2y-30y German government bonds traded below -20bp earlier this week, effectively inducing the ECB to extend the duration of its purchases.
2) by the sharp decrease in Bund liquidity as our market depth metric; i.e. the ability to transact in size without impacting market prices too much, collapsed this week (Figure 2). We measure market depth by averaging the size of the three best bids and offers each day for key markets. Figure 2 shows two such measures, for 10-year cash Treasuries (market depth measured in $mn) and German Bund futures (market depth measured in number of contracts). While both UST and Bund market depth have been trending lower in recent months and while the former moved recently below the Oct 15th low, what was striking this week was the divergence between a modest increase in UST market depth vs. an abrupt decline in Bund market depth. We note this development effectively challenges the market neutrality condition of the ECB from the first week of purchases already!
And then there is the just as critical issue of collateral scarcity.
But before we get into this point, we urge readers to refamiliarize themselves with the critical topic of shadow banking collateral volecity by rereading "What Shadow Banking Can Tell Us About The Fed's "Exit-Path" Dead End", since this is i) all that matters in a world in which every asset move is based on leverage of derivatives and in which the underlying collateral is so scarce, what matters is how efficiently its (re-)rehypothecated asset manifestation is re-used and ii) since virtually nobody actually understands this critical concept.
To be sure, our 2013 article was looking at the Fed's "exit" pathway, one which will soon be all the more critical if indeed Yellen is hoping to not only hike rates soon but to actively unwind the trillions in excess reserves. This is what Peter Stella wrote a year and a half ago on this topic:
Many major central banks are thinking strategically about exit pathways – how best to return to normal central banking. The main point of this column is to point to a key issue – the role of collateral – that has been under appreciated by many economists who are not in daily contact with financial markets.
When economies strengthen and central banks begin to drain reserves from the system, they will inevitably alter the composition of private sector asset portfolios.
* If good collateral is swapped for reserves, banks and nonbanks can use the collateral to fund create credition via what are known as collateral chains.
* If only term deposits are swapped for reserves, or if interest rates are raised only through IOR, the opportunity to lengthen collateral chains will be missed.
In today’s financial world, these chains are critical sources of money and credit creation – the days of textbook money-multipliers are long gone.
When it comes to reducing excess reserves, the ‘how’ matters as much as the ‘when’ and ‘how much’. Understanding this point requires mastery of the brave new world of shadow banks and re-hypothecation – a world that either did not exist or was truly in the shadows when most of us were taught about money and credit creation.
Stella's article also touched on something even more critical and even more misunderstood, namely why in a world in which rehypothecation, and shadow banking dominates, QE is in fact deflationary:
There is a great irony in the journalistic history of monetary policy. What many are calling central bank “money creation” “helicopter money” or “rolling the printing presses” may – in combination with tighter leverage ratios – lead to a tightening of bank credit and deflationary pressures. And all this is occurring while the spectre of uncontrolled credit expansion and monetary debasement are being decried countless times by those who have not recognized that yesteryear’s monetary paradigm is defunct.
... those such as the Fed and the ECB, who will keep piling on failed monetarist theories, in the process deflation the system even more (and pushing trillions and trillions of excess reserves into the equity markets, resulting in hyperinflation in risk prices and deflation everywhere else), until finally one day the central banks have no choice but to unleash hyperinflation. How? Well, rereading Ben Bernanke's seminal November 2002 "Deflation: Making Sure "It" Doesn't Happen Here" speech explains it all:
Even if households decided not to increase consumption but instead re-balanced their portfolios by using their extra cash to acquire real and financial assets, the resulting increase in asset values would lower the cost of capital and improve the balance sheet positions of potential borrowers. A money-financed tax cut is essentially equivalent to Milton Friedman's famous "helicopter drop" of money.
Said "helicopter drop" is coming, as is the hyperinflation it will engender via the inevitable collapse of fiat, but not quite yet: first the ECB, and then the PBOC, will jump through hoops and go through the motions to once again confirm they never grasped just how "yesteryear's monetary paradigm" became defunct, and inject that many more trillions of de novo created money into risky assets, meanwhile exporting deflation to anyone who isn't easing (thus explaining the 25 or so rate cuts in just the past two and a half months).
Indicatively, this is how we summarized this paradox nearly two years ago:
The paradox is that for the Fed to finally start "fixing" the economy, instead of the brokerage accounts of a few billionaires, it has to finally stop QE, because as long as it is running, the only "inflationary" sink hole will be global risk markets, and the only thing levitating are all asset prices enveloped in this bubble.
The Fed may have eased off the throttle, but it was merely replaced with even more easing by the BOJ and now, by the ECB. In a fungible, globally interconnected world, it means that in 2015 central banks will inject more liquidity than ever before.
Which brings us back to the topic of collateral shortage in Europe. And while the above section dealt with collateral shortage in the context of a monetary policy "exit", what JPM has done is flipped it around and shown just how profound are the limitations as the ECB tries to "enter" the same labyrinth of paradoxes that the Fed can supposedly exit in "15 minutes" (spoiler alert: it can't, and never will).
