por admin » Lun Sep 12, 2011 8:51 pm
El problema con los bancos Franceses.
Un ejecutivo de Bank Paribas da conocer sus preocupaciones
"Ya no nos podemos prestar dolares. Los fondos de money market de US ya no quieren prestarnos" dijo un ejecutivo de BNP Paribas, quien no quizo dar su nombre, y como no conseguimos dolares estamos creando un mercado de euros. Es la primera vez que se hace ....ojala funcione, de otra manera el espiral a la baja sera infernal. Nadie nos tendra confianza y nadie nos prestara fondos nunca mas.
El no es el unico preocupado. Los tres bancos mas grandes de Francia han sido sujetos a campanias acerca de su solvencia desde principios del verano y Societe Generale ha perdido 22.5% de su valor.
BNP, Societe Generales y Credit Agricole tienen $57 billones de deuda soberana Griega y deuda privada, versus $34 billones por parte de la banca Alemana y $14 billones de los bancos Ingleses. Ademas la banca Francesa tiene mas de 140 billones de deuda de Espania y 400 billones de deuda Italiana (hasta el mes de Diciembre) Si uno de estos dos gobierno colapsa, la banca Francesa se ira con ellos y tambien el sistema financiero Frances.
(Que horror:) Miren a la banca Francesa versus la banca Americana, el total de la deuda de lso tres bancos mas grandes en US BAC, JPM y C es de $5.86 trillones o 39% del PBI, mientras la deuda de BNP, Credti Agricole y societe Generale es 4.7 trillones de euros o 250% del PBI de toda Francia.
Analistas sugieren que el gobierno va a nacionalizar la banca Francesa. Los bancos estan mudos y el gobierno lo niega. Pero la ultima vez que el gobierno Frances intervino en el sistema finaciera lo hizo de manera muy grande y los resultados fueron un desastre. En 1980 la mayoria de los bancos Franceses eran del estado, y para los 90s el sector estaba bordeando la bancarrota. El sistema bancario se redujo en 50% durante una decada, mientras los de Ingalterra y US crecieron 39% y 50% respectivamente.
El mas famoso caso fue el de Credit Lyonnais, el cual tuvo una plaga de mal manejo en los 80s y 90s hasta que se nacionalizo con otro nombre, el Consortiom de Realisation. En el 2003 Credito Lyonnais fue absorvido por Credit Agricole, pero en Julio del 2008 sus facturas tenian que pagarse.
Una corte de arbitracion ordeno al Consortium de Realisation pa pagar 240 millones de euros a los liquidadores de Bernard Tapie grupo, junto con los 105 millones de euros e interes de 45 millones de euros en danios morales - un total de 395 millones. Mientras tanto el Western Bank Corporation, subsidiaria de Credit Lyonnais, le presto una suma importante la familia Tapie. Los contribuyentes Franceses ha pagado mas de 15 billones de euros por el mal manejo de Creti Lyonnais a traves de los anios.
Los contrbuyentes asumieron las perdidas de Credit Foncier de 2 billones de euros. Y el Herbert bank, ahora llamado HSBC group) anuncio sus primeras perdidas en su historia despues de la nacionalizacion de 1982.
Este y otros desastres fueron provocadps por las nacionalizaciones de los 80s. Pero las subsecuentes privatizaciones, la banca Francesa sigue dominado por los alumnos de la famosa ENA Ecole Nationale d"Administration, y por los oficiales de que han trabajado en el Ministerio de Finanzas. Un estudio conducido por Management Institute de la Universite de La Rochelle encontro que entre 1995 y 2004 los bancos administrados por el gobierno tenian una deuda mas grande que los privados.
Asi el mercado vea realizados sus peores temores o no, la banca Francesa ciertamente mantiene una relacion todavia muy estrecha con el estado. Este opaco sistema no ofrece mucha transparencia a los observadores, mientras los bancos y el estado continuen encubriendose el uno al otro, sin importarle el costo para los contribuyentes. Si los fondos de money market de US ya no le tienen confianza a los bancos Franceses, es por que tienen buenas razones. La manera mas rapida de ganarse la confianza neuvaemnte es eliminar ese sistema.
