Viernes 05/08/11 Situacion del empleo

[admin]

45 economistas entrevistados no se mostraron muy preocupados por el downgrade, la mayor preocupacion dijeron es la posibilidad de otra recesion.

Economists and market participants at an annual retreat were increasingly worried about another recession, though they mostly shrugged off the S&P downgrade of U.S. debt.

David Kotok, chairman of money-management firm Cumberland Advisors, organizes an annual fishing trip in Maine that brings together a group of economists and market seers. This year, it looks like it might be the U.S. economy that gets skunked.

In response to an informal Dow Jones survey of 45 economists, portfolio managers and financial consultants in attendance, two thirds gave a better than 50% chance of recession in the next year. About 25% put the odds of recession at better than 75%.

The reaction to Standard & Poor’s U.S. debt downgrade? Pretty muted since it has been hinted at for some time. And some remarked on the irony of the downgrade, since S&P gave high ratings to the mortgage derivatives that helped precipitate the recession, and is now punishing the U.S. because of the deficit problems the recession triggered.

But economics and the market are secondary issues here, where the main focus has been on fishing. And wine.

[admin]

Dicen que la broma del momento es donde refugiarse del downgrade de los bonos americanos? Pues, donde mas si no en la seguridad de los bonos americanos.

No hay donde ir.

[admin]

El dep. del Tesoro de US insiste que S&P a pesar de reconocer el error de $2 trillones, igual les dio el downgrade lo que les quita credibilidad.

[admin]

No esperan una reaccion muy sangrienta el Lunes.

[jonibol]

Un economista dice en CNN, que a pesar de las quejas de China igual tendrán que comprar bonos del Tesoro, porque no les queda de otra.

[admin]

La mayoria de mercados en el Golfo Persico se hunden.

Dubai -3.6%, Abu Dhabi -2.5%, Qatar -2.2%,, Oman -1.9%, Saudi -0.8% despues de haber caido 5.5% el Sabado.

Algunos estrategas dijeron que estaban buscando cualquier debilidad en el mercado como oportunidad de compra ya que la situacion es completamente diferente a la del 2008.

--------------

WORLD STOCK MARKETSAUGUST 7, 2011, 5:25 A.M. ET
Most Gulf Stocks Tumble
By TIM FALCONER

DUBAI—Stock markets in the Persian Gulf region tumbled Sunday as a downgrade of U.S. government debt by ratings firm Standard & Poor's triggered investor concerns about the health of the world's largest economy and the outlook for global growth.

"The U.S. economy has certainly slowed recently and the European sovereign-debt crisis is still far from over," said Akber Khan, director of asset management at Al Rayan Investment in Doha. "The last three years have underlined the linkages within the global economy so it is unreasonable to expect the rest of the world to be completely immune from disruptions in Europe and the U.S."

Dubai's benchmark DFM General Index was recently 3.6% lower at 1486.34, while Abu Dhabi's main gauge lost 2.5% to 2604.86. Qatar's QE Index fell 2.2% to 8301.45 and Oman's MSM30 Index shed 1.9% to 5651.04. Saudi's Tadawul Index, the region's largest stock market, was trading 0.8% lower at 6023.27, extending Saturday's 5.5% decline.

On Friday, Standard & Poor's stripped the U.S. of its triple-A credit rating, a move that casts severe doubt, say analysts, over the state and recovery of the U.S. economy. The downgrade came after Asian and European shares plunged Friday amid fears over the global economic outlook.

"It's hard to see any decoupling for the regional markets from the global economies. Any global slowdown in the U.S. and Europe will certainly weigh on the regional economies," said Rami Sidani, head of investment at Schroders Investment Management for the Middle East and North Africa.

In terms of stocks, Emaar Properties fell 4.9% to 1.36 United Arab Emirates dirhams in Dubai, while First Gulf Bank slipped 5% to 16.15 dirhams in Abu Dhabi. In Doha, Qatar Telecom lost 1.9% to 51.60 Qatari riyals and Bank Muscat shed 4.2% to 0.688 Omani rial.

Despite Sunday's sharp retracement, some analysts said the pullback offers a buying opportunity and doesn't signal a return to market levels seen at the height of the financial crisis in 2008.