Back to JPM:
This week's speech by the ECB's Executive Board Member Benoît Coeuré tried to address both of the above issues. In particular the speech reinvigorated the debate about collateral shortage in the Euro area. Similar to his Oct 2012 speech, Coeuré made a distinction between collateral shortage and collateral scarcity "Scarcity is a fact and not a problem per se. Allocating scarce resources through prices is the way our economies work. The problem would be a shortage of collateral and/or an impaired price mechanism." At the time, in October 2012, the issue of collateral shortage arose because of the €2.5tr that was put forward as collateral by Euro area banks to be used in ECB's repo operations. We had argued at the time that those fears of collateral shortage were not justified as the ECB had in fact improved collateral availability. Via LTROs the ECB had created more than €1tr of reserves (i.e. cash) against low quality (e.g. peripheral and bank debt) or non marketable collateral (e.g. credit claims). Central bank reserves are equivalent to cash and represent highly-liquid high-quality collateral. In other words, the ECB had created at the time on net €1tr of additional high-quality (i.e. cash) collateral improving collateral availability.
However the situation is very different currently. It is true that in principle QE by itself does not affect the overall supply of collateral as government bonds are replaced with reserves; i.e. one form of high quality collateral is replaced by another form of high quality collateral. The only thing that is changing is the relative pricing of collateral. So in principle, the ECB's QE is merely creating scarcity by making one form of collateral (euro government bonds) more expensive relative to cash.
That's not all: the fungible reserves, because they can no longer be used by banks for downstream rehypothecation purposes, are instead used to invest in risky assets such as stocks. Unsure what this means? Then take one look at the mindblowing move in the Dax (or EuroStoxx) in the past 2 months since the announcement of Q€.
That's nothing more than frontrunning the ECB's reserves being fully allocated to risk assets instead of lying dormant in the form of European Government bonds.
Which then brings up the Stella point noted above regarding collateral rehypothecation front and center, because as JPM notes, "this assessment is complicated by reduced usage and efficiency of cash collateral in recent years. In particular, usage of government bond collateral has increased at the expense of cash collateral by both banks and investors. We note that buy-side investors are becoming more averse to usage of cash collateral for three reasons: 1) to avoid raising cash to meet margin calls by having to sell or repo assets from their portfolio thus increasing transaction costs; 2) to avoid the operational cost of processing interest payments back to the counterparty; and 3) to avoid becoming technically overweight cash which dampens returns, especially in the current zero or negative interest rate environment."
Banks are responding positively to reduced appetite for cash collateral by the buy side as this also helps banks to increase the efficiency of their own collateral management processes via re-hypothecation of security collateral and via consolidating and optimizing collateral across OTC derivatives, securities lending and repos to meet more onerous regulatory requirements. Re-hypothecation or re-use rate of security collateral has decreased post the Lehman crisis, but at around x2 currently it makes bond collateral more efficient than cash collateral."
Unsure what this means? Then refresh the following chart from 2013:
JPM's take:
In all, different to 2012 when the ECB was replacing low quality collateral with higher quality collateral, the ECB is currently replacing high efficiency government bond collateral with lower efficiency cash collateral. In a way an argument can be made against Coeuré’s speech that the ECB not only creates scarcity of one form of collateral vs. another but that it also creates shortage of collateral by replacing high efficiency collateral with low efficiency collateral.
That would be 100% correct, and one can now merely add Coeure to the ranks of those who don't understand that "yesteryear’s monetary paradigm is defunct."
Finally, it is not just the topic of swapping one asset with a higher collateral velocity for another with a far lower, if not zero, velocity, but also the issue of effective supply. As JPM notes, "another important aspect in Coeuré’s speech regarding market liquidity was the notion of "effective supply". What matters more for market liquidity and depth is indeed not the overall stock or supply of euro government bonds, but the size of the effective supply as some asset holders may not be willing to sell. And it is effective supply that would determine whether the Eurosystem be able to meet its quantitative targets. While it is inherently difficult to calculate effective supply we believe we can make some reasonable assumptions to proxy it."
But before JPM's analysis of effective supply in Europe (or lack thereof), it takes one more swipe at just how clueless the Goldman-advised ECB has become:
... we disagree with Coeuré’s view that, similar to their Japanese counterparts, "euro area banks will be more willing to sell euro government bonds to the ECB as they will receive central bank reserves, which in the current low interest rate environment can be viewed by banks as close substitutes for government bonds, and which count towards fulfilling e.g. the required liquidity ratios". The problem with this argument, in our view, is that the ratio of government bonds + reserves to assets for commercial banks remains low for European banks vs. those in the US or Japan. Euro area and UK banks, in particular, have a ratio of government bonds + reserves to assets of 7% vs. 30% for their US and Japanese counterparts. If Euro area banks sell no bonds at all to the ECB and at the same time the ECB injects €1.1tr into the Euro area banking system, the ratio of government bonds + reserves to assets would rise to 11%. This will still be well below the 30% for their US and Japanese counterparts. In addition, as we argued above, government bonds are worth more to banks from a collateral point of view given rehypothecation. And this is perhaps one of the reasons that banks are currently willing to hold euro government bonds with yields that are below -20bp. In all, we continue to believe that banks in the Euro area could end up selling bonds to the ECB, but to a much smaller extent than their Japanese counterparts given their much higher need for liquid assets.
