por admin » Vie May 21, 2010 3:26 pm
Los Keynesian alertaron contra las politicas de Margaret Thatcher en 1981. Hoy se comprueba que estaban equivocados.
Que tendrian los lideres del Fondo Monetario Internacional y de la Union Europea en la cabeza cuando acordaron prestarle mas de $100 billones a Grecia a cambio de promesas para restaurar la estabilidad? Despues de una inicial calma los mercados pronto reconocieron que el programa no es suficiente y no podra ser mantenido.
Cuando los paises se unieron para formar la zona euro y el euro como moneda, ellos renunciaron a usar la politica monetaria para inflar o devaluar. Eso dejo la reduccion de los sueldos y el ajuste de la politica fiscal como los unicos recursos para superar una crisis.
Con la deuda y los sueldos de Grecia extremadamente altos, el IMF -EU no han ofrecido nada nuevo. Al contrario, ha demorado el default de un pais como Grecia al agregar mas deuda como solucion a un problema de excesiva deuda y le da mas tiempo para rebajar los salarios del sector publico en 20% para reducir el deficit al 10% del GDP.
Esto solo prolonga la incertidumbre y ofrece a los tenedores de deuda una promesa del Gobierno Griego de que cumplira con sus deudas. Por supuesto que los mercados tienen que estar nerviosos.
Que es lo que hubiera funcionado? la mayoria de la industria y el comercio de Grecia es el turismo, el cual es propiedad del gobierno. Lo que debieron hacer es privatizar, vender y con ello pagar su deuda publica. Eso hubiera dejado el resto de la deuda mas sostenible y hubieran podido pasar los empleados publicos al sector privado donde la competencia rebajaria los precios y la productividad aumentaria haciendolos mas cercanos a la realidad. Si el gobierno socialista retornara a una economia del sectro privado, Grecia tendria mas posibilidades de recuperarse economicamente.
La mayor parte de la economia que no pertenece al gobierno es una economia informal donde los sueldos y salarios se ajustan rapidamente al mercado. Grecia deberia ofrecer amnistia a todos los que no han pagado impuestos para que salgan al sector formal.
Si despues de vender los activos todavia la deuda es insostenible, Grecia tendria que caer en el default o restructuracion. Para aliviar el dolor Grecia deberia obedecer las reglas de la Union Europea. Pero deberia rechazar el prestamos del IMF. Mas deuda, aunque sea deuda subsidiada no es la solucion correcta, nunca es la respuesta correcta.
El mayor beneficio para Europa del programa IMF-EU es que el gobierno Espaniol ha aceptado reducir su actual y futuro gasto. Estas medidas no son populares debido el alto desempleo en ese pais. Un default de Espania podria forzar a Alemania y Francia a decidir entre una masiva ayuda a Espania o ayudar con la perdida de los bancos Alemanes y Franceses directamente. Los bancos Alemanes tienen $240 billones de deuda Espaniola y solo $43 de deuda Griega.
Los Keynesians que decian que Inglaterra nunca se recuperaria si reducia el gasto publico durante la recesion. Thatcher nunca siguio el consejo de los Keynesians. Las expectativas acerca del futuro de Inglaterra mejoraron y una larga y productiva empezo con sus medidas.
Grecia deberia tomar el ejemplo de Thatcher. El nuevo gobierno de Inglaterra tendra que recordarla tambien. Y ya en el asunto, los economistas Keynesians de la administracion de Obama tambien.
Mr. Meltzer is a professor of economics at Carnegie Mellon University, the author of "A History of the Federal Reserve" (University of Chicago Press, 2004), and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
Privatization Can Help Greece
Keynesians warned against Thatcher's policies in 1981. They were proven wrong.
By ALLAN H. MELTZER
What could the leaders of the International Monetary Fund and the European Union have had in mind when they agreed to lend Greece more than $100 billion in exchange for promises to restore stability? After initial relief, markets soon recognized that the program was not sufficient and not likely to be maintained.
When countries joined the common European currency, they gave up the right to use monetary policy to inflate or devalue. That left wage reduction and fiscal restraint as the only recourse in a crisis. With Greece's money wages and government debt too high, the IMF-EU relief effort does not add any new options. Instead it delays default by offering yet more debt as a solution to too much debt, and it gives the Greek government more time to do what it has been unable to do—lower public-sector wages by about 20% and reduce the budget deficit by 10% of GDP.
This only prolongs uncertainty and offers debt-holders a promise by the Greek government that will be hard to honor. No wonder markets are skeptical.
What would have worked? Much of Greece's industry and commerce, including much of the tourist industry, is owned by the state. It should be sold with the proceeds used to reduce public debt. That would make the remainder of the debt more sustainable and transfer workers to the private sector where competitive pressures for lower wages and increased productivity would more closely align employment costs and reality. If the socialist government returned more of the economy to the private sector, Greece would have a better chance of economic recovery.
Much of the Greek economy not owned by the state is "underground," in the so-called informal sector, where wages and incomes adjust quickly to the market. Greece also should offer an amnesty for unpaid back taxes to those who join the legal sector.
If after selling assets the remaining debt is still unsustainable, Greece will have to default (it will be called restructuring, but it is nonetheless default). To lessen the pain from losses borne by Greek and foreign lenders following default, the country should commit to fiscal policies monitored by the European Union. But it should reject the IMF-EU loan. More debt, even subsidized debt, is not the right answer.
The main benefit to Europe of the IMF-EU program is that the Spanish government has agreed to additional reductions in current and future spending. This was a difficult and unpopular political decision given the very high level of unemployment in Spain. A Spanish default would force France and Germany to choose either massive help to Spain or bailing out the losses on Spanish debt at German and French banks. German banks hold $240 billion of Spanish debt but only $43 billion of Greek debt.
Keynesians who think reducing public spending during a recession is a disastrous error should recall that they warned British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1981 that Britain would never recover if she continued with her tight fiscal and monetary policy during Britain's deep recession. Mrs. Thatcher declined to take their advice. Expectations about Britain's future changed for the better, and a long, productive recovery began soon after.
Greece's government should take heart from her example. The new government in Britain might remember this as well. And so might the Keynesians in the Obama administration.
Mr. Meltzer is a professor of economics at Carnegie Mellon University, the author of "A History of the Federal Reserve" (University of Chicago Press, 2004), and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.