"We would view any weakness in the markets as a buying opportunity as we see the current environment as being fundamentally different to that of 2008, where Mena markets fell in line with global markets but then failed to register a concomitant recovery," strategists at Religare Capital Markets said in a note to clients.

[admin]

Todos de acuerdo en que el mayor riesgo es que los intereses suban debido al downgrade, el consumidor se veria afectado al tener que pagar intereses mas altos en sus tarjetas de credito, compras de autos, hipotecas, prestamos estudiantiles, etc. poniendo mas peso en la ya fragil economia.

[admin]

El downgrade comenzo con una llamada telefonica. El Congreso preparo un reporte de 11 paginas describiendo como el ultimo acuerdo reducia el deficit por lo menos en $2.1 trillones. Mientras los miembros del Congreso estaban ocupados revisando el reporte, alguien en S&P llamo por telefono preguntando por los detalles del proyecto.

Cuatro dias mas tarde, basados en esa conversacion, S&P anuncio la decision del downgrade.

-------------------------------------------------
Downgrade Controversy Began With Single Phone Call

By DAMIAN PALETTA, JEANNETTE NEUMANN, and CAROL E. LEE

WASHINGTON—On Monday, Congress's non-partisan number cruncher released an 11-page report describing how the newly minted debt-ceiling deal would cut the deficit by at least $2.1 trillion. While congressional offices were busy studying the report, an official from the rating firm Standard & Poor's quietly called to ask for details of the underlying projections.

Four days later, based in part on that discussion, the rating firm announced a decision to downgrade America's debt—an unprecedented event in U.S. history—a move that is as controversial as it is potentially damaging to financial markets.

S&P Strips U.S. of Top Credit Rating
The information S&P gathered that day led it to overestimate future deficits by $2 trillion, a fact the Obama administration has called a reckless mistake. That phone call wasn't the reason S&P cut America's debt rating. But it was part of a chain of events, including also a stock market plunge and an emergency Oval Office meeting, which could have serious and lasting consequences for America's standing in the world, the Obama presidency and the reputation of S&P.

Now, the White House finds itself in a position not unlike Europe's debt-laden countries: squabbling in public with a rater whose decision it dislikes. S&P didn't take the Treasury Department's suggestion to take time in reconsidering the decision, and instead rewrote its written justification for the move.

"The magnitude of their error and combined with their willingness to simply change on the spot their lead rationale in their press release once the error was pointed out was breathtaking," said White House National Economic Council Director Gene Sperling. "It smacked of an institution starting with a conclusion and shaping any arguments to fit it."

S&P President Deven Sharma defended the firm's position Saturday in an interview, including the speed with which it put out the statement. "We believe that once we have a rating decision we must move forward and get it to the marketplace quickly," Mr. Sharma said. "It's important to the marketplace to let them have our point of view."

S&P's decision lay in the wild, near-default experience the country had endured just days before.

On July 31, the White House and congressional Republicans reached a deal to raise the $14.29 trillion debt ceiling and cut between $2.1 trillion and $2.4 trillion from the deficit over 10 years. The agreement fell short of the $4 trillion package some White House officials and congressional leaders had strived to achieve. But Republican resistance to tax increases and Democratic opposition to major health-care cuts ultimately torpedoed hopes for a larger deal.

The scaled-back compromise reflected a desperate effort to reach a political consensus before Tuesday, when the government might have run out of cash to make payments on everything from its debt to Social Security. Ominously, the deal fell short of a $4 trillion package that S&P had warned would be necessary to preserve the U.S.'s AAA credit rating that it had held for seven decades.

When the S&P called the Congressional Budget Office—Congress's number cruncher—it asked about the different projections, known as "baselines," that it uses to estimate the impact of policy decisions on future deficits. Estimating that government spending would grow at a higher rate of inflation would make deficits worse, for example. This seemingly innocent exchange would set the stage for a dramatic series of phone calls several days later.

On Tuesday, President Barack Obama signed the debt-ceiling deal into law. The next day, Treasury Department assistant secretary for financial markets Mary Miller and other officials met with a team of S&P analysts to discuss the agreement.

Treasury officials explained to members of the "credit team" from S&P how the deficit cuts and future spending reductions would work.