Especially since the bulk of European bank "assets" are in the form of tens of trillions of "secured loans" which are turning "non-performing" at an alarming pace.
Which brings us to a most critical issue, and one which will be discussed in the coming months, potentially leading to the next European funding crisis - the ECB's stealthy attempts to incentivize the selling of government bonds by quietly moving them from "risk-free" to suggesting they do in fact have an implicit risk. The reason why the ECB is doing this is clear: it know very well that absnet a structural impetus to sell their bonds, European banks simply won't do that, as JPM correctly assumes. As a result, the ECB, and specifically ESRB, will likely soon "shock" the world when it reveals once again that far from having a zero-risk weighting, government bonds are in fact risky, and the logical thing for banks will be to sell them!
In addition, we find rather concerning the statement that "irrespective of the desirable review of the current regulatory framework of sovereign exposures, it is in the best interest of banks to reduce their exposure to their respective government, which should increase their willingness to sell." Clearly, euro area banks and investors are not factoring in a change in the risk weighting regime for government bonds in the foreseeable future. Coeuré’s speech coupled with the publication this week of an ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board) report arguing for increased risk weightings for sovereign bonds is concerning in our mind. Domestic banks have been stable holders of sovereign debt during the euro debt crisis and inducing a change of ownership to perhaps less stable holders, could risk making euro sovereign bond markets more vulnerable to future crisis.
And in a market in which the herd moves as one, and in which there is no liquidity (such as the European government bond market), all the ECB needs now is a controlled demolition whereby European banks, which ever since the infamous "whatever it takes" comment in July of 2012 suddenly decide to sell all their bond holdings. Even with the ECB as a backstop buyer, this essentially guarantees bond market chaos in the coming months.
Going back to the issue of calculating effective supply JPM references a recent report, "Who will sell to the ECB?" in which it argued that the Euro area looks more like Japan in terms of net bond withdrawal, "so various bond investors will need to sell bonds to the ECB eventually as was the case in Japan."
We also argued that the most likely candidate sellers to the ECB are non-euro area investors but with limited contribution from reserve managers, domestic retail investors as they shift away from bonds towards equities and domestic non-bank financial institutions. By looking at the holdings of euro government bonds by these sectors, i.e. investments funds, non-euro area banks/pension funds/insurance companies and others (excl. reserve managers), we calculate that the effective supply of euro government bonds is roughly 30% of overall supply (of €4.6tr stock of 2y-30y euro government bonds) which is not much higher than the 17% share the ECB intends to buy by September 2016. I.e. on our calculations effective supply could be as low as 30% of overall supply.
Here the ECB's last ditch backstop will also prove shortsighted and lacking:
The ECB has the provision that "in case the envisaged amounts to be purchased in a jurisdiction cannot be attained, national central banks will conduct substitute purchases in bonds issued by international organisations and multilateral development banks located in the euro area. These purchases will be subsumed under the 12% allocation to international organisations and multilateral development banks, which will be purchased by some national central banks". While this provision gives some flexibility to the ECB, we note it risks transmitting liquidity impairment from one jurisdiction to another. Raising the issue limit to above 25% for certain bonds or cutting the depo rate to more negative territory are possible options by the ECB as mentioned by our fixed colleagues, G. Salford section in this week’s GFIMS. But again this only shifts the market liquidity problem from one bond segment to another and risks making the ECB chasing its own tail, in our view.
And here, dear readers, is JPM's conclusion - phrased as politely as possible - why the ECB will fail in its QE endeavor, something we have been warning about for the past three years: "In all, we note the above analysis challenges the ability of the Eurosystem to meet its quantitative target without distorting market liquidity and price discovery."
What happens then, just before the wheels of the entire "modern" financial system fall off as the credibility of the "western central bank model" is lost once and for all, is that said model will desperately look toward China, and pray to Beijing to allow the PBOC to join the global monetization intervention in one last ditch effort to preserve the current financial system, before the infamous money paradropping helicopters are finally put into play.
That too will fail, but it will buy the status quo a few more precious months to prepare for what comes after the systemic reset which even JPM, indirectly, warns is fast approaching.
- Fenix
- Mensajes: 16334
- Registrado: Vie Abr 23, 2010 2:36 am
Re: Viernes 20/03/15 Inflacion de Atlanta
por Fenix » Vie Mar 20, 2015 8:24 pm
Indeed This Time Is Different: Because It’s Far Worse
03/15/2015 15:10 -0400
Authored by Mark St.Cyr,
Suddenly the narrative that “everything is awesome” is showing to not be as “awesome” as it was first proclaimed. Merely a few months have passed since the ending of QE and praises of awesomeness everywhere are morphing into questions more akin to “Oh no: not again!” And with that we are now watching those who pushed, pulled, and levitated that narrative scramble desperately to push another narrative back onto the stage that worked so many times before: “Every sell off over the last 6 years has shown to be a profitable buying opportunity.” i.e., Just buy the dip (JBTFD). Yet it would seem these dips; are far different.
Just for context, over the past week, if you were one of the few remaining “home-gamers” still watching CNBC™, you would have been delighted to see once again their host Jim Cramer go through great pains to explain why he discounts the idea that we’re in a bubble to once again like ringing a bell (he uses buzzers and gongs I believe) the indexes sell off in dramatic fashion bringing back memories of Bear Sterns. As of today any gains for the year have been quelled. But not too worry, for he also contends you should have “dry powder” at the ready. i.e., Be ready to “JBTFD.”