Mr. Lecaussin is director of development at France's Institute for Economic and Fiscal Research.
The Trouble With French Banks
A Bank Paribas executive makes his concerns known
By NICOLAS LECAUSSIN
'We can no longer borrow dollars. U.S. money-market funds are not lending to us anymore," a bank executive for BNP Paribas, who declines to be named, told me last week. "Since we don't have access to dollars anymore, we're creating a market in euros. This is a first. . . . We hope it will work, otherwise the downward spiral will be hell. We will no longer be trusted at all and no one will lend to us anymore."
He's not the only one worried. France's three biggest banks have been the subject of whisper campaigns about their solvency since the beginning of the summer, and Société Générale has lost 22.5% of its value.
BNP, Société Générale and Crédit Agricole together hold nearly $57 billion in Greek sovereign and private debt, versus $34 billion held by the largest German banks and $14 billion at British banks. French banks also held more than €140 billion in total Spanish debt and almost €400 billion in Italian debt as of December, according to the latest figures from the Bank for International Settlements. If either of these latter two governments were to default, their banking systems could collapse and take the French system with them.
BNP, Société Générale and Credit Agricole all say that their finances are in order and the market worries are unfounded. But it's difficult for the BNP executive to hide his concern.
"Look at the French banks' debt holdings versus those of U.S. banks," he continues. "The total debt of the three big U.S. banks (Bank of America, JP Morgan and Citigroup) is $5.86 trillion, or 39% of GDP, while the debts of BNP, Crédit Agricole and Société Générale come to €4.7 trillion, or 250% of French GDP."
Analysts are suggesting that the government is set to start nationalizing France's banks. The banks have remained silent on the matter, and the government denies this talk. But the last time the French state intervened in the banking system in a big way, the results were disastrous. As recently as the 1980s, most French banks were owned by the state, and by the 1990s the sector was bordering on bankruptcy. The French banking sector shrank by nearly 50% during the decade, while the those in other countries such as Britain and the U.S. grew by 39% and 50%, respectively.
The most famous case of that time was Crédit Lyonnais, which was plagued by mismanagement throughout the 1980s and 1990s until it shifted its debts and liabilities into a new state-owned company, the Consortium de Réalisation. In 2003 Crédit Lyonnais was taken over by Crédit Agricole, but in July 2008 its bills came due anyway.
An arbitration court ordered the Consortium de Réalisation to pay €240 million to the liquidators of the Bernard Tapie group, along with €105 million in interest and €45 million in moral damages—a total of €395 million for one erstwhile borrower. Meanwhile, the SdBO (Western Bank Corporation), a subsidiary of Crédit Lyonnais, lent sums to the Tapie family that added up to more than two-and-a-half times the bank's total capital. French taxpayers paid out more than €15 billion for the mismanagement of Crédit Lyonnais over the years.
The taxpayer-backed losses of mortgage lender Crédit Foncier came to €2 billion. And the Hervet bank (now part of the HSBC group) announced the first losses in its history after its 1982 nationalization.
These and other disasters were brought on by the bank nationalizations of the early 1980s. But despite the subsequent privatizations, French bank boards are still dominated by the alumni of France's famous ENA, the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, and by officials who have worked at the Ministry of Finance. A study by the Management Institute at the Université de La Rochelle finds that between 1995 and 2004 banks administered by government-linked technocrats were in greater total debt than those that were not.
Whether the market's worst fears are realized or not, French banks certainly maintain an all-too-close relationship to the state. This opaque system doesn't offer outsiders much visibility, save for the knowledge that indebted banks and an indebted French state intend to continue to cover each other, no matter the cost and on taxpayers' backs if they must. If U.S. money-market managers no longer trust the French system, this is a glaring reason why. The fastest way to regain their trust would be to end this system.
Mr. Lecaussin is director of development at France's Institute for Economic and Fiscal Research.