Ms. Miller, a debt market expert and financial analyst who spent 26 years at T. Rowe Price Group Inc., is a key part of the White House's economic team even though she is relatively unknown outside of the administration. She helped delay a default on the U.S. debt for as long as possible during as talks dragged on and was recently nominated for a senior position at Treasury to reflect her rising stature.

Her second-floor office is directly below that of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, with a view overlooking the White House.

The S&P team included sovereign debt chief, David T. Beers, known by some for his bushy mustache and others—particularly in the administration—for being tough-minded. When the 90-minute meeting ended, S&P told Treasury they would confer later in the week to decide the next step. With that, members of the S&P team flew back to New York.

The downgrade clock began to tick.

Administration officials had stewed for months that S&P had an itchy trigger finger gunning for a downgrade. In April, Mr. Beers and other S&P officials met with Treasury Secretary Geithner and others to press for details of the U.S.'s plans to cut deficits. S&P officials felt they had been overly transparent in how they viewed the fiscal problems facing the U.S. Other countries with AAA ratings, such as the U.K., had taken bold steps to reduce their deficit. The U.S. had not.

On Thursday, concerns about global debt problems hammered financial markets, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell more than 500 points. Mr. Beers notified the Treasury Department that the "credit" committee would be meeting the next day.

On Friday, the stock market opened up sharply on an unexpectedly strong jobs report, but rocketed south when rumors of a U.S. debt downgrade by S&P filtered through trading desks and newsrooms. At 9:48 a.m., the Dow Jones began a precipitous 150-point, eight-minute nosedive. Markets see-sawed all day, with S&P officials refusing to comment on their plans.

What few knew at the time was that S&P officials had convened on a conference call Friday morning and meticulously walked through their view of the U.S.'s credit rating, a process they repeat for each of the 126 countries they review. Ultimately, they decided to downgrade the U.S.'s debt from AAA to AA+.

At 1:15 p.m., they called Treasury Department officials to relay the news followed thirty minutes later by an emailed a copy of their draft press release. The announcement would be made public soon.

The email jolted the administration. Mr. Geithner phoned White House chief of staff Bill Daley and White House National Economic Council Director Mr. Sperling and notified them of the downgrade. Messrs. Geithner and Sperling saw Mr. Obama in the Oval Office to deliver the news. Mr. Obama's reaction couldn't be learned, though it came amidst a series of tense calls with European leaders about the euro zone's debt crisis.

At the Treasury building, a team of officials huddled in Ms. Miller's office to dissect the press release. They included Matthew Rutherford, a top Treasury brain who came to Washington from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Chris Meade, a top agency attorney, and John Bellows, whose ambiguous title -- acting assistant secretary for economic policy -- underplayed his importance as a key Geithner adviser and budget expert.

Within minutes, Mr. Bellows noticed what Treasury viewed as a glaring mistake in S&P's decision: The rating firm had used a "baseline" that projected deficits running at a much faster rate than many analysts thought likely. In essence, they had used a CBO "alternative" scenario instead of the more standard outlook.

Over five years, the deficit would be roughly $300 billion smaller using the standard outlook. Over 10 years, the gap would be closer to $2 trillion.

Because Treasury officials believed they were being downgraded because the deficit-reduction deal was $2 trillion short, they thought this new revelation could upend S&P's formula.

They relayed their findings to S&P, Mr. Geithner, and the White House. The monumental decision was now in limbo.

S&P officials were jarred, and phoned a CBO analyst to confer. The firm immediately switched to the more conservative deficit forecast. Treasury officials urged them to delay any decision for several days and take more time to deliberate.

A government official said the Treasury urged S&P to reconvene the "credit" committee in light of the glaring change. S&P agreed, and officials in North America and Europe dialed into another conference call to decide whether to reverse their decision.

Treasury and White House officials waited nervously. Over the course of several hours, their mood would shift from disappointment, disgust, and finally disbelief.

S&P officials decided that despite the new projections the downgrade was still deserved. But they shifted the focus of their justification. Instead of basing it primarily on the insufficient size of the deficit-reduction deal, they emphasized Washington's dysfunctional Washington political culture.

S&P rewrote its press release to reflect this change.