My thoughts? “Investing” isn’t going to be so easy this time. Why? Let me be so bold to use the same meme touted by the likes of those who sold it: Because, it truly is – different this time. Without QE, not only is there no one buying. What’s far, far, far, (did I say far?) worse is: There’s no one to sell too!
Effectively through the interventionist policies over the last 6 years via the QE program what the Fed. has accomplished, whether intentionally, or merely complicit in the results were: to systematically exterminate the dreaded “Short sellers.” Today everybody is currently on one side of the market. And that side is: long.
The dreaded “Bears” that would even out the markets taking positions on the other side are all about gone. Every empirical statistics, every indicator measured whether it be Investor Intelligence™ data and the like shows, historically – they’ve never been so lopsided. Ever! But that’s only the beginning.
During this month another note worthy point in history is celebrating its first anniversary; the release and uproar to Michael Lewis’ Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt (March, 2014 W.Norton & Company)
Here was when the public at large first heard about what a lot of us have been trying to both articulate, as well as warn about. Here for the first time on the media’s big stage the parasitic nature plaguing the financial markets via high frequency trading (HFT) was brought under lights. It sent many of these firms scurrying for cover.
It was shown in great detail if you did try to mount a defense of why they (HFT) were “good for the markets” you would only dig a deeper hole to bury both your reputation, as well as dignity. This was demonstrated with the shameful, as well as lie exposing public display of the then CEO of BATS™ during a televised skirmish with Brad Katsuyama of Flash Boy’s fame. Showing everyone just how broken the integrity of the markets had become. Both functionally, as well as ethically. He vacated his position in disgrace weeks later, but the HFT parasitic machine has since only grown ever larger. So much so the only thing left for this beast to feed upon might in turn be – its brethren.
Now it being reported one HFT firm is suing another for “Egregious Manipulation.” You just can’t make this stuff up. Nonetheless what you can “up” is the level and lengths to which one HFT firm will pursue to have the advantage to front run “provide liquidity” quicker than its competitors because; they’re upping their game with the advent of lasers in an all out arms race to see just who will be faster to the “average investors” blood supply. Why? Easy…
Lasers are faster than microwaves. And when the game is to “view” the other fellows hand before they can blink: You win! Because trading is not about fair play – it’s about winning. Just ask a company like Virtu™. A HFT firm that’s had only 1 (no that’s not a typo) losing trading day in 1485 (neither is that one) trading days and counting. Who knew legitimate, ethical trading could be so “awesome!” I ‘ll bet dollars to doughnuts Bernie Madoff muses: “My 12% returns set off alarm bells and here I sit? WTF!”
But the HFT story along with the Fed. have created another unintended consequence that might prove far greater than the “riding the tiger” analogy invokes. What they’ve created may have more in common with a laboratory monster that becomes uncontrollable, precisely at the wrong time turning on its masters. For the once vast legion of (human) veteran traders who spent their lives on the floors of the exchanges and in the “pits” are all but gone.
What was once possibly the greatest “buffer” as to understand and take positions for, or against irrational selling or buying behavior has disappeared. Much of it stems with the advent of HFT fueled by QE money. But there have also been other issues right alongside running in concert that forced many human traders out of the markets. Not only was there the sheer onslaught of mechanized stop running prevalent that human traders needed to be concerned with. They could also wake to find the company that held their resources for those positions goes “poof” in the night. e.g. The MF Global™ debacle under then CEO Jon Corzine. Is it any wonder why volumes are so anemic?
Within that group of displaced traders (in my opinion) is the one set you’ll need more than anyone in a bull-run going bad: Shorts who need to buy as to cover their positions.
After 6 years of this incessant rewarding to JBTFD with free money supplied by the Federal Reserve fueled with the ever parasitic nature of HFT, the vast majority of this once prominent group; has been all but annihilated. Today, no longer are there “people” to help slow or quell a sell off. Only machines.
What I also find both fascinating as well as frightening is the sheer fact that HFT and all it entails is both manned as well as programmed by math aficionados – not veteran traders. It has been a well-known fact if you are a “veteran trader” looking for work – you need not apply. If you’re a math Ph.D with no trading experience (or even right out of school) the HFT world is your oyster.
Let me ask you this dear reader: Just how well do you think all this HFT and program trading is going to perform when it’s been both formulated, as well as only tested, in a “bull” market environment that was fueled with “free” money? Along with the people creating these programs and orders for execution quite possibly – have never witnessed a true sell off. Ever! Welcome to the pinnacle of “the rise of the machines.”
Remember that immortal line from Trading Places (June, 1983 Paramount Pictures) when the Duke’s were losing their fortune “Turn those machines back on!” Will we need to do the exact opposite when the machines suddenly sell into an empty “pit” of buyers when as its been documented by NANEX™ liquidity vanishes? So much for “providing liquidity” when that liquidity is their own fortunes bleeding from the screens. Plugs will be argued (if not begged) too be pulled.
And that’s just the start of why “this time it’s different.” Monetary policy on a global scale is now becoming unhinged and the carry trades associated within the currency markets are just beginning to show their distress.
