por admin » Jue Mar 01, 2012 1:56 pm
Prestar atencion al rally de los bonos Espanoles e Italianos
El dinero facil del ECB solo ha enmascarado un problema mas profundo del sur de Europa
Mientras la tragedia Griega continua, Europa entra en recesion nuevamente y decide sobre el tamano del fondo de rescate. Espana e Italia estan encontrando facilmente inversionistas dispuestos a comprar su deuda. En un inesperado cambio de eventos, Italia, el foco de atencion de la ansiedad de los inversionistas por sus yileds cerca al 7% a principios del 2012, ha pagado un mas manejable 5.5% en su deuda de 10 anios esta semana.
Mientras tanto, Espana ya ha vendido deuda tres veces este anio. Es que Madrid y Roma finalmente han encontrado los remedios para la crisis de su deuda?
El rally en el mercado de bonos no tiene nada que ver con lo que acontece en Europa. Mas tiene que ver con las acciones del ECB. El provisionar de dinero barato, prestamos ilimitados de 3 anios a la banca esta matando dos pajaron con un solo tiro. La deuda de la banca se esta refinanciando a si misma utilizando prestamos para extender la madurez de sus deudas. Se ha contenido la amenaza del colapso desordenado y sistemico de las instituciones mas importantes.
El LTRO o operaciones de financiamiento a largo plazo tambien ha hecho que el carry trade de algunos de los fondos restantes sean puestos en deuda de gobierno con intereses mas altos. Los bancos Espanoles e Italianos, entre los que mas estan usando el LTRO, han incrementado sus tenencias en 23 billones y 21 billones de euros respectivamente. Esto ha ayudado a bajar los yields de los valores del gobierno a corto plazo.
El rally no va a continuar.
Todo esto ha sido provocado por la excesiva liquidez. Sin embargo despues del segundo anuncio del ECB el costo de la deuda de Portugal se disparo debido al presistente temor de que seran forzados a caer en el default de su deuda.
La salida de Grecia de la zona euro, lo cual es mas y mas posible, la desconfianza de Alemania se sigue incrementando con respecto a Grecia y permance como un riesgo significativo para las otras economias periferales. Es dudoso que los mercados y por ejemplo el ministro de Fiannzas de Alemania Wolfgan Schauble podrian estar tan tranquilos acerca de los predicamentos de Grecia en la ausencia de los efectos calmantes del LTRO.
Aun mas alarmante es el creciente descontento entre el sentimiento y los fundamentos. La liquidez esta haciendo bajar al riesgo pais justo cuando las economias de Espana e Italia se estan deteriorando rapidamente. Aun cuando la Comision Europea, cuyos pronosticos son menos pesimistas que los del IMF, esperan que la produccion pro trimestre de ambos paises se contraeran o permaneceran sin crecimiento en cada trimestre del 2012.
Italia ya ha entrado tecnicamente en recesion. A pesar del surplus fiscal el anio pasado, se ha visto forzada a tomar mas medidas de austeridad que solo van a empeorar la posibilidad de un repunte. Aunque Mario Monti le ha devuelto credibilidad a Italia, el tiene muchos problemas para liberalizar la economia en maneras que la puedan devolver al crecimiento. Aun mas Italia tiene una montana muy alta para trepar en Marzo y Abril.
Espana tiene una deuda de gobierno mas pequena pero en otros aspectos su situacion es peor. Su deficit el anio pasasdo fue de 8.5% del PBI (GDP), en parte por las dificultades que tienen para forzar la disciplina fiscal entre los gobiernos regionales. La deuda del sector privado es una preocupacion aun mas grande. La deuda de los individuos como porcentaje del PBI es dos veces la de Italia, mientras que la deuda de las corporaciones no financieras (en gran parte bienes raices) es dos tercios mas grande. Ahora con dinero disponible y barato en el ECB tienen menos incentivos de limpiar sus balances.
La pregunta es si estos riesgos le importan al mercado de inversionistas. Los yields de ambos paises es del 5% a 10 anios, lo cual indica que podrian salir adelante. Aunque la explicacion es superficial. Son los bancos domesticos los que hanc omprado la deuda Italiana y Espanola.
No hay mucho apetito por parte de los grandes inversionistas internacionales, cuya entrada a ambos mercados es critico para restablecer la confianza. Existe diferencia entre una oportunidad de carry trade y el "verdadero dinero" o demanda por parte de los inversionistas. El rally ha sido logrado por el carry trade.
Los yields de Espana e Italia podrian caer mas. Pero comprar deuda de Italia a 10 anios es una prueba de confianza que muchos inversionistas extranjeros no estan dispuesto a hacer. Ni Espana ni Italia han hecho lo necesario para mejorar los fundamentos de su politica fiscal, y las acciones del ECB solo han enmascarado esos problemas.