This "political settings," as it's known to S&P, didn't assign blame to either the White House or congressional Republicans. But S&P officials felt the political mess raised questions about whether any future deficit-reduction package of substance could be achieved. This would be vital, in their view, to deal with the aging U.S. population and health care costs that will outpace inflation in the next decade.

Mr. Beers telephoned Treasury at 8 p.m. and said the downgrade was imminent. Treasury officials protested.

Thirty minutes later, the historic press release ricocheted around the world.

—Laura Meckler contributed to this article.
Write to Damian Paletta at damian.paletta@wsj.com and Jeannette Neumann at jeannette.neumann@wsj.com

[admin]

El downgrade comenzo con una llamada telefonica. El Congreso preparo un reporte de 11 paginas describiendo como el ultimo acuerdo reducia el deficit por lo menos en $2.1 trillones. Mientras los miembros del Congreso estaban ocupados revisando el reporte, alguien en S&P llamo por telefono preguntando por los detalles del proyecto.

Cuatro dias mas tarde, basados en esa conversacion, S&P anuncio la decision del downgrade.

-------------------------------------------------
Downgrade Controversy Began With Single Phone Call

By DAMIAN PALETTA, JEANNETTE NEUMANN, and CAROL E. LEE

WASHINGTON—On Monday, Congress's non-partisan number cruncher released an 11-page report describing how the newly minted debt-ceiling deal would cut the deficit by at least $2.1 trillion. While congressional offices were busy studying the report, an official from the rating firm Standard & Poor's quietly called to ask for details of the underlying projections.

Four days later, based in part on that discussion, the rating firm announced a decision to downgrade America's debt—an unprecedented event in U.S. history—a move that is as controversial as it is potentially damaging to financial markets.

S&P Strips U.S. of Top Credit Rating
The information S&P gathered that day led it to overestimate future deficits by $2 trillion, a fact the Obama administration has called a reckless mistake. That phone call wasn't the reason S&P cut America's debt rating. But it was part of a chain of events, including also a stock market plunge and an emergency Oval Office meeting, which could have serious and lasting consequences for America's standing in the world, the Obama presidency and the reputation of S&P.

Now, the White House finds itself in a position not unlike Europe's debt-laden countries: squabbling in public with a rater whose decision it dislikes. S&P didn't take the Treasury Department's suggestion to take time in reconsidering the decision, and instead rewrote its written justification for the move.

"The magnitude of their error and combined with their willingness to simply change on the spot their lead rationale in their press release once the error was pointed out was breathtaking," said White House National Economic Council Director Gene Sperling. "It smacked of an institution starting with a conclusion and shaping any arguments to fit it."

S&P President Deven Sharma defended the firm's position Saturday in an interview, including the speed with which it put out the statement. "We believe that once we have a rating decision we must move forward and get it to the marketplace quickly," Mr. Sharma said. "It's important to the marketplace to let them have our point of view."

S&P's decision lay in the wild, near-default experience the country had endured just days before.

On July 31, the White House and congressional Republicans reached a deal to raise the $14.29 trillion debt ceiling and cut between $2.1 trillion and $2.4 trillion from the deficit over 10 years. The agreement fell short of the $4 trillion package some White House officials and congressional leaders had strived to achieve. But Republican resistance to tax increases and Democratic opposition to major health-care cuts ultimately torpedoed hopes for a larger deal.

The scaled-back compromise reflected a desperate effort to reach a political consensus before Tuesday, when the government might have run out of cash to make payments on everything from its debt to Social Security. Ominously, the deal fell short of a $4 trillion package that S&P had warned would be necessary to preserve the U.S.'s AAA credit rating that it had held for seven decades.

When the S&P called the Congressional Budget Office—Congress's number cruncher—it asked about the different projections, known as "baselines," that it uses to estimate the impact of policy decisions on future deficits. Estimating that government spending would grow at a higher rate of inflation would make deficits worse, for example. This seemingly innocent exchange would set the stage for a dramatic series of phone calls several days later.

On Tuesday, President Barack Obama signed the debt-ceiling deal into law. The next day, Treasury Department assistant secretary for financial markets Mary Miller and other officials met with a team of S&P analysts to discuss the agreement.