Today the Euro is not falling – its plunging. Plunging in a way that is reminiscent of a monetary policy that is coming unglued. The so-called “smart crowd” all professed how the weakening of a currency helps, not hurts a country for both its exports as well as its competitiveness on other fronts. So how can all this “good” be so bad you ask? Easy, when it does exactly what it was expressed it shouldn’t do. Plunge – in what has all the appearance of an uncontrollable rout. You’ll know it’s fully off the rails if we here reports supermodel Gisele Bündchen no longer wants to be paid in Euros. But I digress.
China’s economy is showing contraction. Central Banks around the globe have cut and are still cutting interest rates. 24 to date, and that number is expected to grow because everywhere there was supposed to be growth – is contracting, if not out right falling off a cliff. e.g. Look to Australia as just the latest example.
Mario Draghi’s latest “bazooka event” is shaping up to be a total disaster of unforeseen consequences. The where, what, and how all that buying spree of “whatever it takes” is now showing far more concerns than the irrational exuberance everyone envisioned when they had to guess what a true “Full Monty” was going to reveal. Now that it’s been shown, it seems it’s not going to perform as well as anticipated. Well imagine that. Who’da thunk it?
The list goes on, and on. But (and it’s a very, very big but) just when you think it couldn’t get any more narrative busting than the above portends, you have the Federal Reserve’s FOMC meeting this coming week. Here is where everything (and I do mean everything) can come unglued, unravelled, _____________. (fill in your own favorite descriptor)
This meeting is probably more important than any meeting since former chairman Bernanke’s famous (some of us still view it as infamous) Jackson Hole speech of 2010 where he announced the implementation of QE2 and implied QE4ever. And the markets haven’t looked back (or down) ever since. However this time “it’s different.”
The Fed. as of today has pulled the plug on QE, and implied it’s time to raise interest rates. All at a time the global economy is showing just how addicted it truly was to the Fed.’s QE policy of “free” money along with near zero interest rates leaving the Fed. with the difficult choice of exactly which policy are they to enact. For both will have dramatically different results.
One is to go back on all they’ve said, admitting they got everything wrong via the signaling that not only will interest rates not be raised; but in addition the possibility for more QE is at the ready, sending critics of the Fed. spiraling into a concerted effort demanding both an audit as well as hearings. Or…
They stick to their guns, signal the intent to raise rates sending the global economy and markets into a tail spin of unraveling carry trades, currency wars and quite possibly a full-blown currency based Armageddon.
Who knows what will transpire. But one thing is certain: This time is – truly different.
Words Matter - The Propagandists Know
Submitted by T.
03/15/2015 - 16:20
In the age when torture has become "enhanced interrogation techniques"; when the rich are "job creators"; when austerity is rephrased as "reforms"; "scarcity" does not mean shortage; and when murdered children are "collateral damage"; it is good to remember these brilliant words from the late, great, George Carlin.
03/15/2015 15:10 -0400
Authored by Mark St.Cyr,
Suddenly the narrative that “everything is awesome” is showing to not be as “awesome” as it was first proclaimed. Merely a few months have passed since the ending of QE and praises of awesomeness everywhere are morphing into questions more akin to “Oh no: not again!” And with that we are now watching those who pushed, pulled, and levitated that narrative scramble desperately to push another narrative back onto the stage that worked so many times before: “Every sell off over the last 6 years has shown to be a profitable buying opportunity.” i.e., Just buy the dip (JBTFD). Yet it would seem these dips; are far different.
Just for context, over the past week, if you were one of the few remaining “home-gamers” still watching CNBC™, you would have been delighted to see once again their host Jim Cramer go through great pains to explain why he discounts the idea that we’re in a bubble to once again like ringing a bell (he uses buzzers and gongs I believe) the indexes sell off in dramatic fashion bringing back memories of Bear Sterns. As of today any gains for the year have been quelled. But not too worry, for he also contends you should have “dry powder” at the ready. i.e., Be ready to “JBTFD.”
My thoughts? “Investing” isn’t going to be so easy this time. Why? Let me be so bold to use the same meme touted by the likes of those who sold it: Because, it truly is – different this time. Without QE, not only is there no one buying. What’s far, far, far, (did I say far?) worse is: There’s no one to sell too!
Effectively through the interventionist policies over the last 6 years via the QE program what the Fed. has accomplished, whether intentionally, or merely complicit in the results were: to systematically exterminate the dreaded “Short sellers.” Today everybody is currently on one side of the market. And that side is: long.
The dreaded “Bears” that would even out the markets taking positions on the other side are all about gone. Every empirical statistics, every indicator measured whether it be Investor Intelligence™ data and the like shows, historically – they’ve never been so lopsided. Ever! But that’s only the beginning.
During this month another note worthy point in history is celebrating its first anniversary; the release and uproar to Michael Lewis’ Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt (March, 2014 W.Norton & Company)
Here was when the public at large first heard about what a lot of us have been trying to both articulate, as well as warn about. Here for the first time on the media’s big stage the parasitic nature plaguing the financial markets via high frequency trading (HFT) was brought under lights. It sent many of these firms scurrying for cover.
