por Fenix » Lun Mar 23, 2015 8:06 pm
Fund Managers Use Machines, "Smart" Beta To Dupe Dumb Retail Investors
Tyler D.
03/16/2015
Active fund managers have figured out a way to combat the rather inconvenient fact that beating a passively managed index fund over time turns out to be exceptionally difficult, especially net of fees: build an algorithm that replicates your investment strategy, press “go”, then tell investors you’re indexing. This is called “smart beta” in the industry and, like any sophisticated-sounding strategy, it’s luring retail investors and bringing in billions. Here’s Bloomberg:
Few people have profited more from the so-called smart-beta craze than Tom Dorsey. A new exchange-traded fund that he runs using a century-old charting methods took in $1.2 billion last year. Then, in January, he sold his 22-person investment firm, Dorsey, Wright & Associates, to Nasdaq OMX Group for $225 million.
Dorsey calls himself a money manager, Bloomberg Markets will report in its April issue, but his methods are more robot designer. He says so himself, proudly. If Dorsey and his team got abducted from their Richmond, Virginia, office by aliens, their algorithms could keep picking investments for the firm’s new money magnet, the First Trust Dorsey Wright Focus 5 ETF, forever.
“Once a quarter, we press a button,’’ Dorsey says. The Focus 5 algorithm then generates a list of investments, and First Trust Portfolios, his partner company, executes them. Otherwise, they don’t meddle with the robot. “We just need someone to press the button.’’
It’s index investing with key twists, all of them rules-based, with no active management required. Most smart-beta funds track custom indexes. Some are simple variants of the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index and do what they say on the box. Others are hand-crafted and small batch, made by people with little more than a stock-filtering system and a dream.
So it’s index investing, only the index isn’t really an index, it’s a list of stocks generated by a machine and the machine is programmed to do what the fund manager would do if the fund manager were disciplined enough to follow his or her own advice all of the time. In other words, it’s not indexing at all — paradoxically, it’s active management on autopilot and advocates of traditional indexing think it’s nonsense. Here’s Jack Bogle via Bloomberg:
“Don’t mention smart beta in this office!’’
“I don’t even know what it means. Baloney. Marketing!’’
What it means is that fund managers can make a really compelling pitch to investors: “It’s the best of both worlds. These ETFs are smarter than ‘dumb’ traditional index funds, but they’re still passively managed.” While some of these funds follow what might be considered “plain vanilla” strategies (which makes you wonder why you wouldn’t just buy a traditional index fund), others try to be a bit “smarter” by shorting and (of course) employing leverage. As it turns out, some aren’t very smart at all:
Rick Ferri, founder of Portfolio Solutions in Troy, Michigan, says smart beta is a ploy for active managers to retake some of the billions lost to Bogle and his low-cost indexes. If an active manager has an investment strategy that shows positive returns over the past decade or so, and it can be encoded in an algorithm, he can call himself an indexer, charge higher fees for his secret sauce, and kick back and get rich, Ferri says. “Everything that used to be active management became fundamental indexing,’’ he says.
The Janus Velocity Tail Risk Hedged Large Cap ETF has many of the things that smart-beta critics such as Ferri love to hate. Started in June 2013, the fund returned 6.8 percent in 2014, compared with 13.7 percent for the S&P 500, even though it invests in S&P 500–tracking ETFs. It underperformed because it paid for derivatives that protected it from tail risk—the slim chance that something would go really wrong. That insurance lowered its risk, certainly, but the fund captured just 50 percent of the index’s return, after expenses. Those totaled 0.71 percent, or $71 on each $10,000, compared with 0.39 percent, or $39 per $10,000, for Arnott’s PowerShares FTSE RAFI. “They’re making really good juice on this,’’ Ferri says.
Better still, some of the funds barely trade, which means if the automaton that’s automatically buying and selling based on some strategy the manager dreamed up two decades ago won’t quit producing loses, it may be difficult for you to pry your money from its robotic hands:
Velocity Tail Risk doesn’t trade much either. Some days fewer than 1,000 shares change hands, making it harder for sellers to find buyers. Last year, the average difference between an offer to buy and an offer to sell was 0.31 percent, or 62 times the average spread in the SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust, which closely tracks the index.
Much to the chagrin of the Jack Bogles of the world, smart beta funds look set to become increasingly pervasive. As Bloomberg notes, they now account for nearly 20% of the entire market for US-listed ETFs which means some $200 billion is now trading on autopilot, chasing who knows what based on a mishmash of esoteric strategies created by active managers who by virtue of their inability to outperform the dumbest strategy of all (simply buying an index), were driven nearly to extinction — and there’s limited liquidity. What could go wrong?