Treasury officials explained to members of the "credit team" from S&P how the deficit cuts and future spending reductions would work.

Ms. Miller, a debt market expert and financial analyst who spent 26 years at T. Rowe Price Group Inc., is a key part of the White House's economic team even though she is relatively unknown outside of the administration. She helped delay a default on the U.S. debt for as long as possible during as talks dragged on and was recently nominated for a senior position at Treasury to reflect her rising stature.

Her second-floor office is directly below that of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, with a view overlooking the White House.

The S&P team included sovereign debt chief, David T. Beers, known by some for his bushy mustache and others—particularly in the administration—for being tough-minded. When the 90-minute meeting ended, S&P told Treasury they would confer later in the week to decide the next step. With that, members of the S&P team flew back to New York.

The downgrade clock began to tick.

Administration officials had stewed for months that S&P had an itchy trigger finger gunning for a downgrade. In April, Mr. Beers and other S&P officials met with Treasury Secretary Geithner and others to press for details of the U.S.'s plans to cut deficits. S&P officials felt they had been overly transparent in how they viewed the fiscal problems facing the U.S. Other countries with AAA ratings, such as the U.K., had taken bold steps to reduce their deficit. The U.S. had not.

On Thursday, concerns about global debt problems hammered financial markets, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell more than 500 points. Mr. Beers notified the Treasury Department that the "credit" committee would be meeting the next day.

On Friday, the stock market opened up sharply on an unexpectedly strong jobs report, but rocketed south when rumors of a U.S. debt downgrade by S&P filtered through trading desks and newsrooms. At 9:48 a.m., the Dow Jones began a precipitous 150-point, eight-minute nosedive. Markets see-sawed all day, with S&P officials refusing to comment on their plans.

What few knew at the time was that S&P officials had convened on a conference call Friday morning and meticulously walked through their view of the U.S.'s credit rating, a process they repeat for each of the 126 countries they review. Ultimately, they decided to downgrade the U.S.'s debt from AAA to AA+.

At 1:15 p.m., they called Treasury Department officials to relay the news followed thirty minutes later by an emailed a copy of their draft press release. The announcement would be made public soon.

The email jolted the administration. Mr. Geithner phoned White House chief of staff Bill Daley and White House National Economic Council Director Mr. Sperling and notified them of the downgrade. Messrs. Geithner and Sperling saw Mr. Obama in the Oval Office to deliver the news. Mr. Obama's reaction couldn't be learned, though it came amidst a series of tense calls with European leaders about the euro zone's debt crisis.

At the Treasury building, a team of officials huddled in Ms. Miller's office to dissect the press release. They included Matthew Rutherford, a top Treasury brain who came to Washington from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Chris Meade, a top agency attorney, and John Bellows, whose ambiguous title -- acting assistant secretary for economic policy -- underplayed his importance as a key Geithner adviser and budget expert.

Within minutes, Mr. Bellows noticed what Treasury viewed as a glaring mistake in S&P's decision: The rating firm had used a "baseline" that projected deficits running at a much faster rate than many analysts thought likely. In essence, they had used a CBO "alternative" scenario instead of the more standard outlook.

Over five years, the deficit would be roughly $300 billion smaller using the standard outlook. Over 10 years, the gap would be closer to $2 trillion.

Because Treasury officials believed they were being downgraded because the deficit-reduction deal was $2 trillion short, they thought this new revelation could upend S&P's formula.

They relayed their findings to S&P, Mr. Geithner, and the White House. The monumental decision was now in limbo.

S&P officials were jarred, and phoned a CBO analyst to confer. The firm immediately switched to the more conservative deficit forecast. Treasury officials urged them to delay any decision for several days and take more time to deliberate.

A government official said the Treasury urged S&P to reconvene the "credit" committee in light of the glaring change. S&P agreed, and officials in North America and Europe dialed into another conference call to decide whether to reverse their decision.

Treasury and White House officials waited nervously. Over the course of several hours, their mood would shift from disappointment, disgust, and finally disbelief.

S&P officials decided that despite the new projections the downgrade was still deserved. But they shifted the focus of their justification. Instead of basing it primarily on the insufficient size of the deficit-reduction deal, they emphasized Washington's dysfunctional Washington political culture.