It was shown in great detail if you did try to mount a defense of why they (HFT) were “good for the markets” you would only dig a deeper hole to bury both your reputation, as well as dignity. This was demonstrated with the shameful, as well as lie exposing public display of the then CEO of BATS™ during a televised skirmish with Brad Katsuyama of Flash Boy’s fame. Showing everyone just how broken the integrity of the markets had become. Both functionally, as well as ethically. He vacated his position in disgrace weeks later, but the HFT parasitic machine has since only grown ever larger. So much so the only thing left for this beast to feed upon might in turn be – its brethren.
Now it being reported one HFT firm is suing another for “Egregious Manipulation.” You just can’t make this stuff up. Nonetheless what you can “up” is the level and lengths to which one HFT firm will pursue to have the advantage to front run “provide liquidity” quicker than its competitors because; they’re upping their game with the advent of lasers in an all out arms race to see just who will be faster to the “average investors” blood supply. Why? Easy…
Lasers are faster than microwaves. And when the game is to “view” the other fellows hand before they can blink: You win! Because trading is not about fair play – it’s about winning. Just ask a company like Virtu™. A HFT firm that’s had only 1 (no that’s not a typo) losing trading day in 1485 (neither is that one) trading days and counting. Who knew legitimate, ethical trading could be so “awesome!” I ‘ll bet dollars to doughnuts Bernie Madoff muses: “My 12% returns set off alarm bells and here I sit? WTF!”
But the HFT story along with the Fed. have created another unintended consequence that might prove far greater than the “riding the tiger” analogy invokes. What they’ve created may have more in common with a laboratory monster that becomes uncontrollable, precisely at the wrong time turning on its masters. For the once vast legion of (human) veteran traders who spent their lives on the floors of the exchanges and in the “pits” are all but gone.
What was once possibly the greatest “buffer” as to understand and take positions for, or against irrational selling or buying behavior has disappeared. Much of it stems with the advent of HFT fueled by QE money. But there have also been other issues right alongside running in concert that forced many human traders out of the markets. Not only was there the sheer onslaught of mechanized stop running prevalent that human traders needed to be concerned with. They could also wake to find the company that held their resources for those positions goes “poof” in the night. e.g. The MF Global™ debacle under then CEO Jon Corzine. Is it any wonder why volumes are so anemic?
Within that group of displaced traders (in my opinion) is the one set you’ll need more than anyone in a bull-run going bad: Shorts who need to buy as to cover their positions.
After 6 years of this incessant rewarding to JBTFD with free money supplied by the Federal Reserve fueled with the ever parasitic nature of HFT, the vast majority of this once prominent group; has been all but annihilated. Today, no longer are there “people” to help slow or quell a sell off. Only machines.
What I also find both fascinating as well as frightening is the sheer fact that HFT and all it entails is both manned as well as programmed by math aficionados – not veteran traders. It has been a well-known fact if you are a “veteran trader” looking for work – you need not apply. If you’re a math Ph.D with no trading experience (or even right out of school) the HFT world is your oyster.
Let me ask you this dear reader: Just how well do you think all this HFT and program trading is going to perform when it’s been both formulated, as well as only tested, in a “bull” market environment that was fueled with “free” money? Along with the people creating these programs and orders for execution quite possibly – have never witnessed a true sell off. Ever! Welcome to the pinnacle of “the rise of the machines.”
Remember that immortal line from Trading Places (June, 1983 Paramount Pictures) when the Duke’s were losing their fortune “Turn those machines back on!” Will we need to do the exact opposite when the machines suddenly sell into an empty “pit” of buyers when as its been documented by NANEX™ liquidity vanishes? So much for “providing liquidity” when that liquidity is their own fortunes bleeding from the screens. Plugs will be argued (if not begged) too be pulled.
And that’s just the start of why “this time it’s different.” Monetary policy on a global scale is now becoming unhinged and the carry trades associated within the currency markets are just beginning to show their distress.
Today the Euro is not falling – its plunging. Plunging in a way that is reminiscent of a monetary policy that is coming unglued. The so-called “smart crowd” all professed how the weakening of a currency helps, not hurts a country for both its exports as well as its competitiveness on other fronts. So how can all this “good” be so bad you ask? Easy, when it does exactly what it was expressed it shouldn’t do. Plunge – in what has all the appearance of an uncontrollable rout. You’ll know it’s fully off the rails if we here reports supermodel Gisele Bündchen no longer wants to be paid in Euros. But I digress.
China’s economy is showing contraction. Central Banks around the globe have cut and are still cutting interest rates. 24 to date, and that number is expected to grow because everywhere there was supposed to be growth – is contracting, if not out right falling off a cliff. e.g. Look to Australia as just the latest example.
Mario Draghi’s latest “bazooka event” is shaping up to be a total disaster of unforeseen consequences. The where, what, and how all that buying spree of “whatever it takes” is now showing far more concerns than the irrational exuberance everyone envisioned when they had to guess what a true “Full Monty” was going to reveal. Now that it’s been shown, it seems it’s not going to perform as well as anticipated. Well imagine that. Who’da thunk it?