OPINION EUROPEMarch 2, 2012
Beware the Spanish and Italian Bond Rally
The ECB's easy money has only masked deeper problems in Southern Europe
By NICHOLAS SPIRO
Southern Europe's bond markets appear to be confounding the skeptics. As the single currency area slides back into recession, Greece teeters on the edge of collapse, and policy makers bicker over the size of the euro zone's so-called firewall, Spain and Italy are finding eager buyers for their debt. In an unexpected turn of events, Italy, the focal point for investor anxiety at the start of 2012 with its benchmark paper yielding close to 7%, paid a more manageable 5.5% at an auction of 10-year debt this week. Meanwhile, Spain has already met a third of its funding needs for this year. Have Madrid and Rome finally hit on the right remedies for their debt crises?
The bond market rally has little to do with developments at home. Rather, it stems almost entirely from the bold actions of the European Central Bank (ECB). Its provision of cheap, unlimited three-year loans to banks is killing two birds with one stone. It has toppled the "maturity wall" of bank debt coming due in the first quarter of this year, as lenders use the easy loans to refinance themselves. The threat of a disorderly collapse of a systemically important institution has been averted.
The ECB's long-term financing operation (LTRO) has also triggered a carry trade as some of the leftover funds are ploughed into higher-yielding government debt. Spanish and Italian banks, among the biggest users of the facility, increased their sovereign bond holdings by €23 billion and €21 billion respectively in January alone, following the first LTRO on Dec. 21. This has helped drive down yields, particularly on shorter dated government paper.
The rally is unlikely to have run its course. An even bigger take-up at this week's second LTRO auction, totaling €530 billion and involving 800 banks, provides a further fillip to risk assets. Sentiment is being turned around dramatically. Having been burned last year for their overinvestment in Italy, many banks and funds have been caught out in the last two months for being underinvested. In terms of spreads, divergence has suddenly given way to convergence.
Yet all of this is being driven by liquidity. It strains credulity that confidence in Europe's ill-managed monetary union has improved sufficiently in the space of just eight weeks to dispel concerns about financial contagion. Indeed just hours after the ECB announced the result of the second LTRO, Portugal's borrowing costs rose sharply because of persistent fears that it will be forced to default on its debt.
Greece's exit from the euro zone, which has become more likely as mistrust between Athens and its German-led creditors has deepened, remains a significant risk for the bloc's other peripheral economies. It is doubtful that the markets—and, for that matter, key policy makers such as German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble—would be as complacent about Greece's dire predicament in the absence of the calming effects of the LTRO.
Even more alarming is the growing disconnect between sentiment and fundamentals. The gush of liquidity is suppressing country-specific risk just when the Spanish and Italian economies are deteriorating rapidly. Even the European Commission, whose forecasts are less pessimistic than those of the International Monetary Fund, expects output on a quarterly basis in both countries to contract or remain flat in each quarter of 2012.
Italy has just entered a technical recession. Despite posting a primary fiscal surplus last year, it is being forced to undertake more aggressive austerity measures which will only deepen the downturn. Although Mario Monti, Italy's new prime minister, has restored the country's credibility, he is struggling to liberalize the economy in the ways necessary for growth to return. What is more, Italy still has a funding mountain to climb, with a hump in March and April.
Spain has a smaller government-debt burden but in other ways is in worse shape. Its budget deficit last year was 8.5% of GDP, partly because of difficulties in enforcing fiscal discipline among regional governments. Private-sector indebtedness is an even bigger concern. Household debt as a share of GDP is nearly twice that in Italy, while non-financial corporate debt (a large chunk of it property-related) is two-thirds higher. By borrowing cheaply from the ECB, Spain's banks now have less incentive to clean up their balance sheets.
The question is whether these risks matter to bond investors. The yield on Italian 10-year debt is now trading just below 5%, pretty much on par with its Spanish equivalent. This would suggest that the markets are confident that Spain and Italy have turned a corner. Yet this is a superficial explanation. It has been mostly domestic banks that have been purchasing Spanish and Italian bonds of late, and mainly at the shorter end of the yield curve.
There is much less appetite from big international investors, whose re-entry into the Spanish and Italian bond markets is critical for auctions of longer dated paper that provide a more accurate gauge of confidence. There is a difference between opportunistic carry trades and "real money" demand. It is the former that has fuelled the rally.
Spanish and Italian borrowing costs could fall further. But buying 10-year Italian bonds is a leap of faith that not many foreign investors have so far been willing to make. Neither Italy nor Spain have done nearly enough to improve their fiscal and economic fundamentals, and the ECB's move has only masked these problems.
Mr. Spiro is managing director of Spiro Sovereign Strategy, based in London