S&P rewrote its press release to reflect this change.

This "political settings," as it's known to S&P, didn't assign blame to either the White House or congressional Republicans. But S&P officials felt the political mess raised questions about whether any future deficit-reduction package of substance could be achieved. This would be vital, in their view, to deal with the aging U.S. population and health care costs that will outpace inflation in the next decade.

Mr. Beers telephoned Treasury at 8 p.m. and said the downgrade was imminent. Treasury officials protested.

Thirty minutes later, the historic press release ricocheted around the world.

—Laura Meckler contributed to this article.
Write to Damian Paletta at damian.paletta@wsj.com and Jeannette Neumann at jeannette.neumann@wsj.com

[admin]

Tel Aviv -5.6%

[admin]

Trabajadores de Verizon se van a la huelga. 45,000 empleados.

[admin]

Los ministros de finanza del G-7 tendran una teleconferencia hoy Domingo.

El ECB tambien tendra una video conference para discutir el contagio de la deuda soberana en Europa. Estan considerando la compra de bonos Italianos y Espanoles para evitar el aumento de intereses a la deuda de ambos paises que harian insostenible su situacion fiscal.

Japon listo para intervenir su divisa nuevamente.

-------------------

Top Powers Set Emergency Meeting

By TERENCE ROTH, TOM FAIRLESS and LAURENCE NORMAN
FRANKFURT—Governments representing the world's top financial powers have set emergency meetings for Sunday to address Europe's escalating debt crisis and the U.S. ratings downgrade before markets reopen.

Finance ministers from the Group of Seven major industrialized nations plan to hold a teleconference call later Sunday, said two G-7 officials familiar with the situation.

Also Sunday, the European Central Bank plans to hold its own video conference, provisionally for 1600GMT, to discuss growing contagion risk in European government bond markets, according to people familiar with the matter. Under consideration could be plans to purchase Italian and Spanish government bonds to prevent a sell-off that could boost the borrowing costs of those countries to unsustainable levels.

The meetings would culminate a weekend of intense telephoning among policy-makers around the globe. G-7 governments are concerned that financial markets could panic unless leaders worked jointly to ease concerns that the global financial system appeared to face its biggest threat since the collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank in 2008.

A G-7 official briefed on the matter said concrete steps were unlikely from the G-7 at this stage. The group is more likely to issue a statement expressing confidence in the U.S. economy and declaring U.S. assets as unharmed by rating agency Standard & Poor's Friday decision to strip U.S. debt of its triple-A status. "I don't expect anything very specific," the official said. "The main thing is to try to restore confidence before markets reopen."

One proposal circulating among finance ministries in recent days is a G-7 agreement on tax incentives to encourage business investment. But the source said this was still only a "loose idea." The G-7 also likely to welcome the agreement reached in Washington to increase the U.S. debt ceiling and commit to deficit reduction, the G-7 source said.

Japan stands ready to intervene again in the currency markets, Japanese officials said Sunday, as financial markets brace for further turmoil following the U.S. debt downgrade over the weekend.

"I acknowledge that that's one way of thinking," a Japanese official said when asked about the possibility of a G-7 meeting being held before Asian markets open Monday. The G-7 is made up of the U.S., Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Canada and the U.K.

More
G20 Ministers Hold Call
.European officials over the weekend offered support for the U.S. after the first downgrade in its credit rating. Without a strong U.S. economy and finances odds are against Europe generating enough economic growth to cut deficits and debt. Recent worries about Italy and Spain falling into the same debt trap as Greece, Ireland and Spain have sparked calls for more international coordination at European and G-7 level.

French Finance Minister Francois Baroin, speaking on French radio station RTL, said he has been in contact with all other G-7 nations in recent days and also Saturday morning. He didn't give details of the talks or suggest that a meeting was imminent.

Mr. Baroin offered moral support for his U.S. counterpart, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and the U.S. administration's contention that the S&P's findings were flawed.

"We can ask ourselves why Standard & Poor's has taken this decision on the basis of nonconsensual figures that I'm sure the American treasury will comment on," Mr. Baroin said.