The list goes on, and on. But (and it’s a very, very big but) just when you think it couldn’t get any more narrative busting than the above portends, you have the Federal Reserve’s FOMC meeting this coming week. Here is where everything (and I do mean everything) can come unglued, unravelled, _____________. (fill in your own favorite descriptor)
This meeting is probably more important than any meeting since former chairman Bernanke’s famous (some of us still view it as infamous) Jackson Hole speech of 2010 where he announced the implementation of QE2 and implied QE4ever. And the markets haven’t looked back (or down) ever since. However this time “it’s different.”
The Fed. as of today has pulled the plug on QE, and implied it’s time to raise interest rates. All at a time the global economy is showing just how addicted it truly was to the Fed.’s QE policy of “free” money along with near zero interest rates leaving the Fed. with the difficult choice of exactly which policy are they to enact. For both will have dramatically different results.
One is to go back on all they’ve said, admitting they got everything wrong via the signaling that not only will interest rates not be raised; but in addition the possibility for more QE is at the ready, sending critics of the Fed. spiraling into a concerted effort demanding both an audit as well as hearings. Or…
They stick to their guns, signal the intent to raise rates sending the global economy and markets into a tail spin of unraveling carry trades, currency wars and quite possibly a full-blown currency based Armageddon.
Who knows what will transpire. But one thing is certain: This time is – truly different.
Words Matter - The Propagandists Know
Submitted by T.
03/15/2015 - 16:20
In the age when torture has become "enhanced interrogation techniques"; when the rich are "job creators"; when austerity is rephrased as "reforms"; "scarcity" does not mean shortage; and when murdered children are "collateral damage"; it is good to remember these brilliant words from the late, great, George Carlin.
- Fenix
- Mensajes: 16334
- Registrado: Vie Abr 23, 2010 2:36 am
Re: Viernes 20/03/15 Inflacion de Atlanta
por admin » Sab Mar 21, 2015 11:08 pm
Pilotos de alemana Lufthansa, en huelga por cuarto día consecutivo
FRÁNCFORT (Reuters) - Los pilotos de Lufthansa se mantenían en huelga el sábado por cuarto día consecutivo, dejando en tierra casi la mitad de los lucrativos vuelos de tramos largos de la aerolínea alemana, en medio de una disputa por los beneficios de retiro anticipado y recortes de gastos.
Lufthansa canceló 72 de 160 conexiones de tramos largos agendados para el sábado, afectando a cerca de 20.000 pasajeros.
También fueron cancelados algunos vuelos cortos y medios, debido al efecto dominó del paro del viernes, dijo un portavoz.
El tráfico de carga también fue afectado el sábado, aunque 15 de 18 vuelos pudieron despegar a tiempo, agregó.
Lufthansa espera que el tráfico vuelva a la normalidad en su mayor parte el domingo, aunque unos pocos vuelos de larga distancia podrían ser cancelados como resultado de la huelga del sábado, agregó el portavoz.
La aerolínea quiere recortar sus gastos hasta los niveles cercanos a los de sus rivales. Lufthansa se ha visto presionada por compañías como Ryanair y easyJet en las rutas europeas y por líneas aéreas como Turkish y Emirates en el caso de los vuelos de larga distancia.
Las protestas le costaron a Lufthansa más de 200 millones de euros (214 millones de dólares) en pérdidas de utilidades operacionales el año pasado y los perjuicios se están acumulando de nuevo ante la decimoquinta paralización que realizan los pilotos desde abril de 2014.
La disputa de la aerolínea con sus pilotos está relacionada con los beneficios de jubilación anticipada, que el sindicato de pilotos VC quiere mantener, pero que la compañía quiere retirar en caso de nuevos contratados, para recortar gastos.
Los pilotos también quieren que Lufthansa entre a una mediación sobre otros asuntos pendientes, como los salarios y una reducción de costos para vuelos a destinos turísticos, pero la aerolínea rechazó eso.
La compañía además tiene previsto iniciar el lunes negociaciones salariales por separado con el sindicato Verdi, que representa a unos 33.000 trabajadores de Lufthansa en tierra en las unidad de tecnologías de la información Lufthansa Systems, la unidad de catering LSG, Lufthansa Technik y Lufthansa Cargo.
(1 dlr = 0,9360 euros)
FRÁNCFORT (Reuters) - Los pilotos de Lufthansa se mantenían en huelga el sábado por cuarto día consecutivo, dejando en tierra casi la mitad de los lucrativos vuelos de tramos largos de la aerolínea alemana, en medio de una disputa por los beneficios de retiro anticipado y recortes de gastos.
Lufthansa canceló 72 de 160 conexiones de tramos largos agendados para el sábado, afectando a cerca de 20.000 pasajeros.
También fueron cancelados algunos vuelos cortos y medios, debido al efecto dominó del paro del viernes, dijo un portavoz.
El tráfico de carga también fue afectado el sábado, aunque 15 de 18 vuelos pudieron despegar a tiempo, agregó.
Lufthansa espera que el tráfico vuelva a la normalidad en su mayor parte el domingo, aunque unos pocos vuelos de larga distancia podrían ser cancelados como resultado de la huelga del sábado, agregó el portavoz.
La aerolínea quiere recortar sus gastos hasta los niveles cercanos a los de sus rivales. Lufthansa se ha visto presionada por compañías como Ryanair y easyJet en las rutas europeas y por líneas aéreas como Turkish y Emirates en el caso de los vuelos de larga distancia.