ICE Futures Broke Law "Thousands" Of Times In 20 Months, CFTC Fines Exchange 0.75% Of 2015 Revenues
Tyler D.
03/16/2015
From October 2012 to May 2014, the CFTC found that ICE Futures exchange submitted reports and data containing errors and omissions on every reporting day, with cumulative inaccuracies totaling in the thousands. The CFTC stated unequivocally that, those "who fail to meet their reporting obligations will be held accountable," and required ICE to pay a $3 million civil monetary penalty. With expectations of over $4 billion in revenues for FY 2015, the $3 million fine represents just 0.75% of the exchange's income... that will teach them!!!
Full CFTC Statement:
CFTC Orders ICE Futures U.S., Inc. to Pay a $3 Million Civil Monetary Penalty for Recurring Data Reporting Violations
The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today issued an Order filing and simultaneously settling charges against ICE Futures U.S., Inc. (ICE), a designated contract market (DCM), for submitting inaccurate and incomplete reports and data to the CFTC over at least a 20-month period, from at least October 2012 through at least May 2014.
According to the CFTC Order, on every reporting day during the period above, ICE submitted reports and data containing errors and omissions, with cumulative inaccuracies totaling in the thousands. The Order further finds that CFTC staff repeatedly notified ICE of the problems with its reports and data and requested that ICE take action to correct the mistakes, but that ICE continued to submit inaccurate reports and data. The Order requires ICE to pay a $3 million civil monetary penalty and to comply with undertakings aimed at improving its regulatory reporting.
CFTC Director of Enforcement Aitan Goelman commented: “The CFTC cannot carry out its vital mission of protecting market participants and ensuring market integrity without correct and complete reporting by registrants, including DCMs. Today’s action makes clear that registrants who fail to meet their reporting obligations will be held accountable and that the CFTC takes a particularly dim view of reporting violations that continue over many months, especially after CFTC staff has repeatedly alerted the registrant in question to the problems in its reporting.”
Pursuant to Part 16 of the CFTC Regulations, a DCM is required to submit certain trading and market-related reports and data to the CFTC. In particular, a DCM is required to submit, for each business day, clearing member reports showing certain information for each future or option contract, including, among other things, the quantity of contracts currently open, the quantity of contracts bought and sold throughout the day, and the quantity of delivery notices. A DCM is also required to provide the CFTC with permanent record data relating to trading volume, open contracts, prices, and certain critical dates, and transaction-level trade data and related order information for each futures or options contract.
The Order specifically finds that, beginning in at least October 2012, CFTC staff notified ICE about its data and reporting errors, which included incorrect clearing member reports, permanent record data, and transaction-level trade data. ICE responded that these errors resulted primarily from technology upgrades and data migration projects, and while they affected data provided to the CFTC, they did not affect data published by ICE on its website. ICE further assured CFTC staff that its data-reporting problems would be fixed with the conversion to a new data-reporting format. CFTC staff informed ICE that continuing to report faulty data in the interim was unacceptable. Nevertheless, ICE continued to submit inaccurate and incomplete reports.
Further, ICE did not respond in a timely and satisfactory manner to inquiries from CFTC staff from multiple divisions about these data-reporting issues, including initial inquiries from the Division of Enforcement. Eventually, ICE did cooperate fully with the investigation and took effective corrective actions to address its reporting deficiencies. The CFTC has taken that cooperation and those actions into account in settling this matter.
In addition to imposing the $3 million civil monetary penalty, the CFTC ordered ICE to comply with undertakings to improve its regulatory reporting. For instance, ICE must create and maintain a new senior position of Chief Data Officer, who will have direct responsibility for systems and procedures relating to regulatory reporting, and ICE must hire and maintain at least three additional quality assurance staff who will be dedicated to regulatory reporting. ICE also must undertake certain data-reconciliation efforts, including reviewing certain prior data submissions to the CFTC to identify further violations of the charged CFTC Regulations and, beginning 120 days from the date of the Order, endeavoring to reconcile data provided to the CFTC with data published on its website, as well as with other data existing within ICE’s systems and its clearing providers’ systems. Additionally, ICE must correct any errors or omissions in data provided to the CFTC pursuant to Part 16 of the CFTC Regulations within one week of discovery or notification of the errors or omissions, or, in the event such corrections will take more than a week’s time, reporting to the CFTC why additional time will be necessary.
The CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members responsible for this matter are Margaret Aisenbrey, Allison Sizemore, Jeff Le Riche, and Charles Marvine, with assistance from the CFTC Division of Market Oversight staff Kelly Beck, Matthew Hunter, Harry Hild, and Anthony Saldukas and the CFTC Office of Data and Technology staff Regina Sanders, Margie Sweet, Rene Garcia, and Ed Wehner.
And don't do it again...