"We have total confidence in the solidity of the American economy and its fundamentals," Mr. Baroin said, noting last week's new U.S. debt agreement. "This confidence is in no way interrupted by the move from this rating agency."

German Chancellor Angela Merkel has been telephoning with President Barack Obama and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, but so far has resisted calls from political opponents in Berlin to return and take charge.

Dutch Finance Minister Jan Kees de Jager in a statement Saturday also expressed confidence in the U.S. economy and praised U.S. efforts to cut spending. "But a quick and thorough implementation of the proposed fiscal reforms is essential," he said.

—Maarten van Taartwijk, Karen Johnson, Santiago Perez, Kosaku Narioka, George Nishiyama and William Horobin contributed to this article.

[admin]

La bolsa de Tel-Aviv tuvo que ser sorprendida debido a la profunda caida.

[admin]

Perry el mas exitoso de los gobernadores del pais y posible candidato presidencial por los republicanos reza para que Dios ilumine a Obama.

---------------------------
Dios no puede iluminar a quien no quiere recibir la luz. I am sorry.

[admin]

Iglesias cristianas desafían el régimen chino

Por BRIAN SPEGELE en Beijing

Sim Chi Yin for The Wall Street Journal

El pastor Jin Mingri preside la iglesia ilegal Zion, de 800 miembros, en Beijing. Los rostros de los feligreses han sido oscurecidos para proteger sus identidades.
.Un domingo reciente en la iglesia Zion, el pastor Jin Mingri planteó una visión para los cristianos en China que difiere mucho de la del gobernante Partido Comunista sobre la religión en general.

"Dejen que sus descendientes se conviertan en grandes políticos como José y Daniel", instó Jin, refiriéndose a las figuras del Antiguo Testamento que se sobrepusieron a desafíos para transformarse en líderes políticos. "Dejen que influyan en el futuro de este país", agregó el pastor en una de sus numerosas prédicas a su iglesia de 800 miembros.

Jin pertenece a un creciente grupo de líderes protestantes que están desafiando el férreo control del gobierno chino sobre la religión, en una lucha cuesta arriba que pasa en gran medida desapercibida para el mundo exterior. Por primera vez, las iglesias ilegales chinas, que se calcula que tienen decenas de millones de integrantes, están realizando un esfuerzo unificado y cada vez más organizado para obtener el reconocimiento legal.

El gobierno, temiendo que la fe en Dios pueda socavar la fe en el partido, está redoblando sus esfuerzos en contra de las iglesias y las redes que las unen.

View Full Image

Sim Chi Yin for The Wall Street Journal

Miembros de la iglesia Shouwang se reúnen en una oficina luego de que el gobierno cerrara su templo en abril.
.La lucha se está transformando en el más tenso enfrentamiento vinculado a la libertad de credo en China desde la brutal represión de los adeptos a la disciplina Falun Gong en 1999, luego de que hicieran pedidos similares de aceptación oficial, dicen expertos.

En abril, las autoridades desalojaron a la Iglesia Shouwang, una de las más populares congregaciones clandestinas de Beijing con alrededor de 1.000 miembros, del local que alquilaba. En respuesta, 17 líderes de iglesias ilegales de todo China realizaron su primer pedido al gobierno —un acto de desafío sin precedentes— buscando una reforma de las leyes del país que regulan la religión. La policía también ha detenido a otros líderes de iglesias, incluyendo a un popular pastor de Jiangsu en julio, quien fue condenado a dos años en un campo de trabajo forzado por organizar reuniones religiosas prohibidas.

"La situación se está saliendo de control", dijo Yang Fengang, director del Centro para la Religión y Sociedad China de la Universidad de Purdue.

Más de una década después de la represión de Falun Gong, lo que está en juego ahora es más importante: una campaña oficial a gran escala en contra de las iglesias cristianas clandestinas podría suponer riesgos no sólo para la resistencia local sino también dañar la posición internacional del gobierno y generar la condena por parte de cristianos de todo el mundo.

En mayo, la Comisión sobre Libertad Religiosa Internacional de Estados Unidos, que depende del gobierno, emitió un informe en el que criticó "el incremento de los esfuerzos de China para destruir iglesias y cerrar puntos de reunión 'ilegales'" de grupos protestantes.