Las protestas le costaron a Lufthansa más de 200 millones de euros (214 millones de dólares) en pérdidas de utilidades operacionales el año pasado y los perjuicios se están acumulando de nuevo ante la decimoquinta paralización que realizan los pilotos desde abril de 2014.
La disputa de la aerolínea con sus pilotos está relacionada con los beneficios de jubilación anticipada, que el sindicato de pilotos VC quiere mantener, pero que la compañía quiere retirar en caso de nuevos contratados, para recortar gastos.
Los pilotos también quieren que Lufthansa entre a una mediación sobre otros asuntos pendientes, como los salarios y una reducción de costos para vuelos a destinos turísticos, pero la aerolínea rechazó eso.
La compañía además tiene previsto iniciar el lunes negociaciones salariales por separado con el sindicato Verdi, que representa a unos 33.000 trabajadores de Lufthansa en tierra en las unidad de tecnologías de la información Lufthansa Systems, la unidad de catering LSG, Lufthansa Technik y Lufthansa Cargo.
(1 dlr = 0,9360 euros)
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Re: Viernes 20/03/15 Inflacion de Atlanta
por Fenix » Mar Mar 24, 2015 7:13 pm
Wall Street Poised For Another Revenue Bloodbath After Harbinger Jefferies Reports 56% Fixed Income Plunge
Tyler D.
03/17/2015
We have previously explained why Jefferies, arguably the last standalone (despite its purchase by Leucadia a year ago) investment bank on Wall Street is so informative:
Jefferies is best known for among Wall Street shareholders is that, by still reporting a Nov. 30 fiscal year end, 1 month ahead of everyone else, it provides an invaluable glimpse into the fortunes of its Wall Street peers with a 4 week advance notice, especially when it comes to its bread and butter: fixed income trading (recall that CEO Rich Handler was a Drexel bond trader when the firm blew up).
And just like last quarter, earlier today Jefferies reported its earnings for the quarter ended February 28, which capture the trailing two-thirds of every other bank's first quarter period (those who now have a December 31 year end).
The result, just like last quarter, was a disaster and indicative of nothing short of a trading bloodbath on Wall Street in the past three months of trading. In fact, if this is what one should expect out of the larger Wall Street names in a few weeks when the big banks close the quarter, then it may be best to skip earnings season altogether... for the second quarter in a row.
The bottom line, and what everyone who is awaiting the latest FICC numbers from the balance of the banks will be focusing on, is the 56% drop in Q1 revenue from fixed-income trading, down to $126 million from $286 million a year ago.
Investment banking did not help either, plunging by 34% to $272 million from $414 million.
The only silver lining: equities did not plunge, and in fact posted a modest increase of 8% to $203 million. Now if only Jefferies could change its image from a middle market junk-bond specialist catering to the world's B2/B credits, to the New Paranormal's equity powerhouse all would be well.
The results in one chart.
And here is why Jefferies' fixed income trading suffered. It appears soaring volatility wasn't Dick Handler's friend.
The question is whether unlike last quarter, when Jefferies reported results in mid-December promptly followed by disappointing earnings and revenue and EPS misses at every single TBTF and other investment bank (as we warned then would happen), if this time is different and somehow everyone else succeeded where Jefferies failed?
Tyler D.
03/17/2015
We have previously explained why Jefferies, arguably the last standalone (despite its purchase by Leucadia a year ago) investment bank on Wall Street is so informative:
Jefferies is best known for among Wall Street shareholders is that, by still reporting a Nov. 30 fiscal year end, 1 month ahead of everyone else, it provides an invaluable glimpse into the fortunes of its Wall Street peers with a 4 week advance notice, especially when it comes to its bread and butter: fixed income trading (recall that CEO Rich Handler was a Drexel bond trader when the firm blew up).
And just like last quarter, earlier today Jefferies reported its earnings for the quarter ended February 28, which capture the trailing two-thirds of every other bank's first quarter period (those who now have a December 31 year end).
The result, just like last quarter, was a disaster and indicative of nothing short of a trading bloodbath on Wall Street in the past three months of trading. In fact, if this is what one should expect out of the larger Wall Street names in a few weeks when the big banks close the quarter, then it may be best to skip earnings season altogether... for the second quarter in a row.
The bottom line, and what everyone who is awaiting the latest FICC numbers from the balance of the banks will be focusing on, is the 56% drop in Q1 revenue from fixed-income trading, down to $126 million from $286 million a year ago.
Investment banking did not help either, plunging by 34% to $272 million from $414 million.
The only silver lining: equities did not plunge, and in fact posted a modest increase of 8% to $203 million. Now if only Jefferies could change its image from a middle market junk-bond specialist catering to the world's B2/B credits, to the New Paranormal's equity powerhouse all would be well.
The results in one chart.
And here is why Jefferies' fixed income trading suffered. It appears soaring volatility wasn't Dick Handler's friend.
The question is whether unlike last quarter, when Jefferies reported results in mid-December promptly followed by disappointing earnings and revenue and EPS misses at every single TBTF and other investment bank (as we warned then would happen), if this time is different and somehow everyone else succeeded where Jefferies failed?
- Fenix
- Mensajes: 16334
- Registrado: Vie Abr 23, 2010 2:36 am
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