A diferencia de lo que pasó con Falun Gong, que fue suprimido luego de que decenas de miles de sus miembros fueron arrestados y desaparecieron a partir de 1999, el movimiento protestante actual puede resultar más difícil de eliminar. Una amplia red nacional de iglesias clandestinas dispersas por todo el país parece que llegó para quedarse. Apenas Shouwang fue cerrada, por ejemplo, Zion ganó prominencia y Jin se volvió más abierto en sus pronunciamientos. Otros pastores esperan su turno.

Gracias a un poco conocido grupo de seminarios, cada día nacen nuevos líderes religiosos. Solamente en Beijing, alrededor de 20 seminarios 'ilegales', están formando a cientos de estudiantes en cursos que duran dos o tres años, dijo Jin, quien ayuda a organizar las escuelas. Luego de que los estudiantes se gradúan, muchos fundan sus propias iglesias, lo que extiende la red de grupos protestantes clandestinos.

Las tensiones no necesariamente llevarán a un enfrentamiento directo si ambas partes hacen concesiones. El Partido Comunista, que enfrenta una serie de otros problemas sociales urgentes y una transición de liderazgo en el próximo año, podría optar por ignorar por ahora el enfrentamiento.

El gobierno también debe considerar el precedente que crearía si llega a un entendimiento con los protestantes. La preocupación es: "¿qué pasa si los musulmanes u otras organizaciones religiosas piden el mismo tipo de excepción a la normativa vigente?", preguntó Lian Xi, un experto en la historia del cristianismo en China en el Hanover College, en EE.UU. "Es como abrir una represa", dijo.

La Oficina Estatal para Asuntos Religiosos y el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, declinaron declarar para este artículo. La Oficina de Información del Consejo de Estado y la Asamblea Popular Nacional no respondieron a las solicitudes de comentarios.

El punto de vista del gobierno quedó reflejado en un editorial publicado en abril por Global Times, un diario del Estado, luego del cierre de Shouwang. "Una iglesia no debería transformarse en un poder que puede promover cambios radicales. De lo contrario, la iglesia estaría involucrada no en la religión sino en la política, que es algo que no está permitido a una iglesia", decía el editorial.

La tensión con respecto al Cristianismo existe desde hace mucho en China. Hay evidencia de que ya hacia el siglo VII había cultos cristianos allí. Luego de que los comunistas de Mao Zedong tomaran el poder en 1949, el gobierno reconoció cinco religiones: Protestantismo, Catolicismo, Taoísmo, Budismo y el Islam. Pero limitó mucho el culto, destruyó iglesias e hizo que misioneros extranjeros se exiliaran. Durante la Revolución Cultural, que comenzó en 1966, la religión fue prohibida. El culto solamente se autorizó en iglesias conducidas por organismos del gobierno.

La actual ofensiva gubernamental se concentra en los protestantes debido a su rápido crecimiento, el aumento de su organización y de su actitud desafiante, dicen los expertos. Los datos del gobierno indican que en 2010 había en China alrededor de 23 millones de protestantes. Pero algunos académicos creen que su número oscila entre 30 y 60 millones. En comparación, el oficialmente ateo Partido Comunista dice tener 80 millones de integrantes.

En enero, la oficina gubernamental para Asuntos Religiosos estableció sus objetivos para este año y declaró que el gobierno debe conducir "a aquellos creyentes que concurren a lugares establecidos en privado a actividades registradas y abiertas".

Luego de que la policía cerrara la iglesia de Shouwang, sus feligreses trataron de realizar servicios al aire libre cada domingo, pero fueron dispersados por la policía. Algunos fueron confinados a sus casas en tanto que otros fueron expulsados a sus localidades de origen en las provincias.

"La religión y la política están estrechamente ligadas. Llevamos nuestra petición (pidiendo más libertad religiosa) a la Asamblea Popular Nacional, no como personas que nos identificamos como cristianos, sino como ciudadanos que pedimos nuestros derechos. Por supuesto, esto es una acción política", dice Jin. Aún no obtienen una respuesta.

Hasta ahora, Jin puede seguir predicando, aunque es visitado por agentes de seguridad. El pastor asegura que no tiene planes de dejar de hacerlo.